THE NATIONAL INTEREST

A Letter from Wales
Owen Harries

Living With Russia
Zbigniew Brzezinski

The Lessons of German Unification
Robert Zoellick

The Gap
How Soldiers and Civilians Misunderstand Each Other
Eliot Cohen *Peter Feaver* *Richard Kohn*

Talking Turkey
Norman Stone *Graham Fuller*

The French Position
Philip Gordon *Daniel Mahoney*

Harper on *Hamilton*

McInnes on *Oakeshott*

Bacevich on *Kosovo*

Essays & Comments:

John Diggins, Adam Garfinkle, Allen Hertzke & Daniel Philpott, Daniel Johnson, Conrad Black, Anders Åslund, Marshall Goldman, Janine Wedel

Number 61 • Fall 2000 • $7.00

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Nothing like it."

—A. M. Rosenthal



Commentary

Sound thinking for the 21st century.

$45.00 for 11 issues • Subscribe today! • $79.00 for 22 issues

Call 1 800 829-6270

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

PUBLISHER
Irving Kristol

CHAIRMAN OF THE ADVISORY BOARD
Conrad Black

ADVISORY BOARD
Eliot A. Cohen
Midge Decter
Martin Feldstein
Francis Fukuyama
Samuel P. Huntington
Josef Joffe
Chalmers Johnson
H.J. Kaplan
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Henry A. Kissinger
Charles Krauthammer
Daniel Pipes
Paul D. Wolfowitz

CONTRIBUTING EDITOR
Robert W. Tucker

EDITOR
Owen Harries

EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Lawrence F. Kaplan

MANAGING EDITOR
Michelle Brawer

ASSISTANT MANAGING EDITOR
Daniel T. Kennelly

ASSISTANT EDITOR
Brendan G. Conway

EDITORIAL OFFICE
1112 Sixteenth Street NW, Suite 540, Washington, DC 20036
Telephone (202) 467-4884 Fax (202) 467-0006
Web site: www.nationalinterest.org Email: tni@pop.dn.net

SUBSCRIPTION OFFICE
$26 for one year, $44 for two years, $59 for three years.
Outside the U.S. and Canada, please add $10 annually.
Postmaster and subscribers: please send address changes and subscription orders to:
The National Interest, P.O. Box 622, Shrub Oak, NY 10588-0622, or call (914) 962-6297
or (800) 893-8944. All other inquiries should be directed to the editorial office.

The National Interest (ISSN 0884-9382) is published quarterly in Spring, Summer, Fall and Winter issues by National Affairs, Inc. Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in P.A.I.S., Historical Abstracts, International Political Science Abstracts, U.S. Political Science Documents, Political Science Abstracts, and America: History and Life; and available on microfilm from University Microfilms International. Periodicals postage is paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices. © 2000 by National Affairs, Inc. *The National Interest* is printed by Kirby Lithographic Co., Inc. It is distributed in the U.S. and Canada by Ingram Periodicals (1240 Heil Quaker Blvd., La Vergne, TN 37086-7000, 615-793-5522) and Bernhard DeBoer (113 East Centre Street, Nutley, NJ 07110, 973-667-9300) and in the U.K. by Comag Special Services (Tavistock Road, West Drayton, Middlesex UB7 7QX, 44-1895-444055).

BPA International Membership Applied for December 1999.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NATIONAL INTEREST NUMBER 61, FALL 2000

Articles

5 **Living With Russia** *by Zbigniew Brzezinski*
When dealing with a sick bear, coddling will not suffice. Before it can be fully accepted by the West, Russia must give up its imperial pretensions.

17 **Two Plus Four** *by Robert B. Zoellick*
Ten years after the event, a key architect of America's response to German reunification looks back—and draws lessons for the present.

29 **The Gap** *by Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn*
The directors of an ambitious project on civil-military relations detail their findings and plumb the divide between soldiers and civilians.

38 **Why the Gap Matters** *by Eliot A. Cohen*
Bridging the gap between military officers and their civilian superiors will be no easy task. Yet the stakes are too high to contemplate failure.

49 **Mentor for a Hegemon** *by John L. Harper*
Hamilton's legacy is all around us. So why has his wisdom—particularly as concerns foreign affairs—been discounted?

57 **The French Position** *by Philip H. Gordon*
The French, believe it or not, have their reasons for being so quarrelsome with the United States.

66 **Talking Turkey** *by Norman Stone*
Europe has long viewed Turkey as a parent would a troubled stepchild. But a vibrant and increasingly powerful Turkey is making such an attitude absurd—and dangerous.

74 **Defending the Faiths** *by Allen D. Hertzke and Daniel Philpott*
Global religious persecution increased during the 1990s, but not as rapidly as America's awareness of it. The proper place of religious freedom in the hierarchy of U.S. foreign policy concerns.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

82 **A Skeptical Conservative** *by Neil McInnes*
Rationalism and politics is a combustible mixture. We know this from history. Oakeshott knew it all along.

90 **The Forgotten Few** *by Daniel Johnson*
The sixtieth anniversary of a seminal event passes unnoticed. A reminder of what was achieved during the Battle of Britain.

Books

94 **Banal and Dubious** *by Andrew J. Bacevich*
Pedestrian books can sometimes serve salutary purposes.

98 **Atatürk—and After** *by Graham E. Fuller*
The definitive portrait—and vindication—of Turkey's founding father.

102 **The Stiletto Idealist** *by Adam Garfinkle*
An exaggerated indictment of Israel's home-grown critics.

107 **The Many Faces of Mitterrand** *by Daniel J. Mahoney*
Vichy functionary, socialist politician, conservative president—the story of an amazingly adaptable Frenchman.

111 **Good Intentions** *by John Patrick Diggins*
Yes, the road to hell is often paved with good intentions.

Correspondence

117 Marshall Goldman, Anders Åslund, James Brock, Donald Jensen, Johnathan Sunley, Conrad Black, Michael Roskin, Daniel Landau, Stephen Gooch, William Jackson, Herbert May, Sidney Helfant, Peter Herz

Quarterly

127 **A Letter from Wales** *by Owen Harries*
The economy is fine, but really everything else in Britain is falling apart—and the English still can't understand the Welsh.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the weekly Standard

"*The Standard* is required reading up here. You have to see it to be part of the conversation."
- John Kasich, House Budget Committee Chairman

"...The most intelligent, aggressive and well-written publication out there."
- *National Journal*



Save 50% Off Our Regular Subscription Rate!

The Weekly Standard is the nation's foremost journal of conservative politics and opinion. For a limited time, readers of *The National Interest* can save 50% off our regular subscription rate of $78 - that's $39 for an entire year of insightful, incisive news and commentary from Bill Kristol, Fred Barnes, David Brooks, Tucker Carlson, Christopher Caldwell, Andy Ferguson, David Frum, Robert Kagan, Charles Krauthammer, P.J. O'Rourke, David Tell and many others. Don't miss another issue of America's best political journal. Subscribe to *The Weekly Standard* today!

To order, call toll-free 1-800-283-2014, ext. 4861
or return the reader response form below.

Special to readers of THE NATIONAL INTEREST: *50% OFF* our regular $78.00 subscription rate - that's $39 for an entire year.
YES! Please rush me my first issue of *The Weekly Standard*!

❑ Please bill me ❑ Payment enclosed

Send to: The Weekly Standard, P.O. Box 96110, Washington, DC 20078-7769

Name _____

Address _____

City _____

State _____ **Zip** _____

The Weekly Standard is published 48 times annually. Please allow 3-5 weeks for delivery of first issue.
Cover price is $3.50. Rates good only in U.S.A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Living With Russia

Zbigniew Brzezinski

THE PROGRESSIVE inclusion of Russia in the expanding transatlantic community is the necessary component of any long-term U.S. strategy to consolidate stability on the Eurasian mega-continent. The pursuit of that goal will require patience and strategic persistence. There are no shortcuts on the way. Geostrategic conditions must be created that convince the Russians that it is in Russia's own best interest to become a truly democratic and European post-imperial nation-state—a state closely engaged to the transatlantic community.

Of the major Eurasian entities (the European Union, Russia, China and Japan), only Europe and Japan can be said to recognize fully their fundamental stake in international stability. The case is somewhat more ambiguous with respect to China and Russia, which still favor more or less drastic alterations in the distribution of global power. But both are also cognizant of their limitations and aware of their interest in cooperating with the West. China is so inclined largely because it is an ongoing economic success; Russia because it is not. China thrives on foreign investment; Russia fears potential threats from its immediate south and east, and senses the diminished utility of its nuclear forces. China is self-confident; Russia is self-conscious.

Hence, both Russia and China may be susceptible to a strategy aimed at their inclusion in cooperative international structures. To that end, two Eurasian power triangles must be steadily managed and, over time, more directly connected: one involving the United States, the European Union and Russia; and the other involving the United States, Japan and China.[1] For that linkage to be effective, the constructive engagement of Russia is essential.

To be sure, neither America nor, even less, Europe can by itself seduce or transform Russia. Russia's epiphany must come from within, much as was the case earlier in the twentieth century with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the modern Turkish state. But both America and Europe can help create not only a congenial but a compelling context for desirable change. And for that reason, despite justifiable short-term pessimism regarding the outlook of Russia's current political leadership, there is a reasonable basis for longer term optimism.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to the president, is author of *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (Basic Books, 1997). This is the last in a series of three articles on U.S. foreign policy by the author.

[1]See my "Living With China" and "Living With a New Europe" in *The National Interest*'s Spring 2000 and Summer 2000 issues, respectively.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I. The Historical Setting

THE EMERGENCE OF a democratic, Europe-oriented, post-imperial and national Russian state would provide historically relevant and strategically stabilizing answers to the two questions that haunt politically-minded Russians today: what is Russia, and where is Russia? These questions are being posed in an environment bordering on social catastrophe and in a context of geopolitical vulnerability.

One cannot underestimate the cumulative damage inflicted on the Russian people by seventy years of communism. Russia's current condition should not be judged by the superficial glitter of Moscow or St. Petersburg, the primary beneficiaries of Western financial inflows, or by occasional ups and downs in Russian growth rates. The painful reality is that the communist experiment has bequeathed to the Russian people a ruined agriculture, a retarded and in many places primitive social infrastructure, a backward economy increasingly facing the risk of progressive de-industrialization, a devastated environment, and a demographically threatened population.

To measure precisely the cumulative effects of that legacy is impossible. They are both massive and enduring. Russia's current crisis coincides with the collapse of the five hundred year-old Russian Empire, which had expanded in the Soviet era into an even larger communist empire. The domestic crisis threatens the well-being of the Russian people; the imperial collapse, while posing a potential geopolitical challenge, confuses, tempts and frustrates the country's political elite—an elite that for decades was not only doctrinally stupefied, but at times also lethally purged.[2] That elite grew accustomed to the privileges and satisfactions of Russia's global status, a status for which today there is no solid foundation.

The last ten years have compounded rather than resolved these challenges. Russia's relative openness has made the Russian people quite aware of the truly enormous gap separating their condition from that of their West European neighbors. The increasingly widespread awareness that a densely populated China next door is also doing incomparably better is an additional source of anxiety. Finally, for a state long accustomed to thinking of itself as America's principal rival, it is galling to contemplate the fact that Russia's GDP, measured in terms of purchasing power parity, is only about one-tenth of America's, roughly half of India's, and somewhat less than Brazil's.

It must also be troubling for informed Russians to learn that last year China benefited from more than $43 billion in direct foreign investment (bringing the 1992–99 total to about $350 billion)—and that the much smaller post-communist Poland was the beneficiary in 1999 alone of $8 billion in such investment—while only $2–3 billion was directly invested from abroad in Russia during the same period (making for a meager total of $11.7 billion over 1992–99). Flagging foreign investment derives in part from Russia's poor international economic image. In the 1999 Global Competitiveness Report, Russia was ranked last among the 59 countries surveyed (China was 32, Zimbabwe 57, and Ukraine 58). In a comparative assess-

[2]Few in the West fully appreciate the scope of Stalin's purge of the social elite. In one chilling example from the Soviet archives, the NKVD's Moscow headquarters set quotas for the number of people to be immediately arrested and shot. That quota for Moscow in the fall of 1937 was 5,000; for Leningrad 4,000; for Vladivostok 2,000; for Sverdlovsk 4,000, etc. Subsequently, some of the NKVD regional offices submitted appeals, requesting *increases* in their quotas!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment of corruption in 99 states, Russia was placed at 82 (behind Armenia).

It is telling that there have been no major domestically funded investments in Russia over the last ten years. By 1997 overall capital investment in the production sector had fallen to about 17 percent of the 1990 level, and only lately has risen slightly. Moreover, it has been estimated that it would take roughly $25 trillion over the next 25 years to renew Russia's industrial infrastructure, which, on average, is three times older than that of the OECD countries. Indeed, even with sustained economic recovery proceeding at an annual rate of 5 percent, Russia would still account for only about 2 percent of the world's GDP by 2015. By contrast, the United States and the EU together will account for approximately 45–50 percent, and Japan and China combined for probably another 25 percent or so. The qualitative gaps in technological innovation and economic competitiveness between Russia and its western neighbors may be wider still.

The social picture is even bleaker. Some 70 million Russians live in urban areas affected by levels of pollution that exceed U.S. maximum contamination levels by a factor of five or more. About 75 percent of Russia's consumed water supply is polluted by U.S. standards. Russia's health system, long a source of pride, is malfunctioning, with many hospitals (especially in non-urbanized areas) lacking hot water and unable to meet even minimal hygienic standards. Some 100,000 cases of tuberculosis have been registered, and only about 40 percent of all recent births have resulted in fully healthy babies. According to one study, some 20 percent of Russian first graders have been diagnosed with some form of mental retardation. Male life expectancy has declined from approximately 64 years in 1990 to about 59 years in 1999 (alternative data suggests the figure might be about 61 years, still very low by Western standards). *The World Health Report 2000* on national health systems ranked Russia's at 130, barely ahead of Sudan's.

Indeed, Russia's population has dropped from 151 million in 1990 to about 146 million in 1999—with annual deaths in recent years exceeding births by slightly more than 50 percent (about 2 million deaths and 1.3 million births per annum). While economic recovery and an improvement in public health programs could eventually slow the steep population decline, some demographic studies anticipate that Russia's population could dip below 135 million by the year 2025. Then, too, many Russians are moving out of the exposed northern and far eastern extremities of Russia to the more secure central region west of the Urals, thereby reversing long-standing efforts to settle the sparsely populated northern and eastern peripheries.

Russia, then, is confronted by a menacing combination of demography and geography. Its far eastern neighbor, China, not only has a population of some 1.2 billion, but an economy that in GDP terms is already four times larger than Russia's. It is also no source of geopolitical reassurance for Russia that Japan's economy is about five times larger than its own; and that to the west an expanding European Union is taking shape, with an economy already approximately ten times the size of Russia's and a population of some 375 million. Moreover, the much more prosperous Europe is allied to the United States, which has a population twice that of Russia and a GDP more than ten times as large.

To the south prospects are, if anything, even more ominous. That area is currently organized into nine states inhabited almost exclusively by Muslims. Their combined population totals about 295 million, not counting the population of the Europe-oriented Turkey, which is about 65 million. An additional 20 million Muslims currently live within Russia's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

borders. At current birth rates, by the year 2025 the Islamic population living immediately to the south of Russia could number as high as 450 million (not counting the projected 85 million Turks).

It is probable that most of the neighboring Muslim countries will be economically weak, enhancing the likelihood that they will also be politically volatile. Their populations—composed in the main of the younger generation, which is restless, increasingly nationally self-conscious and more intensely Islamic in self-definition—could prove quite susceptible to extremist appeals. Unless handled with great skill and genuine moderation by their formerly imperial neighbor, their political awakening could acquire a fervent anti-Russian cast, of which the Russian mishandling of Chechnya might be only a harbinger.

MUCH, therefore, depends on the performance of the current Russian political elite—an elite that is strikingly different in composition and outlook from its post-communist counterparts in Central Europe. Russia's current leadership includes no former political dissidents, not even one. Moreover, in Central Europe the anti-communist opposition—Solidarity in Poland, Sajudis in Lithuania and Charter 77 in Prague—represented a critical mass that was subsequently capable of undertaking democratic reforms. In most Central European states, the Communist parties also quickly converted themselves into social-democratic ones, generally supportive of reforms and of closer ties with both NATO and the EU.

In contrast, the current Russian political elite is largely an alliance of former apparatchiki, criminalized oligarchs, and the KGB and military leadership. Their renunciation of the Soviet past has been perfunctory: the retention of a mausoleum in the middle of Moscow honoring the embalmed corpse of the founder of the gulag neatly encapsulates their mindset. Indeed, President Vladimir Putin's new team is composed of individuals who, with no exception, could now be serving in the higher echelons of the Soviet government (particularly the KGB) if the Soviet Union still existed. Putin's own political lineage is quite suggestive in that regard. He is a third-generation apparatchik: his father was a Party functionary, while his grandfather even served on Lenin's and then Stalin's personal security detail.

The present Kremlin leadership matured in the Soviet Union's waning years. By and large, it no longer believed in the crudities of Soviet ideology, but it relished Soviet power. The fall of the Soviet Union was for most of its members not only a historical shock but a calamity that could have been, and should have been, averted. While many of them dried their tears with profits derived from the kleptocratic dismantling of the state-owned economy, they nonetheless felt deprived by Russia's loss of international status. Putin captured their pent-up feelings at his inaugural when he spoke nostalgically of Russia as "a great, powerful and mighty state."

In rebuilding a Russia "which commands respect in the world", Putin's good tactical sense dictates that outright hostility to the West is to be avoided. Indeed, some accommodation with the United States is desirable, particularly in order to draw it into an anti-Islamic alliance in the event that Russia's problems in the south spin out of control. President Clinton's easy seduction into the anti-Chechen camp, in 1995 and again in 1999, offers a case in point. Russia's residual nuclear capability also provides the basis for a special dialogue with the United States, thereby enhancing Russia's prestige and perhaps even creating the impression of a special relationship.[3]

Russia's selective accommodation with the United States can be pursued in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parallel with carefully calibrated efforts to cultivate anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, in order to dilute Western resolve regarding any further expansion of NATO and to exacerbate existing cleavages within the Euro-Atlantic community. Traditional diplomacy in dealings with Berlin and with Paris can also be exploited to fuel European rivalries, in order to impede the emergence of a politically more integrated EU, tied to NATO, on Russia's western frontiers. In any case, a détente with the West is the *sine qua non* of continued Russian access to needed Western financial assistance.

Above all, a breathing spell in relations with the West is needed if Russia is to achieve Putin's central goal: the restoration of a powerful Russian state. To the present rulers, the appearance of a dozen or so newly independent states following the Soviet Union's collapse is a historical aberration that should be gradually corrected as Russia recovers its power. Although it would appear that they realize that the end result may not be a single imperial state, they seem determined to attain the gradual subordination of the post-Soviet states within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States in a way that limits their practical sovereignty in the key areas of security and external economic relations.

That aspiration is the root cause of Moscow's vehement opposition to any Western economic presence in the space of the former Soviet Union. The Kremlin's attitude in this regard is still based on the old Leninist zero-sum approach: it is better for the non-Russian areas not to develop economically if such development entails a Western presence. That is why direct access of the newly independent states to the global economy through multiple pipelines from the Caspian Sea region is viewed by the current Russian elite with almost as much hostility as that shown toward Ukraine's flirtation with NATO. As one Russian Foreign Ministry official put it,

> The significant volume of funds already invested or planned by American companies for investment in Caspian oil business is defining a tendency toward a build-up of a political, and on its heels a military, U.S. presence in the Caucasus. In essence, without prior consent, the incorporation of the Caspian region into the sphere of 'the United States' vital interests' is taking place.[4]

Note particularly the quaint insinuation that Russia's "consent" is required for Western investment in the newly independent states.

STRATEGICALLY, Russian policy toward what the Kremlin calls "the near abroad" has essentially three prongs. The first is to exercise pressure on both Georgia and Azerbaijan, increasing their vulnerability to eventual destabilization after their current presidents depart from the scene. Second, Ukraine's return to some sort of a special "Slavic" relationship with Moscow should be encouraged, with the Russo-Belarusian "union" providing a model of the "brotherly Slavic solidarity" to which Ukrainians should aspire. Third, pressure is to be applied to prevent the Baltic states

[3]The current Russian leadership seems more skilled than its predecessors in influencing Western policymakers and opinion shapers, apparently relying more on the KGB's intelligence apparatus, those trained by the Soviet Institute on the USA, easy access to Western centers of influence enjoyed by Russian oligarchs holding dual citizenship, and even on hired public relations firms. It stands to reason that the Russian leaders are not indifferent to the outcome of U.S. presidential elections and may be sensitive to the West's thirst for electoral campaign funds.

[4]S.I. Chernyavskiy, "Washington's Caucasus Strategy", *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* (January 1999).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from joining NATO, on the grounds that they were once "legally" a part of the Soviet Union.[5]

In brief, the Kremlin's current occupants believe that the "mighty" Russian state should be much more than a national state coexisting with others within the former Soviet space. Although most members of the current elite realize that economic recovery is a necessary precondition for regaining historical grandeur, some also place special emphasis on Russia's military power as the basis for its claim to global status. Not surprisingly, that view is strongly held within the top Russian military leadership and was explicitly reflected in the new military doctrine adopted in December 1999. Top military leaders are also particularly strong proponents of re-established Russian political power in a new "Eurasian union."[6]

It would appear, therefore, that the current elite is more preoccupied with the restoration of a dominant Russian state than with a historic reorientation of Russia. As a result, there is an obvious disconnect between the leadership's ends and the country's means. Contemporary Russia is simply too weak to sustain regional domination while nostalgically reclaiming superpower status. Despite numerous internal shortcomings, the new post-Soviet states are determined to retain their independence. It would take an enormous effort, far beyond Russia's present means, to subordinate them. Moreover, it is unlikely that the West, even were it inclined to accept some of Russia's regional aspirations as legitimate, would remain entirely passive if the independence of, say, Ukraine or Georgia—not to speak of the Baltic states—was threatened.

Further, Russian proponents of reliance on military power greatly underestimate the economically draining effects of any renewed arms competition with America, and overestimate the political leverage that Russia can exercise through its essentially one-dimensional strategic capability. The fact is that Russia—already spending about 5 percent of its GDP on the military—cannot compete with the U.S.-pioneered revolution in military affairs. And while its nuclear weapons can serve as a deterrent, they are not an effective political tool; their value is gradually being diminished by nuclear proliferation, especially in Russia's immediate neighborhood.

A prolonged delay in providing realistic answers to the two questions that confront post-imperial Russia—What is Russia? Where is Russia?—could prove calamitous. Social mobilization on the basis of nationalism can only be a short-term remedy. Russia, underpopulated and socially deprived, could become entangled in flaming collisions with the Muslims in the south and more vulnerable to Chinese territorial encroachments in the east, while also antagonizing Europe (and America) to the west. An "alliance" with China would only subordinate Russia to China without solving its problems.

As a result, it may be only somewhat hyperbolic to suggest that the ultimate consequence of any prolonged failure to confront the full implications of Russia's menacing geopolitical context and of the debilitated state of its society could be the emergence not of "a Europe to the Urals" (as once envisaged by General de Gaulle), but eventually of a beleaguered and imploded Russia only to the Urals.

---

[5]Disturbingly, the official position of Russia is that the Baltic states in 1940 gained "admission" to the USSR. See, for example, the official statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry, February 2, 2000.

[6]A good example of such thinking is the doctoral dissertation of the influential head of the Defense Ministry's Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation, General Leonid Ivashov, titled "Evolution of Russia's Geopolitical Development" (May 2000).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Decalogue on Russia's Geopolitical Condition

1. Russia's economy is about one-tenth the size of America's, and its industrial plant is about three times older than the OECD average.
2. About 70 million Russians live in urban areas with levels of pollution 5 times higher than U.S. maximums, and about 75 percent of Russia's consumed water is contaminated.
3. Only about 40 percent of all recent births in Russia have resulted in fully healthy babies.
4. Russia's population has dropped from 151 million in 1990 to 146 million in 1999.
5. Russia's immediate neighbor to the east, China, has a total population of 1.2 billion; to the west, the EU has 375 million; and to the south live approximately 300 million Muslims.
6. China's economy is already four times larger than Russia's, while foreign investment in China during the last decade has been thirty times higher than in Russia. The EU's economy is ten times larger than Russia's.
7. Unlike post-communist Central Europe, the current Russian political elite is an alliance of the KGB-military leadership with former apparatchiki and criminalized oligarchs; all the current top Russian leaders could be serving in the Soviet government if the Soviet Union still existed.
8. The present Russian government has made it clear that its central goal is the restoration of Russia's power and not democratic reform.
9. Russia desires an accommodation with the West in order to gain a free hand in dealing with the new states in the former Soviet space.
10. Defiance of demography and geography could embroil Russia in conflicts menacing to its future as a major territorial state.

II. For Strategic Direction

IN CONSIDERING Western policy toward Russia, we would do well to reflect briefly on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent emergence of the Turkish national state. That experience is more pertinent to Russia's dilemmas than either Germany's and Japan's after 1945, or Great Britain's and France's after they ceased to be empires.

Unlike Germany and Japan, Russia was neither occupied and subjected to political "re-education" by the Cold War's victors, nor treated to large-scale social reconstruction under their direct supervision. For most Russians, the outcome was more ambiguous and confusing. Most at first did not feel defeated; many later felt deceived; few were receptive to Western tutelage.

Like the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire was territorially contiguous. Both Ottoman and Russian imperial elites drew many members from the subject nationalities. The boundaries of what was specifically Russian or Turkish territory were not very precise. In both cases, the empire was not a remote reality overseas but a seamless extension of the homeland itself. Hence, the sudden loss of empire was both more searing and directly disruptive.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In contrast to the efficiently repressive Soviet Russia, however, the long, slow decline of the Ottoman Empire spawned a significant minority of dissident intellectuals and young officers determined to model Turkey on the West European nation-states. The Young Turks, first organized in the late nineteenth century, gained increasing political influence, especially in the wake of the military defeats suffered by the Ottoman rulers. Some of them at first sought to recreate a modernized version of the old empire. But the defeat suffered in World War I prompted the next generation of reformist leaders, notably Kemal Pasha (who later became known as Atatürk), to embrace the concept of a modernized, post-imperial state, patterned on the European nation-states. In short order, the Swiss civil code, the Italian penal code and the German commercial code were adopted, and—very important to note—irredentist claims, derived from the imperial past, were explicitly renounced.

Three timely conclusions can be drawn from the emergence of the modern national Turkish state: first, Turkey would not be contending today for membership of the European Union were it not for the fact that Atatürk and his bold reformers represented a critical mass capable of effecting a psychological break with the past; second, this effort would not have endured if the West had continued to spurn Turkey; and, third, the process of historical self-redefinition is necessarily a prolonged one, to be measured in decades, not years, and is likely to be punctuated by periodic setbacks.

These conclusions contain important lessons for Russia. Although Putin displays a picture of Peter the Great in his office, his reliance on a KGB entourage and his professed admiration for his KGB predecessor, Yuri Andropov, indicate that Putin is no Russian Atatürk. His geopolitical mindset reflects the thinking of the last Soviet generation and not of the first post-Soviet generation. Nonetheless, a new outlook is being nurtured beneath the existing political surface in the much more open conditions of post-Soviet Russia. And if only for actuarial reasons, the next generation of Russian leaders is unlikely to be the product either of the KGB or of the apparat.

THAT generation will come of age at a time when Russia's past imperial and global status will have become a distant memory rather than an entitlement. This inevitably will create a different global outlook. The next generation of leaders is much more likely to include graduates of Western universities and businessmen with genuine international (but not criminal) exposure, sharing a more widespread desire for Russia not only to be like the West but to be a part of the West. Not least, the Russian public will increasingly demand that its overall lifestyle begin to match at least that of Central Europe, and that Russians not be deprived of free access to the enlarging Europe next door. In short, a critical mass supportive of a genuine break with the past is taking shape.

To encourage that process, Western aid to Russia should be continued. But such assistance should not be directed to the central government. Russia is wealthy enough to be able to address its basic problems through its own resources, and Western aid has the tendency to perpetuate the worst inclinations in the current elite. Also, since financial aid is fungible, its diversion to military programs and operations (such as those in Chechnya) is a likelihood. Instead, Western aid should concentrate on helping Russia's nascent NGOs, which promote the emergence of a new, younger and more open-minded political elite—an elite that understands

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its own interest in a society based on the rule of law.[7]

The United States should also expand its ongoing visitor programs for younger Russian political and economic aspirants. In 1999 the Library of Congress initiated a program to bring to the United States some 2,000 younger Russian local officials for visits designed to acquaint them with the complexities of American democracy. This initiative deserves to be enlarged tenfold, and it should be complemented by a similar program for the newly independent states. After World War II, tens of thousands of young Germans and Japanese were made familiar with American democracy, with an immensely beneficial impact. Younger Russians, especially from outside Moscow and St. Petersburg, should have the same opportunity.

However, the reorientation of Russia's outlook will be delayed if Russia's current political leadership gains the impression that its priorities can be successfully pursued, especially in the space of the former Soviet Union. That such illusions and nostalgia tend to be self-perpetuating makes it all the more important that Western policy both engage Russia and drive home the need for a basic redefinition of Russia's role in Eurasia. To facilitate Russia's historical transformation, Western support for the consolidation of the new states—especially Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan—must be sustained.

Admittedly, the necessary strategic balance will not be easy to strike. In fact, some Russian sources have claimed that Clinton administration officials at times have encouraged Russian efforts to regain a dominant position in the former Soviet space.[8] Even the internationally condemned Russian assault on Chechnya did not produce a single noticeable U.S. response, on the grounds that it would be contrary to the policy of "engagement." It may unfortunately be the case that, during the latter phases of the Clinton administration, the one-sided U.S. emphasis on the West engaging Russia—but not on Russia engaging the West—could delay by some years the day when Russia comes fully to terms with its current historical condition.

To hasten rather than delay that moment, the transatlantic community must patiently keep the grand option of an ever widening and deepening association open to Russia, while persistently re-inforcing an environment that discourages any Russian efforts to turn back the geopolitical clock. Only then may the next generation of Russian leaders—no longer the products of the Soviet era and more likely to represent a new critical political mass—draw the sole realistic conclusion to the dangers posed by their country's internal malaise and external vulnerability: namely, that in order to recover Russia must opt for the West. What is more, Russia must do so unambiguously and unconditionally as a post-imperial state. Russia's imperial baggage cannot be dragged into Europe. Russia cannot be at once imperial and European.

To prepare the ground for that historic choice, it is crucial that the West signal clearly that the continued enlargement of the EU and of NATO does not exclude *a priori* the possibility of Russia's eventual participation. Although President Clinton gave such a signal in his "Charlemagne" speech in Aachen in June

---

[7]For a compelling case for a much more discriminating Western aid policy toward Russia, see Michael McFaul, "Getting Russia Right", *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 65-7.

[8]"Off the record, State Department officials often talk unequivocally in favor of a Russian sphere of influence in Eurasia." Andrei Kortunov, "The U.S. and Russia: A Virtual Partnership", *Comparative Strategy* (October-December 1996), p. 347.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2000, he does not speak for the EU or even for NATO. A formal statement to that effect should be made, perhaps jointly by both organizations. Clearly, a truly democratic Russia that desires to be part of the West should have the option of becoming, in some mutually acceptable fashion, associated closely with both the EU and NATO. The precise modalities need not be spelled out now; in fact, given Russia's present condition and orientation, any effort to do so would be counterproductive. But the option should be held out.

In the meantime, a strategic setting favorable to that prospect should be fostered. Steps can be taken to enhance gradually the role of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which sponsors joint security programs between NATO states and Partnership for Peace members. While the United States in particular should be alert not to fall into the trap of becoming Russia's ally against the Muslims (or the Chinese), the serious possibility of conflicts spreading like grass fire throughout Central Asia might, over time, dilute Russia's hostility to greater Western involvement in the region. Moscow might then view more favorably not only greater economic access to the region, but also a larger role for peacekeeping by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and eventually perhaps even by NATO.

A Decalogue of Strategic Guidelines

1. The lessons of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire are highly relevant to Russia's contemporary dilemmas.
2. Turkey's historic self-redefinition was made possible by the presence of a reformist critical mass and by the West's eventual responsiveness.
3. The next generation of Russian leaders may provide the critical mass needed for a decisive, post-imperial choice in favor of the West.
4. To that end, Western financial assistance should concentrate almost exclusively on the advancement of a new democratically-minded elite through the promotion of grassroots democracy and expanded visitor exchanges.
5. Propitiation of Putin's regime will only delay the desired evolution of Russia into a democratic, Europe-oriented, national Russian state.
6. Support for the newly independent states will help to advance the historical self-redefinition of Russia.
7. The EU and NATO should formally propose Russia's eventual association, and both the EU and NATO should explore with Russia specific initiatives to that end, including a special EU status for Kaliningrad.
8. In the meantime, both EU and NATO expansion should continue, thereby eliminating any geopolitical ambiguities or temptations in the areas immediately west of Russia.
9. A transcontinental security dialogue on strategic doctrine, building on a closer NATO-Russia connection, eventually could link the two key Eurasian security triangles.
10. Effective engagement cannot be pursued through one-sided courtship but only by shaping a decisive geopolitical context, in which a choice for the West becomes Russia's only viable option.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The EU's forthcoming expansion to Central Europe, even if somewhat delayed, is bound to include Poland and eventually the Baltic states. In that context, discussions with Russia regarding a possible special EU status for the Kaliningrad region could prove fruitful, not only resolving the region's persisting economic problems but also initiating closer EU-Russia arrangements. The same is true regarding the EU's ongoing efforts to promote Baltic regional cooperation that embrace both the St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad provinces of Russia.

IN THE meantime, President Clinton's initiative in inviting Russia to join both the EU and NATO has given greater urgency to the task of enlarging both. In fact, it is altogether unrealistic to contemplate Russia's inclusion in either structure without Central Europe's full and prior inclusion. It is equally unrealistic, and even risky, to envisage delaying Central Europe's full membership until Russia either grants its permission or itself opts for Europe. That would be tantamount to granting Russia an indefinite veto, with the likely effect of stimulating the Kremlin's geopolitical aspirations regarding the Baltic states and Ukraine. The bottom line is that the consequence of any inclination to make NATO enlargement contingent on Russia's permission is a prescription for the perpetuation of geopolitical ambiguity on the western fringes of Russia, which will impede Russia's own internal evolution. Indeed, Russia's willingness to acquiesce to the further eastward expansion of NATO, particularly regarding the Baltic states, is a litmus test of the sincerity of any declared choice by Moscow in favor of a European and a transatlantic connection.

Constructive initiatives toward Russia thus will only be credible if they are matched by tangible steps toward the enlargement of both the EU and NATO. That dual enlargement is desirable in itself, and also because it eliminates the risk of a possible collision between competing notions of "europeanism" and "atlanticism." Moreover, several European countries immediately to the west of Russia—the Baltic states especially—want to be, and have the right to be, part of both the EU and of NATO. The next president of the United States should therefore urge our allies to move promptly on the admission of any democratic European state that meets the criteria for NATO membership, even before the year 2002 (the date previously set by NATO for the consideration of further enlargement).

The enlargement of NATO, in any case, has already proven beneficial for Europe's security, including Russia's. Most notably, it has made post-Cold War Europe more stable, anchoring Germany more solidly in its middle rather than making it a "border state", as some German leaders feared might happen after reunification. NATO enlargement has consolidated a sense of security among the new members and promoted better relations between them and their nonmember neighbors. It has encouraged aspirant nations to improve their treatment of minorities and to settle their territorial disputes. It has also stimulated closer Polish-Ukrainian cooperation, reinforcing Ukraine's declared interest in its eventual association with the West. Last but not least, Romania and Bulgaria, because of their desire for membership, acted decisively during the Kosovo conflict to prevent the unilateral deployment of Russian paratroopers into Pristina—a deployment that could have precipitated a risky collision between Russia and NATO.[9]

The West should not be timid in affirming that Russia's acquiescence to the

[9]See Zbigniew Brzezinski and Christopher Swift, "Russia and the Kosovo Crisis" (Washington, DC: CSIS, October 1999), pp. 14–16, 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

expansion of the EU and of NATO will hasten the day when Russia itself will be able to choose a more comprehensive association. Its precise form and extent will have to be negotiated, but a constructive Russian response should also prompt both NATO and the EU to begin a systematic review as to what kind of a shared security system, spanning "Vancouver to Vladivostok", might be both feasible and desirable. The enhancement of the OSCE, and its transformation from a "European" to a "Eurasian" framework, could likewise become timely; and NATO itself may eventually become a core element of a transcontinental security system.[10] Given a positive Russian attitude, it may not be too early to initiate informal exploratory discussions regarding these longer range prospects in the context of the NATO-Russia Joint Council, a step that would enhance the Council's significance and also gratify Moscow.

Thus, step by step, a linkage of the two critical global security triangles—involving the United States, the European Union and Russia; and the United States, China and Japan—may be constructed. That process may be hastened by the ongoing revolution in military technology, which raises the serious possibility that the more than forty year-old reliance on mutual deterrence may have to be fundamentally revised in favor of some form of strategic defense. Given that such a development bears directly on the immediate security interests of the three nuclear NATO powers, as well as of Russia and China, a comprehensive dialogue among them will become necessary beyond any bilateral U.S.-Russia discussions. That need will itself generate pressures for a standing Eurasian security forum.

It is important to reiterate that, while it should be the policy of the United States to engage Russia in an ever closer relationship with the West, such policy should not be confused with one-sided courtship. Effective engagement should strive to create a geostrategic setting in which the Russian elite itself comes to realize that Russia's only option is its best option: to become genuinely "engaged" to the West.

It takes only a little imagination to conjure how beneficial it would be for Russia if one day the Kremlin startled the world by announcing that it welcomed the enlargement of the EU and NATO to include all those who wished to join, and that Russia itself hopes to qualify for membership of both. Such an epiphany would liberate Russia from its ominous geopolitical context and create favorable conditions for its acutely needed social rehabilitation.

The policy of effective engagement should be deliberately designed to make that choice Russia's only choice. □

---

[10]The case for the further expansion of the EU was made in my "Living With a New Europe." On expanding the OSCE from a European to a Eurasian organization, see my "Living With China." It should also be noted that the EU has initiated strategic consideration of a long-term security relationship with Russia, through its "Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia" of June 4, 1999.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Two Plus Four

The Lessons of German Unification

Robert B. Zoellick

TEN YEARS ago, on October 3, 1990, the Federal Republic of Germany absorbed the German Democratic Republic, creating a single, united Germany. Less than a year before, the people of East Berlin had breached the Berlin Wall, prompting a flurry of diplomacy. Events moved so quickly that they seemed pre-ordained. But were they?

At the time, I was serving President George Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, as counselor of the Department of State. One of my assignments was to help develop and implement U.S. policy toward German unification. In this article, looking back after a decade, I offer ten observations about American diplomacy during those busy months.

FIRST, the story of German unification underscores the importance of anticipation. Even with the best intelligence, it is difficult to foresee what lies ahead. Nevertheless, officials should seek to identify critical trends so they may then prepare the groundwork to meet various contingencies in a fashion that moves them toward their strategic goals. This precept might seem obvious, but the press of events, a full in-box and a long list of phone calls to return can easily pre-empt long-range thinking and preparatory action. The normal state of affairs is that people turn to immediate and usually easier tasks before facing longer term complex problems.

Consider the world in late 1988, as President-elect Bush was preparing to assume office. Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost* had made the Soviet leader a celebrity, even a symbol of hope, around the world. The German public seemed especially charmed by this very new type of Russian leader. Elsewhere in Central Europe, particularly in Poland and Hungary, restive publics were stirring; people were just beginning to test the boundaries of the Soviet empire's new rules. In geopolitical terms, the center of gravity appeared to be shifting to Central and Eastern Europe. Hence, for the United States and the NATO alliance, Germany's posture would be decisive in shaping the future course of events.

Yet there was a tension in the relationship between the United States and Germany, and it was about to burst into the open. President Reagan had successfully pressed the Soviets to scrap their deployment of intermediate-range

Robert B. Zoellick was the U.S. representative in the negotiations on the agreement for Germany's unification. He currently is a fellow and board member at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a research scholar at Harvard University's Belfer Center, and a senior international adviser to Goldman Sachs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nuclear missiles in Europe. This left principally short-range nuclear missiles in place, situated mostly in Germany, as well as America's ICBMs. In late 1988, NATO was considering a plan to modernize this missile force. But the West Germans were asking why only they and their East German neighbors should have to bear the brunt of nuclear deterrence in Europe. As one West German politician observed dryly, "The shorter the missiles, the deader the Germans."

President Bush was keenly aware of the rapidly changing European scene. He launched a series of initiatives to mold the dynamic environment to America's advantage. At the NATO Summit in May 1989, he advanced a proposal to reduce drastically conventional military forces in Europe. (In doing so, Bush overrode the vigorous resistance of his chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe.)

Bush's dramatic move accomplished a number of aims. It seized on Gorbachev's rhetoric about reducing Soviet ground troops and challenged the Soviet Union to cut their numbers further to achieve equal levels with the West. The proposal also shifted the focus of U.S.-Soviet arms control from its traditional concentration on strategic nuclear limitations to the recently launched negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (the CFE talks). By doing so, the United States was directly targeting the Soviet army of occupation in Central and Eastern Europe. It also pushed the debate on short-range nuclear missiles to the background. Indeed, NATO reached an agreement at its 1989 summit to defer the question of the modernization of such missiles, easing a sharp point of contention between the United States and Germany. Finally, President Bush's NATO initiative demonstrated his determination and ability to lead the alliance at a critical moment.

The President's plan to reshape the political landscape in Europe had other dimensions as well. After the NATO Summit, he visited Mainz, the capital of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's home state, to deliver a speech about the importance of the partnership between Germany and the United States. Recognizing the changing public mood in Germany, including its positive response to Gorbachev, Bush sought both to charm and challenge his German allies. He praised them for their extraordinary political and economic accomplishments over the previous forty years. But he also urged the Germans to accept the responsibility of being a partner with the United States in making all of Europe "whole and free."

President Bush intended to take his message further east. I recall early in 1989 seeing a page of notes that the President had typed personally and given to Secretary Baker. It identified areas of particular interest, including developments in Central and Eastern Europe. He acted on this interest directly in July 1989 with the most powerful weapon in the Western diplomatic arsenal: a visit by the president of the United States to Poland and Hungary. In doing so, President Bush was acknowledging and encouraging the movements for freedom; he was also competing with Gorbachev and signaling to the Soviet leader that he would pay a huge price in terms of Western opinion (which he seemed to cherish) were he to interfere with the march of liberty behind the Iron Curtain.

In sum, by the summer of 1989, the new U.S. administration had discerned major tremors in Germany, Central and Eastern Europe, and the NATO alliance itself. It had repositioned the United States to work closely with its German ally; achieve parity in conventional forces in Europe as a result of large Soviet withdrawals; consign the issue of short-range nuclear missiles to the background; signal a direct interest in political change in Central and Eastern Europe; and lead

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATO by proposing and refining plans to meet the concerns of all its members. Without knowing for sure what Gorbachev might do or how events might unfold, the United States was deployed to manage change.

SECOND, the United States approached German unification with a strategic and historic perspective. Senior American officials viewed the challenges of unification within the context of even larger changes taking place in Europe.

In 1989 and 1990, President Bush, Secretary Baker, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and their colleagues recognized that their decisions would shape Europe for decades to come. It was therefore important to ensure that individual actions meshed with the larger strategic goal of achieving security in western Eurasia. The U.S. aim was to unify Europe in peace and freedom, while seeking to avoid a "Versailles victory" that invited its own destruction.

The United States wanted Germany to be a strong democratic partner in building a new Europe and a new transatlantic relationship. Thus, it would have been a grave mistake to accept, as a price of unity, restrictions on German sovereignty. The United States wanted Germany to evolve over time, within Europe, as a true political, economic and security associate. Any limits imposed from outside would create the potential for future grievances.

For U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, the strategic objective was to limit the rise of future irredentism while building a new political and security structure in Europe based on the North Atlantic alliance. To that end, the United States sought to treat the Soviet Union with respect. America designed a negotiating process that offered the Soviets an opportunity to participate in the development of Europe's new security system, and the United States and Germany tried to address legitimate Soviet concerns. We even helped our Soviet counterparts to develop a public explanation of how the outcome took account of Soviet interests and sensitivities.

I hasten to add, however, that this willingness to work cooperatively with the Soviets did not slip into over-empathizing, short-changing U.S. interests, or creating false expectations. Secretary Baker, who bore the brunt of the advocacy and negotiating duties, was a master at displaying resolve and firmness, while listening carefully to reasoned arguments that he would seek to address—as long as the response did not counter U.S. interests.

For U.S. policy toward Europe as a whole, America's strategic aim was to promote peace and security, as well as a political dynamic of freedom and democracy, by pressing for Germany's unification within the European Community and NATO. To provide an assurance of America's commitment to the security of this new Europe, the United States recommended maintaining American forces on the continent. In December 1989 at the Malta Summit, President Gorbachev told President Bush that he actually wanted the United States to keep its troops in Europe. U.S. forces would only stay there as part of NATO, Bush answered, so a continued U.S. military presence depended on a healthy NATO.[1]

[1]In a similar vein, President Bush told U.S. allies at the 1991 NATO Summit in Rome that U.S. forces would only remain in Europe if they were wanted. The hush in the room that followed his statement made it clear that his point had been understood: America was in Europe as an ally, not as a military hegemon. If new concepts of a European army were premised on America as a competitor rather than as an ally, the United States would accept the point and bring its forces home.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The United States publicly outlined its strategic concept for a unified Germany within a more unified Europe, linked to America. As early as December 1989, Secretary Baker gave a speech in Berlin that described this vision. He previewed the changes the United States would seek in order to shape NATO for the future, develop new ties between the United States and the evolving European Community, and promote the role of the CSCE.[2] In sum, the diplomacy of German unification sought to close out the Cold War in Europe by laying the foundation for a political and security structure for a new Europe.

THIRD, the U.S. strategy toward German unification combined these conceptual and institutional goals with a critical, practical judgment about events on the ground: we believed that the East German public would be a driving force for national unity. We were convinced that the average East German wanted what his or her cousins had in West Germany—and which most East Germans could see on Western TV. This was not the view of the U.S. embassy in East Germany. The U.S. diplomats there were in touch with the dissidents in the church movements and other intellectuals who had challenged the communist regime; these courageous people wanted to find a "third way" between communism and capitalism. But the general public did not.

I recall a visit with Secretary Baker to a Lutheran church in Potsdam in December 1989, not long after the opening of the Berlin Wall. One could not help but be moved by the sincerity and decency of people who had struggled to preserve the church as a sanctuary of conscience against a brutal regime. But when we asked about the preferences of their fellow East Germans, I listened carefully as the ministers and lay leaders sadly recounted that their congregation wanted the prosperity of the West, not a new socialist experiment in the East.

There were two important policy implications that stemmed from this intelligence judgment. First, the Federal Republic of Germany—West Germany—was the legitimate German state in the eyes of Germans, both in the East and West. So unification would be a takeover, not a negotiated merger. Second, events on the ground would create a continuing momentum for unity that the United States and West Germany could use to their advantage. On the other hand, the momentum created a risk as well: a stalled diplomatic process would probably lead to a crisis, because there would be either a massive East German migration to the West or huge, uncontrollable protests against the weakening local authority and the occupying powers.

FOURTH, the U.S. initiative to channel the diplomacy into the "Two-plus-Four" process[3] reflected a larger evaluation of events and thinking about the Soviet Union in late 1989, as well as a decision on how best to deal with President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had devised the label "New Thinking" to describe their approach to Soviet foreign policy.

---

[2]The CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, was later renamed the OSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

[3]The "Two-plus-Four" process involved the two Germanies and the Four Powers: the United States, the USSR, Great Britain and France. The United States and West Germany argued for this particular description (as opposed to "Four-plus-Two" or "the Six"), because we wanted to stress that Germany's unification was the key issue, and that the four allied powers would be supporting and adjusting to that unity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

During the course of 1989, Secretary Baker and his team had arrived at two conclusions about this label: that the content behind it was vague or even lacking; and that, with adroit interaction and influence, the United States had a reasonable opportunity of persuading Soviet leaders how best to define that content.[4] In the context of German unification, this strategy required working closely with the Soviets to help provide them with justifications for accepting U.S. and West German preferences.

The United States thus advanced the Two-plus-Four process to draw the Soviets into the diplomatic dynamic, which in turn was propelled by the East German people, who were driving toward *de facto* unity. I recall making this point to an obdurate Soviet official, Ambassador Yuly Kvitsinsky, just after he had angrily rejected efforts by our West German and British colleagues to press for details on the Soviet position on unification. Kvitsinsky bluntly asserted that, "You cannot do this without us; you cannot leave the Soviet Union out", suggesting the USSR would only respond if and when it chose to do so. I replied that he was partially correct: the only one who could leave the Soviet Union out was the USSR itself, because the process was in fact moving forward with or without it. I pointed out that we had offered the Soviets an opportunity to deal with reasonable concerns, but if they would not cooperate we would move on.

Indeed, the diplomacy of the United States and West Germany combined an overture to the Soviets on process along with substance. In May 1990 Secretary Baker and I (and later President Bush) summarized various ideas to meet Soviet concerns through separate presentations of "nine points."[5] Since all these points had been stated before, if in a less organized fashion, the diplomatic purpose was to demonstrate a willingness to be forthcoming. At a more basic level, Dennis Ross[6] and I suspected that the Soviets had not focused on the individual ideas when each had been proposed. We thought that effective packaging might highlight the points and also lend them greater weight. This experience suggests another modest diplomatic lesson: do not assume that the other side has understood your message just because it is out in the public realm. The value of clean, simple and direct communication cannot be overstated.

In recent years, some have argued that U.S. commitments to the Soviets included

---

[4]This was controversial at the time. Some preferred to stand back and wait for the inevitable contradictions in Gorbachev's policies to lead to his demise. Others distrusted all Soviets and argued against trying to work with them. Given the fate of Republicans who had been associated with détente, the safest course was to continue to attack the Soviet Union for its all-too-evident failings.

[5]The nine points were: 1) Follow-on CFE negotiations would address the size of conventional forces throughout Europe, including in Central Europe. 2) We would be willing to move up the start of the proposed arms control negotiations on short-range nuclear forces. 3) Germany would reaffirm that it would neither possess nor produce nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. 4) No NATO forces would be stationed on the former territory of the German Democratic Republic during a specified transition period. 5) Germany would work out a transition period for the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Germany. 6) NATO strategy would be reformulated to take into account the changes that had occurred in Europe. 7) Germany's future borders must be settled. 8) The CSCE should be enhanced. 9) Germany and the USSR would seek to establish satisfactory economic ties, preferably in a way that benefited *perestroika*.

[6]Ross was the director of policy planning at the State Department, a respected adviser to Secretary Baker on the Soviet Union, and my close colleague.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a promise not to enlarge NATO. I adamantly disagree, in part because I recall anticipating the possibility of Poland and others joining NATO and so I wanted to avoid taking any action that would preclude that option. Shevardnadze has stated that the United States did not rule out NATO's enlargement. There was no limitation in the nine points, nor in the Final Settlement agreement. (And, in my experience, Soviet diplomats were quite adept at pinning down in documents explicit issues of concern and were hardly prone to rely on general assumptions.) On the contrary, I viewed the overture at NATO's London Summit to invite East European countries "to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO" as the first step down the path to possible membership.[7]

Not all those on the American side agreed with the effort to create the Two-plus-Four process or to present the nine points. Some feared that the process would provide the Soviets a vehicle through which they could be disruptive. After decades of distrust in the Cold War, the impulse not to offer the Soviets any cooperation was understandable. The counterpoint was that with 380,000 troops in Germany and its Four Power legal rights, the Soviet Union already had multiple means to resist the unification of a fully sovereign Germany within NATO. Given these Soviet assets, there were dangers if the United States sought to exclude the Soviets from decisions about unification, ranging from the risk of accidental violence to troublemaking Soviet proposals and even a deadlock leading to crisis. Moreover, once the Soviets accepted the Two-plus-Four process, the proponents of that mechanism expected that the internal German momentum would push the Soviets to resolve their differences with the four Western allies. The Soviets seemed off balance and behind events; we hoped to use this condition to pull them along to our desired outcome.

The positive experience with the Two-plus-Four process may underscore another diplomatic lesson: Do not assume that the other side has fully figured out its position, especially during periods of flux. Fast-moving events can leave governments and individuals uncertain about their objectives and the means to achieve them. In the right circumstances, negotiators can use processes to shape the other side's determination of how to achieve its objectives, and perhaps even help define the objectives themselves.

FIFTH, having created the Two-plus-Four process to help conduct the diplomacy, it was important for the United States, West Germany, Great Britain and France to have an operational concept about how to connect the means with the desired ends. The discipline of linking process with goals and results is vital, because diplomats can easily fall into the trap of treating talks and process as ends in themselves.

In 1990 the United States relied on West Germany to handle the internal aspects of unification, thereby maintaining the momentum on the ground. The Two-plus-Four would resolve the unfinished business of 1945—such as finalizing borders and sovereign rights—while also serving as a loose "steering group" that would orchestrate but not negotiate action

[7]My recollection on possible NATO enlargement is especially sharp because it related to a drafting disagreement on the night before the signing of the Final Settlement in Moscow on September 12, 1990. The open issue was the extent of non-German NATO activities on the former territory of the German Democratic Republic. Without stating my speculation explicitly, I wanted to preserve the possibility of transit by U.S. and other non-German NATO allies across Germany in case Poland were ever to join NATO. This concern was resolved satisfactorily.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the many other issues that would prepare the external context for German unification. For example, this external environment included the negotiations on lower and balanced conventional forces in Europe, changes in NATO, new activity in the CSCE, and possible economic assistance for the Soviet Union. Each element contributed to a safer and more secure Europe with a united Germany, as well as to the rationale about the consideration of their interests that Soviet officials could use domestically to justify the unification of Germany within NATO. As the various components of the overall arrangement moved toward apparent resolution, the Two-plus-Four group could move into a negotiation of the Final Settlement agreement. It would become the process through which the four World War II victors would relinquish their remaining rights over the two German states.

SIXTH, the U.S. government was aware of the critical need to communicate with the public—especially in Germany and Europe—so as to generate support for its diplomatic strategy. The subtitle of Philip Zelikow's and Condoleezza Rice's 1995 landmark study of German unification, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft*, emphasizes one perspective: how a relatively small number of political leaders and diplomats moved quickly in a series of negotiations to transform a political earthquake into a new political and security order for Europe. The statecraft, however, was responding to and capitalizing on the actions of the German people. American diplomacy had to be attentive to, and work with, this public movement. Moreover, other publics throughout Europe and the Soviet Union were also anxious about the course of events; if their concerns were not addressed, their respective political leaders would create problems in diplomatic drawing rooms.

Both President Bush and Secretary Baker sought, through words and actions, to communicate America's aims to the Europeans. They wanted to show the German public that America stood by Germany at this critical moment. They also wanted to reassure the other peoples of Europe that the new European system would offer security as well as freedom. This was one of the purposes of Secretary Baker's speech in Berlin in December 1989: to relate chaotic events to a larger plan for the future of Germany, Europe and transatlantic relations.

Those American officials with broader political experience recognized that the public announcement in Ottawa of the launch of the Two-plus-Four process in February 1990 would send a powerful signal, in addition to serving as a diplomatic tool. After forty-five years of communism, we appreciated that the East German people might still be skeptical or suspicious about the real likelihood of unification. Given the rapid course of events, even West Germans might wonder if unification were truly possible. Yet because the American and West German diplomatic strategy was based on using the momentum of the German public for unity, we needed to demonstrate clearly that the Four Powers had accepted the idea that unification was on its way.[8] Indeed, the Ottawa announcement had an electric effect on German public opinion. I believe that it helped produce a surprise victory for the Christian Democratic Union in the March 1990 elections in East Germany, because, while Chancellor Kohl had shrewdly positioned the party

[8]In contrast, a photo of the four ambassadors of the victorious World War II powers, without any Germans, after a December 1989 meeting at the old Allied Control Authority building in Berlin, sent precisely the wrong message: that the Four Powers would not let this German movement for freedom and unity get out of control.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for unity, the Social Democratic Party leadership was noncommittal at best.

The U.S. delegation was also keenly sensitive to the public diplomacy dimensions of the ministerial meetings of the Two-plus-Four. Given the German public's sympathy for Gorbachev, we were always concerned that an adroit Soviet move might try to paint the United States as the foe of unification in the minds of the German public. The United States and its allies were insisting on a united Germany's membership within NATO, in accord with our strategy for a secure Europe after unification. If the Soviets had launched a public campaign accepting unification, but not within NATO, we could not have been sure of the German public's response. (An even tougher case would have been if the Soviets had stated that they would accept Germany within NATO, but only along the lines of French alliance membership, without military integration or the presence of American soldiers and bases.) Therefore, Secretary Baker's statements to the ministerial meetings, which we released to the press, always emphasized our core principles of support for Germany's unification in freedom and of not singling out Germany for discriminatory treatment (including limits on its choice of alliances).

In retrospect, this integration of diplomacy and communications strategy may also seem self-evident. But most diplomats are by training and experience apolitical. They usually work with people in power, not those challenging the current order. As such, they focus on communicating to leaders and officials, but not to general publics.

SEVENTH, U.S. officials were extremely fortunate that the American public expressed strong support for German unification. I was exceptionally proud, as an American, to see the public readily support keeping a long-standing promise to the German people. Average Americans instinctively associated with the desire of average Germans to unify in freedom; they fully shared in the excitement of the crowds surging through the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. The American tendency to assume that the world thinks as we do can get us into trouble, but, on this occasion, America's fraternity with freedom served it, Germany and NATO very well. The U.S. focus on the future—not an obsession with the past—enabled it to adapt quickly to changed circumstances.

This public support for and trust in Germany had a practical effect on U.S. diplomacy: it afforded us the freedom to be agile. For example, in early 1990 Chancellor Kohl had temporarily deferred Polish demands for Germany to make a firm commitment regarding their border because of domestic political maneuvering. President Bush managed a discreet mediation that reassured Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, without forcing Kohl to back down publicly. One could have imagined groups in the United States demanding a more direct approach if they had viewed the whole process skeptically.

Of course, the mood in many European countries was different. Old fears and animosities surged to the surface and were given voice by political leaders. There were even echoes of these anxieties in "elite" American media circles. If President Bush and Secretary Baker had taken counsel of the warnings and hesitations expressed in establishment editorial opinion, the United States would never have moved boldly to mold events to its design.

EIGHTH, for all the strategy, concepts and planning, the United States was fortunate that its leaders had invested in building good personal ties and trust with their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

principal foreign counterparts. Most important, President Bush and Chancellor Kohl respected and relied on one another, and President Gorbachev came to trust President Bush and rely on Chancellor Kohl.

At the time, President Bush was criticized at home for not showing enough emotion, or what was soon to become known as triumphalism. But the memoirs and official documents that have come to light over the past ten years demonstrate that his instinct was the right one. America's ability to use enormous fluidity to its advantage depended on Gorbachev's belief that Bush would not exult over his problems, and that the United States would seek to cooperate as the Soviet Union stumbled under the pressure of shocking change.

Secretary Baker's relationships with the German and Russian foreign ministers, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Eduard Shevardnadze, were also indispensable. Baker and Genscher each recognized in the other a master of power in his own political system. Both had a keen intuition about human nature. And both respected the code that one's word is one's bond.

The partnership with Shevardnadze was even more striking, given his background and the political system he represented. But the Soviet foreign minister was an intelligent, questioning man struggling to come to grips with the recognition that his country's past could not define its future. By revealing information and insights in private sessions with Baker, Shevardnadze earned his trust. Baker responded by offering support where possible.

For example, in advance of the NATO Summit in early July 1990, Baker gave Shevardnadze a general description of some of the initiatives that the United States hoped NATO would adopt. Shevardnadze thanked Baker for both the substance of the proposals and for sharing the confidences. The advance notice was extremely helpful, Shevardnadze went on to say, because it would enable him to pre-empt opponents, like Marshall Akhromeyev, with a positive public statement on the day NATO issued its communiqué. And that is precisely what he did. We had progressed to the point where the American and Soviet foreign ministers could plan secretly how to use tentative NATO language to persuade the Soviet Union to accept a unified Germany within NATO.

At lower levels, private exchanges of information and opinion were even more candid. Frank Elbe, Genscher's chief of staff, formed a partnership and channel of communication with me that proved instrumental time and again. The U.S. participants also had strong bonds with Horst Teltschik, Chancellor Kohl's assistant for foreign policy and security. Because of my close working relationship with Robert Blackwill, the senior director for Europe and the USSR on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, at times it seemed as if the State Department and the NSC had created a connection in order to ensure that the German Chancellery and Foreign Ministry would also be pressed to cooperate.

The most important, and truly courageous, participant in our troika was Sergei Tarasenko, Shevardnadze's assistant in the Foreign Ministry and later the head of his planning staff. Tarasenko formed a warm working relationship with Dennis Ross and me during 1989, and we drew Tarasenko to Elbe's attention. On numerous occasions, Tarasenko would explain the battles taking place in Moscow over various policies, including German unification. When Shevardnadze's public statements diverged from positions he had taken with Baker, Ross or I would point out the risk of breached trust to Tarasenko; Tarasenko then conveyed the messages to Shevardnadze, who would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

explain the situation to Baker. Even more important, Tarasenko relayed how U.S. and German positions related to maneuverings within Moscow. Whatever Tarasenko's background earlier in his career, which I can only guess, by the time of our association he was a resolute, reliable and respected person of high principle.

Despite these close ties, the views of key participants at various levels often diverged. We did not mistake reliability, integrity and even friendship for identical interests.[9] On this score, Secretary Baker was the most disciplined of all. He always kept in mind his principal duty and objective, and neither friendship nor personal sympathy would divert him from the job to which he was committed.

U.S. diplomacy also had one other critical advantage: the key individuals worked closely together as a team. Too often, officials are handicapped not just by internal differences, which are to be expected, but by personal rivalries and circuitous maneuvering to advance positions by undermining others. President Bush, Secretary Baker, Secretary Richard Cheney and General Scowcroft set a very different tone. And most of the officials working for them recognized that forthrightness and fairness enabled the administration to share the load more effectively and accomplish much more.

NINTH, timing is vital in diplomacy. In 1989–90, Germany and the United States seized the moment. The East Germans accidentally opened the Brandenburg Gate on the night of November 9–10, 1989. Within ten months, on September 12, 1990, the Four Powers and the two Germanies signed the Final Settlement agreement resolving the key external dimensions of unification. Within another month, on October 3, Germany was united.

During this critical period, Gorbachev's position was weakening. However, he had one more surge of strength at the 28th Congress of the Communist Party in July 1990. On that brief rising tide, Gorbachev agreed with Chancellor Kohl on the principal terms of Germany's unification within NATO. The critical groundwork had been laid by Gorbachev's successful summit meeting with Bush in Washington late in May and then by the forthcoming results of the NATO Summit in early July.

By December 1990, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had resigned and there were rumors of coups against Gorbachev. By August 1991 the plotters struck, and Gorbachev and the Soviet Union were finished.

Even high-level American attention was in question by the time of the signing of the Final Settlement agreement. In August 1990 Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and President Bush and Secretary Baker quickly turned to assembling an international coalition to wage the Gulf War. The deal on Germany's unification was sealed just as the window of opportunity was closing.

TENTH, U.S. and German diplomacy were blessed with good fortune. Although luck may be the residue of design, the U.S. strategy could have been derailed by a host of calamities or new obstacles. An accidental spark could have led to widespread violence. Mistakes and fears could have unraveled into a Soviet use of force, as Shevardnadze reportedly has stated was possible twice in 1989.

After initial misgivings, the NATO allies, especially Great Britain and France, offered solid backing for the German and

[9]Fortunately, American and West German interests usually overlapped, making for an extremely cooperative relationship.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American strategy. Early in the process, during 1989, French President François Mitterrand met with Gorbachev in Kiev to explore how to put the brakes on Germany's unification. The Soviet memorandum of the conversation reveals that Gorbachev was wary of being maneuvered into a negative position and was particularly attentive to the U.S. posture; he felt that a Soviet-French (and even British) blocking combination would not serve his interests if the price were a breach with the United States and West Germany. To ease British and French concerns, President Bush arranged separate private meetings early in 1990 with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Mitterrand. After these sessions, our cooperation at the working level was usually highly effective, supported by high-level aides such as Charles Powell, who worked with Mrs. Thatcher.

The Soviets could have caused many additional difficulties if they had been more obstructionist, though it is not clear that such a strategy would have served long-term Soviet or Russian interests. The Soviets might have accepted unification but made Germany's membership in NATO their point of critical resistance. It is hard to say how the German public would have reacted to this. At one point, the Soviets did propose delinking the internal aspects of unification from the external ones—letting Germany unify without resolving Four Powers rights, the question of membership in NATO, the future of Soviet forces in Germany, and a host of other external topics. This initiative was directed at disconnecting the diplomatic process from the political momentum on the ground, which the U.S. strategy had tapped effectively. Although some Germans might have been tempted, the German political leaders refused this ploy.

Finally, there was the good luck of having the right leadership in the right place at the right time. In his book, *At the Highest Levels*, Strobe Talbott, later appointed deputy secretary of state by President Clinton, revealed a very different sense of American priorities. Talbott saw the events of 1989–90 as follows:

> In their handling of German unification, Bush and Baker were primarily concerned with shoring up their fellow conservative Helmut Kohl and thus staying on the good side of a vital ally. They failed to give full consideration to the potentially disruptive consequences of quick unification—consequences that would become apparent during the two years after 1990.[10]

This passage conveys a fundamentally different foreign policy outlook from that of President Bush and Secretary Baker. First, it traces Gorbachev's downfall to his external policies, not to the political and economic chaos he had unleashed at home. Second, it reveals a willingness to hedge on America's commitment to vital allies, even in a supreme moment of testing, in order to favor other powers. Third, it ignores the strategic connection of German unification to NATO's future, and, through NATO, to America's ongoing political and security presence in Europe. Fourth, it assumes a very different sense of timing about the need to proceed speedily with German unification, both to achieve our ends and to avoid the diplomatic and probably human disasters that would have been triggered by delay and the associated uncertainty. In sum, Talbott's outlook would have made the Soviet Union America's first priority, not Germany and NATO. Moreover, he assumed that U.S. foreign policy could have "saved" Gorbachev, the Soviet

[10]Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993), p. 470.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Union or later Russia from itself. We have had a chance to see the consequences of this outlook for U.S.-Russia relations over the past eight years.

Today, ten years after German unification, there may be one more lesson we can draw: diplomatic events must find their place in a continuing stream of actions, both before and afterwards. It is the course and currents of that stream that will determine the enduring implications of individual episodes. The most successful nations build on their achievements. They extend the logic of their strategies to deal with the next series of events, both anticipated and unexpected. They make new judgments about how to transform seemingly isolated incidents into momentum that will move them closer to long-term objectives. They connect strategies with operational concepts. They pay close attention to building public support for their strategies, and they establish relationships of trust with others around the world. They move with alacrity to seize and shape opportunities, and they try to avoid mistakes. Finally, successful diplomacy capitalizes on good luck, but does not rely on it. □

Transatlantic Internationale Politik (TIP)

...is the quarterly English-language magazine of the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin.

TIP features a selection of articles, essays and op-ed pieces on topical issues in foreign affairs. It also presents European documents, book reviews, and a survey of articles from European foreign policy magazines.

"I have long felt that the eminent journal of the German Council of Foreign Relations would be of great interest and importance to a wide readership. TIP will be good news indeed to the international foreign policy community."

Henry A. Kissinger

1 year (4 issues) $39,80 □
2 year (8 issues) $59,70 (incl. 25% discount) □
3 year (12 issues) $83,50 (incl. 30% discount) □
free sample copy □
Please mark your choice with a cross beside the respective subscription rate

□ Name
Adress
City/State/ZIP
Payment enclosed □ Bill me □ Charge my Mastercard □ Visa □ Amex □
Account# Exp. Date
Signature

Please send your subscription order or your request for a free copy to
TIP-Subscription Service c/o Aluta Company 5108 Wally Drive El Paso TX 79924-9906
Fax (915)755-4806 e-Mail: tip@fsd.de http://www.dgap.org/english/indexe.htm

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Gap

Soldiers, Civilians and their Mutual Misunderstanding

Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn

IN A 1997 speech at Yale University, Secretary of Defense William Cohen claimed to see "a chasm developing between the military and civilian worlds, where the civilian world doesn't fully grasp the mission of the military, and the military doesn't understand why the memories of our citizens and civilian policy makers are so short, or why the criticism is so quick and so unrelenting." Cohen was voicing an age-old concern about America's relations with its military, one echoed in recent years by policymakers who fear that, absent an urgent threat to the nation's security, a democratic society will not nurture and support an adequate military, and that the military's loyalty to civilian authority will diminish accordingly.

The question at the end of the 1990s was said to be a "cultural" one: Has a "gap" in values between the armed forces and civilian society widened to the point of threatening the effectiveness of the military and impeding civil-military cooperation? To answer this question, we directed a comprehensive study, The Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society, sponsored by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies—a consortium of faculty from Duke University, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and North Carolina State University—with a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. Specifically, the project sought to answer three questions: *What is the character of the civil-military gap today? What factors are shaping it? What are the implications for military effectiveness and civil-military cooperation?*

To assess these questions, we, in cooperation with roughly two dozen experts, surveyed some 4,900 Americans drawn from three groups: military officers identified for promotion or advancement, influential civilians, and the general public.[1] The questions we posed addressed many topics: defense and foreign policy, social and moral issues, and relations between civilian policymakers and military officers. Our team then analyzed the answers and combined them with other political, sociological and historical stud-

Peter D. Feaver is associate professor of political science at Duke University, and director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies.

Richard H. Kohn is professor of history and chair of the Curriculum in Peace, War and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The authors are editors of the forthcoming volume, *Soldiers and Civilians: The Gap Between the Military and American Society and What it Means for National Security* (MIT Press), in which some of the studies mentioned in this article will appear.

[1]For greater detail on the project, see our web site, www.poli.duke.edu/civmil.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ies to draw conclusions and offer specific recommendations.

We discovered that, while the concerns of the secretary of defense and others should not be exaggerated, numerous schisms and disturbing trends have emerged in recent years, which, if not addressed, may further undermine civil-military cooperation and in certain circumstances harm military effectiveness.

Not a New Concern

CONCERNS about a troublesome divide between the armed forces and the society they serve are hardly new and in fact go back to the beginning of the Republic. Writing in the 1950s, Samuel Huntington argued that the divide could best be bridged by civilian society tolerating, if not embracing, the conservative values that animate military culture. Huntington also suggested that politicians allow the armed forces a substantial degree of cultural autonomy. Countering this argument, the sociologist Morris Janowitz argued that in a democracy military culture necessarily adapts to changes in civilian society, adjusting to the needs and dictates of its civilian masters.[2] The end of the Cold War and the extraordinary changes in American foreign and defense policy that resulted have revived the debate.

The contemporary heirs of Janowitz see the all-volunteer military as drifting too far away from the norms of American society, thereby posing problems for civilian control. They make four principal assertions. First, the military has grown out of step ideologically with the public, showing itself to be inordinately right-wing politically, and much more religious (and fundamentalist) than America as a whole, having a strong and almost exclusive identification with the Republican Party. Second, the military has become increasingly alienated from, disgusted with and sometimes even explicitly hostile to civilian culture. Third, the armed forces have resisted change, particularly the integration of women and homosexuals into their ranks, and have generally proved reluctant to carry out constabulary missions. Fourth, civilian control and military effectiveness will both suffer as the military—seeking ways to operate without effective civilian oversight and alienated from the society around it—loses the respect and support of that society.

By contrast, the heirs of Huntington argue that a degenerate civilian culture has strayed so far from traditional values that it intends to eradicate healthy and functional civil-military differences, particularly in the areas of gender, sexual orientation and discipline. This camp, too, makes four key claims. First, its members assert that the military is divorced in values from a political and cultural elite that is itself alienated from the general public. Second, it believes this civilian elite to be ignorant of, and even hostile to, the armed forces—eager to employ the military as a laboratory for social change, even at the cost of crippling its warfighting capacity. Third, it discounts the specter of eroding civilian control because it sees a military so thoroughly inculcated with an ethos of subordination that there is now *too much* civilian control, the effect of which has been to stifle the military's ability to function effectively. Fourth, because support for the military among the general public remains sturdy, any gap in values is inconsequential. The problem, if anything, is with the civilian elite.

---

[2]Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The debate has been lively (and inside the Beltway sometimes quite vicious), but it has rested on very thin evidence—competing anecdotes, claims and counterclaims about the nature of civilian and military attitudes. Absent has been a body of systematic data exploring opinions, values, perspectives and attitudes inside the military compared with those held by civilian elites and the general public. Our project provides some answers.

The Real Gap

THE MILITARY officers in our survey are indeed much more conservative than the civilian elite, but not more conservative than the general public.[3] On social values, the military diverges from both the elite and the public, fitting somewhere between the two—considerably more conservative than the former but not as conservative as the latter. On the issue of personal and political freedoms, for example, the military responses were unambiguously on the side of civil liberty. Very strong majorities of the officers we surveyed responded that they opposed removing from public libraries anti-religious books (89 percent), pro-communist books (94 percent) or pro-homosexuality books (82 percent)—higher support for free speech than one would find in a random sample of the public at large. Intriguingly, one of the largest gaps between our military sample and that of the general public concerns views on human nature. On the classic question of whether most people can be trusted, a strong majority in both our elite samples—civilian (60 percent) and military (65 percent)—responded affirmatively, but an equally strong majority of our mass sample responded that "you can't be too careful." Still, military officers express great pessimism about the moral health of civilian society and strongly believe that society would be better off if it adopted military mores. While civilian elites share such pessimism, they strongly disagree that the military has a role to play in civic renewal.

Military officers are more "religious" than civilian elites, although not as dramatically as some have claimed. If "religious" is measured by the frequency of attending religious services or of engaging in religious activity, the difference is slight. For instance, roughly comparable percentages of officers and civilian elites report that they pray anywhere from several times a day to once a week (roughly a fifth in all instances). The opinion divide is somewhat greater if the gauge is taken to be the degree to which faith plays a role in everyday life. Servicemen are more likely than civilian elites to agree that "the Bible is the inspired word of God, true, and to be taken word for word" (18 versus 11 percent); more likely to agree that "the Bible is the inspired word of God, true, but not to be taken word for word" (48 versus 34 percent); and less likely to agree that "the Bible is a book of myths and legends" (3 versus 7 percent). In any case, the differences are not strikingly large. Except for a larger proportion of Roman Catholics and a smaller proportion of Jews, religious identification in the armed forces is congruent with that of the broader American population.

Despite common assumptions to the contrary, civilian elites, while having relatively little personal connection with the military, do not express a great deal of hostility to the warrior culture. Only 7 percent (compared with 1 percent of servicemen) believe that a so-called "social

[3]Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Further Evidence, 1998-99", TISS project paper; James Davis, "The Brass and the Mass", TISS project paper.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

engineering role"—that is, redressing historical discrimination—is a "very important" role for the military, although somewhat more (23 percent, versus 14 percent of the military) say it is at least "important." However, on the question of whether the cultural gap hurts military effectiveness, roughly a third of civilian elites who have never served in the military think so, and, interestingly, slightly more than a third of the military agrees. Elite civilians do not have an inflated view (relative to the military) of the military's ability to perform effectively in constabulary missions, although they are somewhat more eager to use the military for humanitarian operations. The military officers we surveyed criticized the quality of political leadership and expressed a pervasive hostility toward the media; yet at the same time, both rising officers and the rank and file possess more trust and confidence in government institutions than do their civilian counterparts.

The officers we surveyed also express little dissatisfaction (about the same as the public and civilian elites) with the current extent of gender integration in the military, although they oppose expanding combat roles for women. But by a very large margin (76 percent) the military officers we surveyed oppose gays and lesbians serving openly, an idea that more than 50 percent of both the civilian elites and the mass public favor.[4]

While officers still consider themselves to be neutral servants of the state, the officer corps has developed a more distinctive partisan affinity. Over the last generation, the percentage of officers that identifies itself as independent (or specifies no party affiliation) has gone from a plurality (46 percent) to a minority (27 percent), and the percentage that identifies itself as Republican has nearly doubled (from 33 percent to 64 percent).[5] While elite civilians and the mass public are split about evenly, for every Democrat in our sample of officers there are eight Republicans. Their political views are not, however, the "hard right" Republican positions some observers expected to see.

What Factors Shape the Gap?

MOST students of these issues, no matter what side they take in the debate, assert the following: the media are hostile to the military and portray it negatively, encouraging civilian hostility toward it; popular culture (films and novels) caricatures and disparages the military; the media influence civilian attitudes toward the use of force (the "CNN effect"); the gap between military personnel and civilians is widening, due to factors such as the decline in veterans as a percentage of civilian society, the downsizing of the armed forces since the Cold War, and the self-selection of the all-volunteer force; and professional military education is the key arena in which the professional values and norms of the officer are shaped, and, hence, where civil-military concerns should be addressed.

Our team's findings challenge many of these assumptions. The media play a complex role in shaping civilian and military perspectives. But contrary to views widely held among elite military officers, the major daily newspapers do not generally portray the armed forces in a harsh

[4]Laura Miller and John Allen Williams, "Combat Effectiveness vs. Civil Rights?", TISS project paper.

[5]Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-1996", *International Security* (Winter 1998/99), p. 11; Holsti, "A Widening Gap", TISS project paper.

[6]Krista Wiegand and David Paletz, "The Elite Media and the Military-Civilian Culture Gap", TISS project paper.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

light. Content analyses over a period of six months discovered ratios of positive to negative stories in excess of two to one.[6] While popular fiction and film do stereotype both the military and civilian society, the effect is not uniform. Some action thrillers (*Executive Orders*, *Rules of Engagement*) have depicted tough realists in uniform with higher moral standards, greater loyalty and more competence than civilians—and have disparaged politicians, political institutions, and a hedonistic and greedy civilian culture. High-brow fiction and film (*Catch-22*, Stanley Kubrick's war films) tend to do the reverse.[7]

Our military and civilian samples did differ in background, suggesting that demographics may partly exacerbate differences between the two groups. The up-and-coming officers in our sample were disproportionately male, white, Catholic and highly educated. Nevertheless, differences of opinion persist even when demographic factors are controlled, suggesting that the military may selectively attract and promote a certain profile of officer that accounts for some of these differences. Thus, opinion gaps between officers and civilian elites are narrower at the lowest ranks than at the more senior levels. Numerous factors have contributed to the "Republicanization" of the officer corps. They include: the fallout from Vietnam; Democrats abandoning the military and Republicans embracing it; an increase during the 1980s in the proportion of young people identifying themselves as Republican and expressing an interest in joining the military; and the Reagan-era military build-up.[8] Lastly, the curricula at military academies and war colleges fail to provide officers with a coherent understanding of American society, its culture, and the tradition of American civil-military relations. In some cases military education accentuates civil-military differences.[9]

The Stakes

UNQUESTIONABLY, this gap in viewpoints affects national defense, but not always in the way observers of civil-military relations seem to believe. So far the defense budget has not been hurt by the gap and the divide does not appear to be the principal factor driving the current crisis of recruiting and retaining people in uniform.[10] Yet while much is made of the public's respect for and confidence in the military, this confidence is brittle and shallow, and may not endure.[11] Personal connections to the military among civilians are declining. And because the gap in opinion tracks closely with the presence or absence of such contacts, support for national defense could diminish in the future.

For the first seventy-five years of the twentieth century, there was always a higher percentage of veterans in Congress than in the comparable age cohort in the general population. This "veteran's advantage" preceded the introduction of the draft but began to decline with the end of conscription. Indeed, beginning in the mid-1990s, the percentage of veterans in Congress has dropped below that in the population at large. Thus far this has not affected congressional voting patterns, but, if the general gap is indicative,

[7]Howard Harper, "Reaching and Reflecting Audiences in Fiction and Film", TISS project paper.

[8]Michael Desch, "Explaining the Gap", TISS project paper; David Segal et al., "Attitudes of Entry-Level Enlisted Personnel", TISS project paper.

[9]Don M. Snider et al., "The Influence of Professional Military Education", TISS project paper; Judith Stiehm, "Civil-Military Relations in War College Curricula", TISS project paper.

[10]Benjamin Fordham, "The Civil-Military Gap and Peacetime Military Policy", TISS project paper.

[11]Paul Gronke and Peter Feaver, "Uncertain Confidence", TISS project paper.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the change in veterans' representation will diminish congressional understanding of the military and may affect agenda-setting and support.[12]

The experience gap is partly counterbalanced by the military's significance as an institution in American society, which remains very high. The material presence of the military remains strong; it consumes a large, if shrinking, portion of the GDP; its reach is geographically distributed in rough proportion to regional population share (although sparse in the Midwest); and it is prominent on the public stage and especially in the media.[13] There are trends, however—such as the downsizing of the armed forces, which reduces social connections to the military—that will inevitably diminish its institutional presence.

Emerging professional norms within the officer corps promise more friction in civil-military relations. As Eliot Cohen points out in his accompanying article in this issue, the principle of civilian control is well entrenched in the United States, but the military officers we surveyed showed some reluctance to accept one of its basic premises: namely, that civilian leaders have a right to be wrong. Contrary to the traditional understanding of civilian control, a majority of elite military officers today believes that it is proper for the military to *insist* rather than merely to *advise* (or even advocate in private) on key matters, particularly those involving the use of force—for instance, "setting rules of engagement", developing an "exit strategy", and "deciding what kinds of military units (air vs. naval, heavy vs. light) will be used to accomplish all tasks." Most likely a result of the Vietnam debacle—which the military still blames on civilian micromanagement, failed strategies and "go along" military leaders—this assertiveness has already caused friction among policymakers and will continue to do so. It may lead in some instances to unprofessional behavior. Many military officers we briefed disagree with our interpretation of this finding. Ironically, many of them invoked a reading of *Dereliction of Duty*, H.R. McMaster's widely read and influential analysis of civil-military relations under President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, to justify a norm that military officers ought to insist that their advice be followed, and resign in protest if the senior civilian leadership seems to be pursuing a reckless policy.[14]

The so-called "Republicanization of the force" finding has received considerable attention and in some cases has been misunderstood. While we discovered a remarkably high percentage of partisan association, we did not ask other questions on our survey about partisanship and therefore have no systematic evidence of a correlation between party identification and intensity of partisan activity. But there is anecdotal evidence that the old

[12]William Bianco with Jamie Markham, "Vanishing Veterans", TISS project paper.

[13]James Burk, "The Military's Presence in American Society, 1950-2000", TISS project paper.

[14]The book argues that the civilians lied to the service Chiefs and misrepresented their views to Congress and the public—and the Chiefs went along with it, thus contributing to a disastrous military strategy. Officers interpret the book as saying that the Chiefs ought to have resisted the strategy and to have resigned over it—a rendering congruent with the "received wisdom" in the officer corps for the last quarter century. According to the author, the book does not argue that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) should have insisted that the administration follow its advice, but, rather, that the JCS failed to give its best military advice to the national command authority. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

taboos are weakening: senior officers, for example, have identified their party affiliation in talks with junior subordinates or written letters to the editor critiquing one party or another. To dismiss this partisan gap with the explanation that the military is simply "identifying with the GOP out of self-interest" is to miss the point entirely. Developing a partisan identity harms the U.S. military and national defense. Viewed as "just another interest group", the armed forces would lose public and financial support. Uniformed advice would be less trusted by the civilian leadership, and, eventually, military professionalism would deteriorate.

Another of our findings is that the presence of veterans in the national political elite has a profound effect on the use of force in American foreign policy. At least since 1816, the greater the presence of veterans in this elite, the less likely the United States has been to initiate the use of force in the international arena.[15] This effect is statistically stronger than many other factors known to influence the use of force. The trend of declining veterans in the national political elite suggests, all other things being equal, a continuing high rate of military involvement in conflicts in the coming years.

Finally, the notion that the American public is unusually casualty shy—widely believed by policymakers, civilian elites and military officers—is sheer myth. The American public will accept casualties if they are deemed necessary to accomplish a mission that has its support. Concerning the constabulary interventions that have become a staple of the post-Cold War era, the public is much more accepting of casualties than the military officers we surveyed.[16] The military's casualty aversion is not a mere expression of self-preservation, but is more likely grounded in a lack of confidence in the political leadership, or a belief by senior officers that casualties will spell failure no matter what the outcome of the operation.

Implications

THREE MAIN critiques have been offered by those who think that the civil-military gap is much ado about nothing. First, divides of this sort have been around since the beginning of the Republic. Second, the principal challenges facing national security today are recruiting, retention, modernization, organization, and the growing mismatch between military missions and the resources devoted to defense—none of which is chiefly caused by this gap. Third, such divergences do not really matter because, at the highest policy levels, civilian and military elites have "fused"—that is, suppressed their differences to cooperate and work together amicably.[17]

But the gap and the tensions related to it are real, and they may have serious and lasting consequences for U.S. national security—consequences that could shackle future administrations. To begin with, the post-Cold War era is the first period in American history in which a large professional military has been maintained in peacetime. The lack of an urgent and immediate threat to the nation's existence, of the kind that during the Cold War forced military and civilian elites to reconcile their differences, may now foster a much higher level of civil-

[15]Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, "Civilian Hawks and Military Doves", TISS project paper.

[16]Feaver and Gelpi, "The Civil-Military Gap and Casualty Aversion", TISS project paper; Cori Dauber, "The Role of Visual Imagery in Casualty Shyness", TISS project paper.

[17]David W. Tarr and Peter J. Roman, "The Military Leadership, Professionalism, and the Policy-Making Process", TISS project paper.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military conflict.[18] And if, as we foresee, support for the armed forces and understanding of their needs diminish, they will be less capable and effective.

Then, too, while the gap is not the principal cause of recruiting and retention problems, it is likely to exacerbate them in the future. The public's respect and admiration for the military no longer translates into a willingness to join the armed forces. The narrowing of personal connections to the military means that recruiters today must persuade doubtful prospects with less help from family and friends who have served themselves. Moreover, since expressions of support for the armed forces derive partly from personal connections to them, the reservoir of public confidence may shrink as the war generations die off.

Finally, the fusion between civilian and soldier at the most senior policymaking levels will not compensate for the distrust of civilians expressed in the lower ranks of the services. In fact, the divergence of opinion between the senior and junior ranks has created a troubling divide within the officer corps itself. In suggesting that the military has a responsibility not merely to advise but to insist on policy, field grade officers believe that their leaders, under certain circumstances, should resist civilian direction or resign in protest. In our follow-on exchanges with hundreds of military officers, a two-part rationale has been offered: civilian leaders are increasingly ignorant about military matters and so cannot be trusted to make wise decisions; and, in any case, the greatest disasters in U.S. history (Vietnam being the exemplar) could have been averted had senior officers spoken out against misguided, even duplicitous, politicians.[19] Mid-level officers who endorse this thesis express frustration with their senior leaders for not resisting more vigorously political pressure and perceived civilian mismanagement. Many complain about readiness, gender integration and declining standards of discipline and training. Nearly half of the officers we surveyed said they would leave the service if "senior uniformed leadership [did] not stand up for what is right in military policy."[20]

The implications for civil-military cooperation, civilian control and indeed American democracy are profound. The senior-most military officers we briefed understand that civil-military relations in a democracy do not and cannot operate this way. "The mid-level officers seem to think", one told us, "that we can 'insist' on things in the Oval Office. That is not how it works at that level." The military advises and even advocates strongly in private, but, once a decision is made, its duty is to execute official policy. In the U.S. military there is no tradition of resignation in protest of dubious or unwise policies. In fact, the American military rejected individual and mass resignation—which can be indistinguishable from mutiny—at Newburgh, New York in 1783 when dissident officers tried to sway the army to march on Congress or go on strike, and were only dissuaded by a dramatic confrontation with their commander, George Washington. Union officers could not say in 1862, "We

[18]Russell F. Weigley, "The American Civil-Military Gap", TISS project paper.

[19]In contrast, Eliot Cohen has argued that the success of democracies at war has involved effective questioning, oversight and on occasion intervention by civilian leaders into the technical aspects of military affairs. Cohen, "The Unequal Dialogue", TISS project paper.

[20]This is much higher than the opposition expressed with regard to other hot-button issues about which officers have strong views: slightly more than a quarter said they would leave if "homosexuals were allowed to serve openly in the military", and only 6 percent said they would leave if "women were allowed to serve in ground combat units."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

signed on to save the Union, not to free the slaves; we quit." George C. Marshall did not consider resigning in 1942 over the decision to invade North Africa, which he opposed. Resignation accompanied by protest undermines civilian control by giving a whip to the military ("do it our way or else")—and, paradoxically, leads to an *increase* in the politicization of the force. For if civilians fear a resignation in the event of a serious policy dispute, they will vet the military leadership for pliability and compliance and promote only "yes-men."

To address these troubling trends, the Department of Defense must undertake a series of initiatives to improve civilian understanding of military affairs. Secretary of Defense Cohen's recent "Public Outreach Initiative" web site is a good but modest step. The Marine Corps' new "One Year Out" program, which places promising officers in civilian work places, should be expanded to more officers and broadened to the other services. ROTC must be expanded without regard to "yield" until such time as the entire officer accession process can be revised. Congress should fund expanded outreach to the media and community leaders through such programs as the Joint Civilian Orientation Course and through cooperation with Hollywood. Tinkering with the civilian side will fail, however, unless accompanied by change on the military side, and the place to begin is officer education. Civil-military relations need thorough coverage at every level, from Academy and ROTC through Staff and War College and flag officer short courses.

For the longer term, systemic change will be needed, particularly a review from the ground up of the military and civilian personnel systems in order to assure the quantity and quality of people in national defense. The way we recruit, promote and manage the precious human resources of the armed forces has changed remarkably little over the last half century, and the system has in any event been a response to two world wars and the Cold War—an industrial age system now trying to field an information age force. Likewise, the quality of civilian policymakers has too long been neglected. And, because national defense spending depends so heavily on professional and personal relationships among the uniformed and civilian leaderships, future administrations should institutionalize procedures for team-building between political appointees and their military counterparts and subordinates.

Ultimately, however, responsibility for the relationship, as with everything else in military affairs, lies with civilians: partly Congress, but especially the commander-in-chief. In the upcoming presidential election, the American public should judge its politicians accordingly—and in the coming years hold them accountable for their stewardship of the nation's security. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Why the Gap Matters

Eliot A. Cohen

THE REACTION of most policymakers and senior military officers to the publication of the findings of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society was, predictably, one of irritation or hasty dismissal—even on the part of those who initially raised, in a vague but worried way, the issue of a civil-military "gap." Thus Secretary of Defense William Cohen observed:

> Several journalists and academicians point to a cultural divide between the military and the larger American society. Clearly, we demand higher standards from those who wear the uniform than we do of civilians. This is not a negative factor but a positive one that Americans continue to value.[1]

One easily understands the annoyance of public men and women at the debate. In the world of policy, life is busy enough with the multiple crises of the moment, and larger phenomena such as the gap between civilians and the military are matters of merely theoretical (un)importance. In that urgent world, distinctions between soldier and civilian are often blurred: a functionary is a functionary, after all. For their part, soldiers feel wounded at the mistrust implied by such studies—can one not infer from them a fear of overweening military power? Their daily experience, moreover, of press stories about cost overruns and sexual harassment cases, of badgering by congressional committees and dithering by political appointees, hardly squares with a military that is out of control. Political leaders resent the imputation, which they glean from such surveys, that they really do not control the show, and thus have failed to discharge their responsibilities. Democrats resist what they see as a slur directed against President Bill Clinton, a civilian leader who has had an unusually bad run with the U.S. military, whose ranks he assiduously avoided during the Vietnam War. Republicans, on the other hand, ascribe whatever roughness there may be in the relationship between civilian and soldier to just that cause—even though more than a few among their own ranks also somehow failed to see active service during the same war.

As for the average citizen, he or she would be surprised to learn that anyone cares about civil-military relations. After all, the armed forces are popular, and no

Eliot A. Cohen is professor of strategic studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

[1]Cohen, "No Shortchanging Defense", *Washington Post*, January 27, 2000.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one could, for a moment, conceive that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would ever ride on horseback to the White House and evict the president from the Oval Office. The idea is absurd even in the backwaters of international politics, where uniformed men with gold braid and dark sunglasses have traditionally toppled civilian leaders. So why all the fuss, and why should anyone care about "the gap"? Even its discoverers, after all, declare that some gap between civilian and soldier is desirable; few, after all, would want Marines sporting ponytails, sailors who insist on only working eight-hour days, pilots who go on strike, or soldiers who slouch rather than stand at attention.

The question resists a simple answer, but its essence is this: over the last thirty years, fundamental concepts of military professionalism in the United States have eroded, at times to an alarming degree. The changes have been subtle, but already they have distorted the making of policy, and could do so further. They reflect, moreover, not so much military malfeasance (in many ways the reverse) as absent-minded complacency about the proper roles, limits and functions of the officer corps—and of civilian control. They stem in turn from profound changes in the military art, and from the evolution of a unique and overarching American international role in which military power often plays the largest part. A gruff reassertion of civilian control by firing a few indiscreet or obstreperous generals or admirals will not provide an answer (not that civilian leaders should hesitate to do it). Rather, thoughtful soldiers and statesmen will have to cooperate to restore the appropriate combination of primacy and collegiality, understanding and sense of limits, necessary to healthy civil-military relations.

To do so, they must begin by purging themselves of the notion that if there is no threat of a coup, there is no problem. The truth is that the civil-military relationship in a democracy is almost invariably difficult, setting up as it does opposing values, powerful institutions with great resources, and inevitable tensions between military professionals and statesmen. Those difficulties have become more acute in the United States as a result of two great changes: the end of a centuries-old form of military organization, and a transformation in America's geopolitical circumstances.

The Decline of the Mass Army and the Rise of the American Empire

OF ALL the changes affecting military organizations in modern times, none looms so large as the growth, after the French Revolution, of the mass army and its terminal decline in our day. Countries recruited mass armies in war (and in many countries during peacetime as well) on the basis of near universal male conscription, equipped them with the relatively cheap products of nineteenth and twentieth-century industrial production, and staffed them with large cohorts of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) reporting to a small, semi-aristocratic class of officers. Numbers mattered. Small countries like Prussia, and more recently Israel, could field astonishingly strong armies because they trained their young men effectively and mobilized them efficiently. While the quality of equipment and the genius of individual commanders mattered, what proved more important was the organizational skill of large staffs, and the sheer quantity of forces that bureaucracies could raise, feed and support. For nearly two centuries military service marked the passage to adulthood of many young men in the developed world. Yet this experience, including subjection to military discipline,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mirrored social order rather than distorted it. The discipline imposed by industrial modes of manufacture, which required uniform behavior, punctuality and meticulous performance of semi-skilled tasks, made the factory not all that dissimilar to the barracks. Social norms—which took for granted gender-segregated social activity and male dominance in the work place, and which included, above all, the assumption that masculinity implied a kind of tough perseverance—were similarly congruent. So too were social structures: the division among workers, foremen or shop stewards, and managers mirrored nicely the military castes of enlisted ranks, non-commissioned officers and officers.

None of this holds true any longer. The mass army is dead or dying in the developed world, replaced by small, all-volunteer forces using high, often craft-produced, technology. The quality of arms today, while it does not trump individual skill, matters vastly more than it ever has. In theory, a superbly skilled crew in a Russian T-72 tank might be able to take on a group of bumblers in an American M-1 Abrams, but they would find it tough to take out a tank whose armor their ammunition could not penetrate and that could see and shoot them when they could do neither. The qualitative element in war—particularly once supporting activities such as the gathering and processing of information are considered—has come to trump quantity. That fact, combined with the decline of great power conflict, has doomed modern mass military systems. One after another, major powers have abandoned conscription, even, as in the case of France, despite powerful political motivations to retain it. Even countries that retain large military organizations and that have increased their defense budgets (China and Turkey come to mind) have, at the same time, shrunk the number of troops they have on active duty.

In the days of the mass military, large numbers of soldiers and sailors (though not airmen) were front-line operators who put themselves at risk to operate a variety of machines of war in combat. Officers led and managed; non-commissioned officers trained and controlled; enlisted personnel did the fighting. The generation of combat power stemmed in almost equal parts from capable leadership, modern technology and sheer numbers. Today, the rise of long-range engagements and precision weaponry means that smaller—in fact, minute—numbers of highly trained specialists actually operate weapons. The vast majority of officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel engage in a variety of administrative and support tasks, some of which are not very different from civilian tasks and are, in fact, subject to replacement by civilian contractors. All military organizations have begun, in other words, to look more like air forces, in which only a handful of personnel operate enormously sophisticated weapons in the face of the enemy, or like special operations units, in which the distinctions between officer, NCO and enlisted melt away in the face of demanding physical and technical tasks.

This change is far from complete, but it poses profound challenges for the traditional, nineteenth-century model of officership, resting as it does on the requirements of the mass army that have shaped the American concept of military professionalism. Even now, more than a generation after the end of the draft, the stratification of social classes in the military persists to a remarkable degree. The military's sense of its place in American life retains the imprint of the mass army days; the popular picture of the soldiering life owes more to the long gone days of World War II—think of Stephen Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan*—than it does to the realities of the army of today. "The volunteer GIs of today stand watch in Korea, the Persian Gulf, Europe and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the dangerous terrain of the Balkans", wrote General Colin Powell in a tribute to the American GI as "person of the century" in *Time* magazine.[2] The fact is, however, that the serviceman or woman of today is a very different kind of individual than his or her counterpart swept up in the draft of years gone by. There is a world of difference between volunteer and draftee, citizen-soldier and budding professional, long-service regular and in-for-the-duration conscript, thoroughly trained expert and mass-produced cog in a machine. Sentimentality about soldiers—an understandably common commodity—confuses our understanding of a revolution that has occurred during the last thirty years, roughly the career span of today's four-star generals.

The transformation of America's global position has also had abiding implications for the nature of officership. The Cold War was a real war in several senses, and not least in this: it required the sustained mobilization of a mass army (of draftees or short service volunteers) standing ready for large-scale conventional conflict. Today, ten years after the end of the Cold War, the requirements have changed. A smaller but still large military (at 1.4 million men and women—more than four times the size of the pre-1940 peacetime force) is poised to police unruly areas, from the mountains of northern Iraq to the slums of Haiti, from the rough terrain of Yugoslavia to the rebellious and bandit-riddled highlands of Colombia. Never before—including even the glory days of the Roman Empire—has one military so towered over all others on the planet. And certainly never before has the U.S. military exercised such political power in times of real peace. Theater commanders-in-chief act as important policymakers, moving easily from high command to ambassadorships in China or to control of American drug policy, coordinating more of American foreign policy than the bureaus of the State Department—if only because their resources are so much greater and their geographic scope so much wider.

The mentality of an imperial army is, of necessity, utterly different from that of a mass army. The former is composed of soldiers; the latter crusaders. The former accepts ambiguous objectives, interminable commitments and chronic skirmishes as a fact of life; the latter wants a definable mission, a plan for victory and decisive battles. In the imperial army the trooper finds fulfillment in the soldier's life; in the mass army in the belief that he exists to "fight and win America's wars." For some of the services (the navy, in particular), the transition to an imperial role has been much easier than it has been for others (the army, most notably). But to the extent that the American officer corps has developed a strategic lexicon rich in terms like "end states", "mission creep", "clear objectives" and "exit strategies", it clings to the strategic challenges of the last century. To the extent that civilian leaders mouth those phrases even as they fail to live up to the philosophy of war they imply, they increase the likelihood of unproductive civil-military friction.

Three Levels of Civil-Military Relations

THESE TWO facts—the end of the mass army and the rise of the United States to unequalled global power—create the backdrop for the current debate about civil-military relations in the United States. Some of the confusion in that debate stems from a failure to distinguish among the three levels of civil-military relations, upon each of which different

[2]Powell, "The American GI", *Time*, June 14, 1999, p. 71.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forces operate. These are, first, the relationship between society and the armed forces as a whole, that is, the realm of culture, mores and attitudes; second, the interaction between the military as a set of institutions and their counterparts in civil society, such as the clash between military organizations and the press, the courts or environmental groups; and, third, the power relationships at the pinnacle of government, including the intricate web of individual leaders, advisers and subordinates who together shape policy, particularly as regards the use of force. In all three realms great changes have taken place over the last two generations, and not just in the United States.

Broadly speaking, armed forces around the world have found themselves yielding—willingly or grudgingly—to many of the trends in contemporary social norms. The prime example of this is the opening up of almost all career fields in the military to women (with the exception, and even that tenuous, of infantry combat). For nearly all of recorded history war has been the purview of men, and concepts of masculinity have rested heavily on their role—actual or potential—as fighters. In all developed societies, however, more and more fields have opened up to women, such that they now fly fighter planes, launch cruise missiles, and exercise command in ways that would have been unthinkable thirty or forty years ago. Similarly, as taboos have melted away in civil society with regard to homosexual behavior, militaries have found themselves forced to yield their deep-seated aversions to the requirements of neither asking nor telling.

These changes have affected the very essence of military life. There are other subtler but no less important trends. The rise of assertive individualism in civil society has gradually worked its way into the military as well. Soldiers live in quarters that look more like the dormitories inhabited by their college-bound counterparts than they do like the open bay barracks of old. Even the U.S. Navy, the most traditional of services, finds itself challenged by its civilian leadership to abandon its "conscription mentality" and provide amenities for sailors that accord more with civilian norms of privacy than do racks of bunks three or four high, and to promote a concept of using skilled workers for something more stimulating than chipping paint to keep them out of mischief.

To be sure, for a military organization to survive and be effective, it must retain an irreducible core of difference from civil society. This, perhaps, explains the size of the gap discovered by TISS researchers with regard to certain values. Military officers, researchers found, doubt that the civilian world values the same things they do, and perhaps they have a point. The requirements of self-sacrifice, discipline, loyalty and altruism demanded by military service cannot be squared with a society that, though brimming with energy, celebrates the opposite values of acquisition, individuality, career and geographic mobility, and self-actualization. What has not yet occurred, and what is required, is a redefinition of those core military virtues, an explicit understanding of how they differ from (and may not always be superior to) those of civil society, and a plan of action to guard them.

The relationship between the *institutions*, as opposed to the *mores*, of civil society and the military constitutes the second level of civil-military relations. Here, too, increased visibility and interpenetration have become the norm. In the United States and elsewhere, base commanders find themselves confined by environmental restrictions and bands of local activists seeking relief from the intrusions and disagreeable consequences of military training. Courts interject themselves into military administration and justice, as in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

example of the Israeli high court ordering the Israeli air force to take women into its pilot ranks. The media, expanding and ubiquitous, equipped with small audio and video recording devices, have access to soldiers in the field, even as editors can now order up detailed imagery of military installations from civilian sources. Enterprising contractors compete for work formerly done by arsenals and military depots.

The military, particularly after the looming threat of all-out conflict that overshadowed the Cold War, has become a public institution like many others, scrutinized, badgered and blocked by sophisticated and well-organized groups operating from a variety of motives, and disinclined to accept military necessity as a reason for accepting the Defense Department's wishes. At the same time, segments of the military feel comfortable, as perhaps never before, in incorporating the practices and, in some ways, the ethics of other institutions. A service organization will refer to the servicemen and women it supports as "customers", human resource experts import diversity experts to train a wayward work force, and generals happily tout the benefits of total quality management, or, for that matter, any other management fad. The Army Corps of Engineers, in the most notorious recent case, acts like any organization hungry for expanded budgets and missions, even if it means shrugging off direction from its nominal civilian masters.[3] The upshot is, once again, a blurring of civilian and military roles.

As an institution, the military has preserved its autonomy only in the areas of force structure and, to a somewhat lesser degree, the use of force. In these realms competing institutions do not exist, public interest is low, and the prestige of the military's technical expertise is still fairly high. This brings us to the third level of civil-military relations, that of soldier and statesman—the interactions of small groups of men and women at the very pinnacle of government. Here the picture looks very different. Whereas at the societal and institutional levels the armed forces appear on the defensive, as it were—pressed hard by forces in civil society at odds with those of military life—at the elite level the opposite holds true. The military retains a determining voice in shaping the tools of force and their use.

Military reluctance explains much of the hesitancy of the United States in committing military force to operations in Yugoslavia, for example. For a variety of reasons, officers do not hesitate to express, occasionally with stunning frankness, their views about how, when and whether the United States should use force. When, for example, sources on the Joint Chiefs of Staff leaked military opposition to the conduct of the Kosovo war to the press, the stated objection was that, "I don't think anybody felt like there had been a compelling argument made that all of this was in our national interest"—as if the determination was the military's to make.[4] It was in keeping, however, with a string of events in which the military had attempted to follow the advice of the editor of the U.S. Army's senior professional journal, when he declared:

> . . . there will still be instances where civilian officials with Napoleon complexes and micromanaging mentalities are prompted to seize the reins of operational control. And having taken control, there will be times when they then begin to fumble toward disaster. When this threatens to happen, the nation's top soldier . . . must summon the courage to rise and

[3]See, for example, Michael Grunwald, "Pentagon Vows to Rein in the Corps of Engineers", *Washington Post*, February 25, 2000.

[4]Bradley Graham, "Joint Chiefs Doubted Air Strategy", *Washington Post*, April 5, 1999.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

say to his civilian masters, 'You can't do that!' and then stride to the focal point of decision and tell them how it must be done.[5]

This squares with the TISS survey data, presented by Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn in this issue, showing officers declaring their belief that it is their duty to *insist* on the adoption of certain courses of action (rather than advise or advocate), including "setting rules of engagement" (50 percent), developing an "exit strategy" (52 percent), and "deciding what kinds of military units (air vs. naval, heavy vs. light) will be used to accomplish all tasks" (63 percent).

The major doctrinal statements about the use of force in the last twenty years—Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's six rules for intervention, and General Powell's doctrine of overwhelming force—reflect views dominant in the officer corps, views in turn molded by the military's understanding of the Vietnam War. They were echoed by politicians who believed, or found it convenient to declare that they believed, that the job of politicians was merely to set objectives, not scrutinize military plans, monitor the conduct of operations, and adjust strategy to circumstances. This trend reflects a combination of developments, including a common (mis)reading of the Vietnam War, an unwillingness on the part of civilian leaders to accept the responsibilities levied upon them by their offices, and a confidence in the technical expertise of soldiers. Recent doctrine, however, has flaws of the most terrible kind, for it presumes a kind of universal, apolitical and objective military expertise, when military judgment is, in fact, highly contextual and contingent, intimately connected with the politics of a situation and subject to a variety of prejudices and personal experiences. Still, the truth is that for the most part civilian political leaders have given up on the kind of hard questioning and probing that characterized the leadership style of those presidents who believed in civilian control and exercised it best—Lincoln, Roosevelt and Eisenhower among them. Each of these leaders, in different and large ways, violated massively the simplistic doctrine of civilian control that is current in the military and Congress: namely, politicians should set objectives and then get out of the way.[6]

Recent decades have seen a shift of power at the top to the uniformed military and away from civilian defense leaders. Many causes have been and still are at work here. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 increased the power of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, above all, its chairman. The entropy that afflicts the executive branch of government has played a role, too. The agonizingly slow processes for hiring political appointees, who alone can make decisions on behalf of an administration, and the excruciating burden of disclosure statements (not to mention divestitures and recusal from post-government employment) mean that the upper echelons of the government are often staffed by career personnel in acting positions, by lawyers or academics (often with little defense or even any governmental experience), or by no one. On a number of occasions military officers have served in policymaking positions up to the level of national security adviser, and more frequently at the deputy assistant or assistant secretary level.

---

[5]Lloyd Matthews, "The Politician as Operational Commander", *Army* (March 1996).

[6]This is the subject of my forthcoming book, *Supreme Command* (Free Press). Some examples include Eisenhower's crushing of Matthew Ridgway's doctrine of limited war during the 1950s, Roosevelt's insistence on the invasion of North Africa in 1942, and Lincoln's oversight of the Army of the Potomac through the end of the Civil War.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

During the Cold War the American military developed a cadre of sophisticated officers, trained in the arts of both domestic and foreign politics. From the West Point cadets trooping off to summer internships in congressional offices to colonels operating comfortably as multinational chiefs of staff, from rising young officers serving as White House Fellows in the Office of Management and Budget to theater commanders-in-chief who parley on equal (and more than equal) terms with ambassadors, defense ministers and even heads of state, the American military has become accustomed to extensive political and diplomatic roles. The upshot of all this is a military more willing than ever before to stake out policy positions, to denounce publicly military commitments, or to criticize policy.

At the same time, the military exercises control, to a remarkable degree, of force structure and weapons acquisition. To be sure, Congress adds or trims requests at the margin, and periodically the administration will cancel a large program, such as the navy's projected replacement of the A-6 bomber. But by and large, the services have successfully protected programs that reflect ways of doing business going back for decades. One cannot explain otherwise current plans for large purchases of short-range fighter aircraft for the air force, supercarriers and traditional surface warships for the navy, and heavy artillery pieces for the army. Civilian control has meant, in practice, a general oversight of acquisition and some degree of control by veto of purchases, but nothing on the scale of earlier decisions to, for example, terminate the draft, re-deploy fleets, or develop counterinsurgency forces. The result is a force that looks very much like a shrunken version of the Cold War military of fifteen years ago—which, indeed, was the initial post-Cold War design known as the "base force." The strength of the military voice and the weakness of civilian control, together with sheer inertia, has meant that the United States has failed to reevaluate its strategy and force structure after the Cold War. Despite a plethora of "bottom-up reviews" by official and semi-official commissions, the force structure remains that of the Cold War, upgraded a bit and reduced in size by 40 percent.

So What?

WHAT WILL be the long-term consequences of these trends? To some extent, they have become visible already: the growing politicization of the officer corps; a submerged but real recruitment and retention crisis; a collapse of junior officers' confidence in their own leaders;[7] the odd antipathy between military and civilian cultures even as the two, in some respects, increasingly overlap; deadlock in the conduct of active military operations; and stagnation in the development of military forces for a geopolitical era radically different from the past one. To be sure, such phenomena have their precedents in American history. But such dysfunction occurred in a different context—one in which the American military did not have the task of maintaining global peace or a predominance of power across continents, and in which the armed forces consumed barely noticeable fractions of economic resources and decisionmakers' time. Today, the stakes are infinitely larger.

For the moment, the United States dominates the globe militarily, as it does

[7]In one survey, only a third of military respondents said they believed that "when my Service's senior leaders say something, you can believe it is true." *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A Report of the CSIS International Security Program* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), p. 72.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economically and culturally. It is doubtful that such predominance will long go unchallenged; were that to be the case it would reflect a change in the human condition that goes beyond all human experience of international politics over the millennia. Already, some of the signs of those challenges have begun to appear: increased tension with the rising power of China, including threats of force from that country against the United States and its allies; the development of modes of warfare—from terrorism through the spread of weapons of mass destruction—designed to play on American weaknesses; the appearance of problems (peacemaking, broadly defined) that will resist conventional solutions. None of these poses a mortal threat to the Republic, or is likely to do so anytime soon. Yet cumulatively, the consequences have been unfortunate enough; the inept conclusion to the Gulf War, the Somalia fiasco, and dithering over American policy in Yugoslavia may all partially be attributed to the poor state of American civil-military relations. So too may the subtle erosion of morale in the American military and the defense reform deadlock, which has preserved, to far too great a degree, outdated structures and mentalities.

For now, to be sure, the United States is wealthy and powerful enough to afford such pratfalls and inefficiencies. But the full consequences will not be felt for some years, and not until a major military crisis—a challenge as severe in its way as the Korean or Vietnam War—arises. Such an eventuality, difficult as it may be to imagine today, could occur in any of a number of venues: in a conflict with China over Taiwan, in a desperate attempt to shore up collapsing states in Central or South America, or in a renewed outbreak of violence—this time with weapons of mass destruction thrown into the mix—in Southwest Asia.

The Problem of Professionalism

THE PARADOX of increased social and institutional vulnerability on the one hand and increased military influence on narrow sectors of policymaking on the other is the essence of the contemporary civil-military problem. Its roots lie not in the machinations of power hungry generals; they have had influence thrust upon them. Nor do they lie in the fecklessness of civilian leaders determined to remake the military in the image of civil society; all militaries must, in greater or lesser degree, share some of the mores and attitudes of the broader civilization from which they have emerged. The problem reflects, rather, deeper and more enduring changes in politics, society and technology.

The challenge to American policymakers and soldiers lies in admitting that there is a problem without exaggerating its size and scope. There is no danger of a coup, but there is dry rot. There is no threat even of a MacArthur-sized crisis between political and military high commands, but there is a level of mistrust, antipathy and condescension that is worrisome. There is no fear of collapse of civilian control, but there is erosion in some areas, distortion in others, and, more than anything else, confusion about the meaning of military professionalism under the new conditions—plus sheer ignorance and forgetfulness about what civilian control entails. What are the solutions?

In a welcome development, the United States Military Academy at West Point has created a Center for the Professional Military Ethic to begin rethinking the nature of military professionalism. It is long overdue. The old concept of officership rested on a melding of essentially aristocratic traditions with those of the newly emergent professions of the turn of the twentieth century, all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

re-interpreted in light of the American experience of mass warfare in the last 150 years. A new professional code and outlook is required, and with it a renewal of the concept of civilian control. Such a code cannot be a matter for internal military discussion alone; it must be a matter for public debate and articulation by political leaders, particularly those who have custody of the Department of Defense. The new understanding must come to terms, explicitly, with the new techniques of war, the new forms of military organization, and the new geopolitics of American strategy, as well as the enduring fundamentals of the military's place in a free society.

A useful point of departure would be the preparation of a Department of Defense white paper on civil-military relations and military professionalism—a capstone document that would lay out not only rules of the road but their rationale, for civilians and soldiers alike. Such a document should establish the basis for policy. It should, as well, serve as the basis not only for professional military education at all levels, but (together, perhaps, with a set of case studies) as a means of educating civilian leaders who may be new to the military. One place to begin might be *The Armed Forces Officer*, a pamphlet published in 1950 and continually revised, if not always read, up through 1988. It requires substantial revision, for it too is infected with the suspicion about civilian authority that is a troubling feature of contemporary civil-military relations.[8]

What might such a document cover?

(1) Recognition of the ways in which the military should and should not resemble civil society. Debates about whether officers, in particular, are held to a "higher standard of behavior" than their civilian counterparts are pointless. The standards are different, if, no doubt, in some respects more demanding. To a large extent this is a matter of education, of including the study of civil-military relations in war colleges and earlier in military careers. It should establish, as clearly as possible, the buffer required to protect the military from the mores and institutions of civil society, as well as the ways in which it must accommodate them.

(2) A strict interpretation of the bounds of acceptable military involvement in policymaking. In particular, this includes a clarification of the fine but essential distinction between political literacy—vital for an officer engaged in the complex tasks of peacekeeping or armed diplomacy—and politicization. As well, such an interpretation would imply far greater scrupulousness in excluding the military from policymaking positions (to include appointments as acting service secretaries, assistant secretaries of state or defense, or policymaking positions on the National Security Council).

(3) A re-examination of what "military advice" means in the context of a world without the immediate threat of large-scale war. Officers, and to a surprising extent their civilian counterparts as well, have been brought up with a naive, even simple-minded understanding of the intricate dialogue that occurs between civilian and military leaders regarding the use of force. The notion, for example, that it is inappropriate for civilian leaders to ask questions about the tools of force is pervasive yet misguided. The means chosen for the use of force can affect the goals sought and achieved; and if, as Clausewitz taught, politics pervades all

[8]For example: "Sometime in the 1960s, perhaps as a result of the self-examination process that came with the war in Vietnam, an old idea resurfaced among some politicians and intellectuals: Peace is all-important and should be obtained at any cost." *The Armed Forces Officer* (1988), pp. 2–5, http://www.dtic.mil/mil-ed/pamphlet/AFO18.pdf.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

aspects of war, no question by civilian authority is ever out of keeping with the nature of war itself. The idea that the military can define for itself what its proper strategic tasks may be—a notion far from uncommon in some circles—is out of keeping not merely with democratic institutions, but with the nature of war itself.

(4) A restatement of the principles of civilian control and of their logic. Indeed, much of the dismay arising from "the gap" reflects misunderstanding among citizens and politicians, even more than among soldiers, about the role of strong civilian control of the military in a democratic form of government. The quandary of civilian control in a democratic regime is that its powers are only self-limited. There is, *in principle*, no military decision that should fall beyond the purview of civilian leaders. *In practice*, however, civilians must know when to refrain from exercising the authority they rightly hold.

(5) Finally, a white paper should reflect, honestly and without embarrassment, the chronic tensions and difficulties of American civil-military relations. The occasional hostility between full-time soldiers and citizen-soldiers, the overweening aspirations of a MacArthur (and before him a Leonard Wood), the catastrophic experimentation in social engineering of the 1960s, the mutual mistrust and antipathy of the Clinton administration—all these must be aired. The notion that American civil-military relations have never been problematic because a coup has never threatened American democracy is dead wrong. Civil-military relations in the United States necessarily have been characterized by suspicion, manipulation and misunderstanding. Candor on that matter is one of the best possible antidotes.

The crisis in American civil-military relations is neither so immediate nor severe as to alarm the body politic. The ship of state is very far from hitting the rapids of open civil-military conflict. Rather, the problems more resemble disturbing currents running below a seemingly placid river. The hazards lie downstream and could take the form of a nasty shock from a submerged reef, whose presence is betrayed only by a few ripples on the surface. To dismiss those rocks as a matter of merely theoretical interest guarantees an unpleasant collision in the future. There are various prudent measures that might be taken to rectify the problem, some discussed here, others alluded to in the article by Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn. But none is more important than the willingness on the part of civilian and soldier alike to recognize the problems for what they are, to debate them in the public square, and thus to treat them with the high seriousness they deserve. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mentor for a Hegemon

The Rising Fortune of Alexander Hamilton

John L. Harper

THE twentieth century belonged to Thomas Jefferson. No historically conscious person can fail to note that, while one of Washington's most prominent memorials is dedicated to the Sage of Monticello, there is nothing similar—only a run-of-the-mill statue on the south side of the Treasury Department—dedicated to his great adversary, Alexander Hamilton. If the point were to commemorate their respective contributions to the building of this country, Hamilton, surely, would have the memorial and Jefferson would have to content himself with a mere statue. Despite the suggestion on his tombstone, Jefferson was not the sole author of the Declaration of Independence. He contributed little or nothing to the Revolutionary War effort or to the writing of the Constitution. He resigned in frustration and near nervous exhaustion as secretary of state. True, he was in the right place at the right time when French Louisiana landed on his lap.

For his part, Hamilton was as responsible as anyone for the establishment of the American state: the consolidation and funding of the national debt, the tax system, the customs service, the first Bank of the United States. He was instrumental in the launching of the navy in 1794. He promoted the protection of infant industry for national security purposes and to develop a domestic market for American products. Meanwhile, Jefferson and his sidekick James Madison did all they could to sabotage Hamilton's program of developing the sinews of national strength.

No historically conscious observer can fail to be struck, moreover, by the fact that one hundred years ago, at the dawn of the "American century", the standing of the two men was more or less the reverse of what it is now. Hamilton's reputation was high; Jefferson's was low. One explanation of the current odd state of affairs is that Hamilton needs no beatification. Manhattan and the Pentagon are his monuments. He won the basic argument with Jefferson about the kind of country we were going to be. But such a claim begs the question of his low standing in the eyes of both the intelligentsia and ordinary citizens.

The key to Jefferson's popularity is not what he did but what he stood for: above all, individual liberty. Jefferson embodies the values that Americans like to think they hold most dear. Of course, there has also been a great deal of conscious manipulation. Someone had to put Jefferson's face on the nickel and to build his memorial—and that someone was Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt wrapped

John L. Harper is professor of American foreign policy at the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

himself in Jefferson's mantle and made him the patron saint of the New Deal and modern liberalism. Even as he accumulated power for the central government with Hamiltonian relish, Roosevelt cast his fellow New Yorker as the villain.

By the same token, American conservatives, with some prominent exceptions, do not esteem or even know Hamilton. That is because postwar American conservatism has been, generally speaking, either libertarian or else hostile to a secularized industrial society, while Hamilton was neither of these. George Will picked Jefferson as "Person of the Millennium", while Hamilton was not even in the running. An influential traditional conservative, Russell Kirk, wrote,

> Alexander Hamilton, the financier, the party-manager, the empire-builder, fascinates those numerous Americans among whom the acquisitive instinct is confounded with the conservative tendency, and they, in turn, have convinced the public that the 'first American businessman' was the first eminent American conservative.

Hamilton, in other words, was a sorcerer's apprentice whose program of economic development undermined the kind of conservative order he supposedly desired.

Not even academic realists revere Hamilton. Kenneth Waltz, when reminded that Hamilton's writings are a gold mine for realists, acknowledged (with some regret) that today's students of international relations theory do not read much of anything written before the 1950s. In fact, there is only one group in recent memory that has looked on Hamilton as a genuine hero: Progressive Republicans like Theodore Roosevelt and Herbert Croly, who believed in activist government, a meritocratic elite and an assertive foreign policy. Along with Jefferson's prominence, the sad demise of Progressive Republicanism is the main reason for the decline of Hamilton's reputation in the public eye.

Return to Grace?

IF THE twentieth century has not been kind to Hamilton, what about the twenty-first? More than one observer has noted a recent swing of the pendulum in his favor. *National Review*'s Richard Brookhiser has declared his "return to grace." For *The Economist* Hamilton has been "making a comeback." At least ten books dealing with him have appeared in the past three years, compared with three or four in the previous decade. These offerings include Brookhiser's own *Alexander Hamilton: American* and Michael Lind's *Hamilton's Republic: Readings in the American Democratic Nationalist Tradition*. Lind's collection is a deliberate attempt to breathe life into a dormant tendency of thought and to apply its lessons to the contemporary political and cultural debate.

Aside from the enduring fascination of a life story that would require a Stendhal to do it justice, there appear to be several reasons for this recent revival of interest. Jefferson's stock has been falling for reasons that have nothing to do with Hamilton, but this has had a buoying effect on the latter's. Perhaps the most compelling reason is the post-Cold War search for a foreign policy model other than the prevailing strategy of trying to have America's finger in every pie. If Jeffersonian liberalism is the ultimate source of a policy of economic globalization and democratic "enlargement", it is only natural that those skeptical of such policies and preferring a more measured and discriminating American strategy should look to Hamilton.

They will find that he has many valuable and provocative things to say, but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that there are basic ambiguities in his life and message that make it hard to draw unequivocal lessons. It turns out that Hamilton was not exactly what he is often thought to have been. Moreover, while no one did more to establish the country, Hamilton was always an outsider, never fully at home or accepted in the United States. There is the inescapable sense with Hamilton that America was the stage he was acting on, but that the part he was playing originated elsewhere—and even that his chosen audience was somewhere else. He measured himself, in other words, against the likes of Pitt, Talleyrand and Bonaparte as much as against Jefferson, Madison and Jay.



CORBIS/Bettmann

An American Machiavelli

HAMILTON was, fundamentally, a kind of Machiavellian figure operating in the New World. His grasp of what the Florentine thinker meant by *la fortuna*, the fickle goddess of fortune, the force of circumstance, was practically innate. The history of the West Indies, where he grew up in the mid-eighteenth century, is the history of war, piracy, slave uprisings, sudden death from disease, economic boom and bust. His bankrupt father had disappeared and his mother had died by the time he was eleven. At the center of his character was a powerful drive to dominate fortune and create order, coexisting with a deep fatalism and pessimism about human life.

Hamilton was a person of exceptional *virtù*—highly intelligent, physically courageous, endowed with phenomenal energy and charm. As every schoolchild knows—this was also a defining feature of Machiavelli's *principe nuovo* or new prince—Hamilton was illegitimate. He was an upstart—in John Adams' notorious phrase, the "bastard brat of a Scotch peddlar"—and never allowed to forget it. Adams also called him "the Creole" to emphasize his parvenu, exotic roots. It should not be surprising, then, that an extraordinary ambition and obsession with personal honor ran through his life.

Like Machiavelli, Hamilton was inspired by the Greek and Roman idea that "the love of fame" was "the ruling passion of the noblest minds", meaning the kind of fame achieved only by the lawgivers and institution builders. He was also attracted by the noble prospect of ending it all in a blaze of glory and coming home on his shield. One sees this in his wartime letters and in his imploring Washington to allow him to lead an infantry attack before the British surrender at Yorktown that put an end to the war.

The key to Hamilton's political education was the army. He started out as an artillery officer and became Washington's protégé and closest aide. During the war he adopted a nationalist, as opposed to a state-centered, point of view. Like much of the officer corps, he came to see himself as part of a tiny elite struggling to create the country while most Americans

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stood idly by or feathered their own nests.

By war's end he believed that the states of the American confederation would either form a strong union or eventually fight each other—for example, over control of the West—and in the process become the tools of rival European powers. In the latter case, late eighteenth-century America would come to resemble early sixteenth-century Italy. The American states would fight each other despite—or rather in part because of—the fact that they had adopted highly democratic political systems. Hamilton's view of international politics derived from Machiavelli's view that it was precisely the element of popular participation that had made the Roman Republic such a successful expansionist state.

The first ambiguity in Hamilton has to do with the relationship between his basic views and the Constitution. Though he did as much as anyone to secure its ratification, he had serious doubts about whether the resulting government would be strong enough to survive. Hamilton was not really a federalist in the sense in which we use the term today. He favored a central government with a veto over state laws. He had serious doubts about democracy—after all, Greek history taught that democracies were often dominated by demagogues. To insulate the system against demagoguery and corruption by foreigners, Hamilton favored a senate and an executive elected for life (as in the Florentine Republic). One can only wonder how seriously the current presidential candidates would be taken if they were running for a life term.

Another ambiguity in Hamilton has to do with his relationship to the "parent state." Even as he fought the British, he made no secret of the fact that Britain was his chosen model. Britain's insular—not to be confused with isolated—and maritime destiny provided an example for America's own. The British executive had the kind of authority and continuity required to conduct foreign policy in a world where the law of the jungle usually prevailed. Hamilton particularly admired the way the British financial system had mobilized wealth on an unprecedented scale to wage war. Hamilton's partisans, from Henry Cabot Lodge to Clinton Rossiter, have denied or downplayed his leaning toward Britain, but he was essentially an Anglophile. Unlike the radicals Jefferson and Adams, his preference in 1775 was political autonomy within the British Empire. British arrogance and obtuseness could drive Hamilton to distraction, but he always favored a kind of Anglo-American entente in which, he believed, America would eventually play the leading role.

The message of his famous *Report on Manufactures* is similarly ambiguous. To the British it said: Mercantilism is not necessarily our preference, but since you have imposed restrictions on our trade and shipping, we can try to beat you at your own game. On the other hand, Hamilton held out hope that the British might open their markets and the two sides could become a single trading system, as they had been before 1776. Hamilton did not believe—despite the sentiments attributed to him by George W. Bush—that "commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men." (Amazingly, Bush attributes to Hamilton the very view that the latter is attacking in the *Federalist* 6.) He was not—*pace* Walter Russell Mead—the prophet of a "fully integrated world economy." But nor—despite what Pat Buchanan has argued—was he a strict economic nationalist. In other words, he was not a "Hamiltonian" in the sense that term is often understood today.

To say that Hamilton was Machiavellian is not, of course, to say that he was a carbon copy of the original (due allowance must be made for the different

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intellectual milieus in which they operated) or that he consciously emulated Machiavelli (although his mother's collection of books was said to include a French translation of *The Prince*). Machiavelli, after all, had a bad name in the eighteenth century. Even Frederick the Great, one of his aptest pupils, penned a famous essay against him. Nor does it mean that there were not fundamental differences between Hamilton and Machiavelli, for instance over the very existence of natural rights.

Rather, it means two things. First, as already suggested, Hamilton's personal story is that of a kind of prince, who uses audacity and cunning in his drive for legitimacy and fame. Nowhere was such cunning more on display than in his involvement in foreign policy. Hamilton maintained his own channel, unauthorized by George Washington or Secretary of State Jefferson, to the British government. He consistently misled Washington as to the extent of his pro-British views. That is to say, the kind of "neutrality" he recommended during the European war that followed the revolution of 1789 was always more ostensible than real because, as a practical matter, it favored Britain over France. In the late 1790s, he attempted to exercise control over key members of Adams' cabinet as a private citizen in New York.

Second, there is the basic similarity of outlook and temperament, starting with the almost romantic belief in the regeneration and greatness of their countries, to be accomplished, at least in part, by heroic leadership. Both lived through a "revolution in military affairs", in Machiavelli's case the one that began with the French invasion of Italy using artillery in 1494, in Hamilton's the one launched by Napoleon in the 1790s. Both were deeply preoccupied with the problems of military organization and favored national and citizen armies over the hiring of foreign troops. Both viscerally disliked half-measures and procrastination, and were prone to despair over the human raw material they had to work with. Hamilton became bitterly alienated from what he saw as basic traits of the American character, including localism, extreme individualism and the belief in American moral superiority. On American "exceptionalism" he wrote, "Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age?"

Finally, there is the feeling of kinship with an idealized foreign model, in Machiavelli's case the Roman Republic, in Hamilton's contemporary Britain. The two states were far from identical, but they did have something fundamental in common: both were dynamic, self-aggrandizing states that saw expansion as necessary to security and well-being—states inclined to prefer glory to republican purity, if that were to be the choice.

Hamilton's Ten Commandments

HAMILTON's foreign policy advice in the 1780s and 1790s would seem, on the face of it, to belie the image of an aggrandizing Machiavellian. His voluminous writings can be reduced to a decalogue of axioms emphasizing, among other things, solvency and self-restraint:

1. "There can be no time, no state of things, in which credit is not essential to a nation." Like the "declinists" of our day, he is reminding us of the permanent nexus between financial stability and national security.

2. "Not only the wealth, but the independence and security of a Country, appear to be materially connected with the prosperity of manufactures. Every nation . . . ought to . . . possess within itself all the essentials of national supply." The state must promote the health of industry, especially defense-related industry, regardless of the dictates of the market.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

3. "Foreign influence is truly the Grecian horse to a republic." What we call today domestic lobbies, emotionally and financially tied to other countries, undermine republican virtue and pervert the national interest.

4. "Whenever a particular nation adopts maxims of conduct contrary to those generally established among nations calculated to disturb their tranquillity & to expose their safety, they may justifiably make a common cause to oppose & controul [sic] such Nation." The clear implication is Anglo-American cooperation to uphold the European balance of power.

5. "There have been . . . almost as many popular as royal wars." It would be foolish to think that in creating a world of perfect democracies one would have altered human nature or eliminated the causes of deadly conflict. What we call today the "democratic peace" is a will-of-the-wisp.

6. "Wars more often proceed from angry and perverse passions than from cool calculations of Interest." The statesman should always allow for the role of emotion, and especially of injured pride, in the behavior of potential adversaries.

7. "Mildness in the *manner* and *firmness* in the *thing* are most compatible with true dignity, and almost always go farther than harshness and stateliness." Or as Theodore Roosevelt was to put it one hundred years later, "speak softly and carry a big stick."

8. "It is often wise by some early condescension to avoid the danger of future humiliation." Going more than halfway to settle disputes—appeasing the other party—may be a way to buy time or to avoid needless and costly wars.

9. "Evil is seldom as great, in the reality, as in the prospect." In other words, external threats are usually not all they are cracked up to be, and one should try to avoid fulfilling one's own gloomy prophecies.

10. If there were to be a summation of the Hamiltonian approach, it would be in the injunction "ever to combine energy with moderation." Running through these axioms is the assumption that a distinction should always be made between what the country *needs* to do in order to survive and what it might *want* to do in the world if it could. It is, arguably, an approach as valid now as it was two hundred years ago. In this view, Hamilton becomes the patron of a self-centered, robust, but self-contained and cautiously accommodationist foreign policy. Yet to understand Hamilton one must also ask the question whether *he* would argue that his philosophy of foreign affairs is appropriate to the position of the United States today.

A clue to the probable answer lies in his observation that, "A very powerful state may frequently hazard a high and haughty tone with good policy, but a weak State can scarcely ever do it without imprudence. The last is yet our character, though we are the embryo of a great empire." Hamilton would surely point out that many of his axioms were designed for a country that was unarmed, thinly populated, surrounded by potential enemies, and beset by serious sectional tensions—a "Hercules in the cradle."

When Hamilton and Washington spoke in the Farewell Address about taking advantage of America's "detached and distant situation", they were talking about conditions in 1796. They fully expected that, as the country became stronger, as distances grew shorter due to improvements in ocean transport, it would join the ranks of the world powers. One had only to look at what the British had managed to achieve, and at America's power base compared to theirs. Hamilton did not say exactly what he meant by an American "empire", but he presumably foresaw that the United States, by virtue

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of its commercial and naval might, would come to exercise hegemony (not the same as formal control) over wide areas of the globe.

What, now that the United States is the number one world power, would Hamilton have to say on the central, vexing issue of the new century? Should it try to prevent the emergence of "peer competitors" even at the risk of exhausting itself over the long run? It is conceivable that he might argue, in the spirit of his 1790s advice, that the United States should appease the Chinese by granting them naval supremacy on their own doorstep, just as the British prudently conceded U.S. naval supremacy in the Western Hemisphere one hundred years ago. He might argue that the United States should gracefully accept, and even abet, the rise of a powerful united Europe just as Britain accepted, more or less gracefully, the rise of the United States.

But it seems more likely that Hamilton's geopolitical instincts, akin after all to those of British statesmen, would lead him to oppose the emergence of a single power center on the European continent that might defy the United States elsewhere in the world. And it would be more in the spirit of Hamilton's fatalistic and imperial vision of America to argue that it has no choice but to try to keep allies and client states in line (lest they climb on someone else's bandwagon) and potential challengers at bay. As Pericles (whose name Hamilton used as a pseudonym) said, "Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go." Or as an acute modern observer put it, "Great power status is lost, as it is won, by violence. A great power does not die in its bed." We should have realized that long ago. What little meliorism one detects in Hamilton's view of international politics (and there is precious little) is based on his faith in American, or rather Anglo-American, military and economic strength.

The Imperial Temptation

A BASIC unanswered question, and fundamental ambiguity, in Hamilton is that if you succeed in creating institutions and in pursuing policies designed to generate the power needed to survive, what is to prevent you sooner or later from over-reaching yourself abroad, and even threatening liberty at home? Is it really possible to be rich and austere, energetic and moderate, imperial and republican, at the same time?

The last episode in Hamilton's career is a kind of parable in this respect. In 1798, through Washington's patronage and over President Adams' strong objections, Hamilton had himself appointed inspector general of an army that he intended to lead, in cooperation with the British in the conquest of the Floridas, Louisiana and possibly parts of Latin America. Hamilton was not (as Jeffersonians have always claimed) a militarist, and his view of the French threat to American territory during the Franco-American "quasi-war" was a reasonable one, especially before the destruction of the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile in August 1798. But it is hard to avoid the conclusion that he was driven by dreams of personal military glory, and that his model at this point was that other general, also born on an island, also an artillery officer by origin, also about five feet seven inches tall. Hamilton did all he could to prevent Adams from not having a war with France and Spain. When Adams accused Hamilton of pro-British views and decided to send a peace mission to France, Hamilton tried to destroy him by writing a famous pamphlet. The result was that he helped to break up the Federalist Party and to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

make his arch-rival, Jefferson, president of the United States. The quarrel can be seen to mark the beginning of a historic split over foreign policy between Hamiltonians, or conservative internationalists, with their world power ambitions, and conservative isolationists (including Adams' son, John Quincy), who would pursue a narrower, more continental vision of the national destiny.

For Hamilton, in any event, it was a kind of political suicide, anticipating what was a kind of literal suicide in the duel with Aaron Burr four years later. Hamilton's army, despite the extraordinary energy its commander devoted to raising and training it, was used only to round up a handful of tax evaders in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, then disbanded in disgrace.

The foreign policy legacy of Thomas Jefferson, according to Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson, is fundamentally ambiguous. His message can be read to support the notion of America as passive exemplar of liberal values, but also of America as crusader, actively attempting to reform the world. It would be comforting to think otherwise of Hamilton; in other words, that he offers a clear set of assumptions and lessons for the new century. But such is not the case.

In the end, his foreign policy legacy is also ambiguous. The compelling messages of his remarkable career and writings are solvency, realism and the creative role of the state. But another is what Tucker and Hendrickson call the "imperial temptation", the impulse to solve problems through force rather than painstaking diplomacy, the tendency toward hubris, the loss of self-control. The first part of his legacy entitles him to a sustained revival of interest in his life and work, a rank second to none in the national pantheon, and a monument of his own. The second part should give us pause. □

www.nationalinterest.org

Read current issue extracts • Subscribe • Buy back issues • Search archives • And more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The French Position

Philip H. Gordon

IN AN UNGUARDED moment during last year's primary season, Senator John McCain referred to a minor diplomatic incident as "one of the many reasons I hate the French." McCain probably does not hate the French, but his comment does give some indication of France's place in the American imagination. For more than fifty years, France has been tweaking America's nose, refusing to tow the U.S. line on subjects as diverse as NATO, Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, and what Americans until very recently were encouraged to think of as "rogue states"—the very concept of which, of course, the French do not accept.

The latest example of French obstreperousness has been the growing tendency of France's leaders to criticize American unilateralism and call for a more multipolar world, in which a strong Europe provides a counterweight to the United States. Statements such as the recent one of Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine, that France "cannot accept a politically unipolar world, nor a culturally uniform world, nor the unilateralism of a single hyperpower", led Michael Gonzales to warn, in a *Wall Street Journal* article of November 23, 1999, of "a serious split in the North Atlantic Alliance" caused by France's "increasingly petulant attacks on the U.S." The article, entitled "Can America Trust the French?", suggested that France's aim was to "contain U.S. might in all areas." Former Reagan administration official and George W. Bush adviser Richard Perle provided the answer: "To be perfectly blunt about it, we don't trust the French."

Clinton administration officials are obviously more circumspect, but a similar sentiment extends to a wide variety of subjects. France is invariably seen in Washington as the ally most likely to challenge U.S. positions and oppose American leadership, and most determined to obstruct and dilute American power. In June 2000 U.S. officials were stunned by France's refusal to sign the Warsaw Declaration on the strengthening of democracy, a U.S. initiative and a high priority of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. One senior U.S. official tersely commented that "107 countries had come to support democracy, but only 106 actually did so." Similarly, after a series of speeches late last year by French leaders calling for a more "multipolar world", State Department spokesman James Rubin was moved to comment that it was "passing strange that France would spend so much energy and focus so much attention on the danger to them of a strong

Philip H. Gordon is Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies and director of the Center on the United States and France at the Brookings Institution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States rather than the dangers that we and France together face from countries like Iraq." French critiques of American policy are often seen not merely as alternative approaches to a difficult issue (as, for example, when similar critiques come from the British or Germans), but rather as attacks on America itself.

One could, of course, argue that it matters little whether the French and the Americans disagree. Both countries have quarreled periodically over the past sixty years, but they tend to stand together on the vital issues of the day, as in Kosovo last year. As difficult as France can be, it is one of only two allies (along with Britain) that share basic American values and interests and that have the resources, the military means and the will to take substantial risks in the name of international security. Particularly as the European Union seeks to develop its own foreign and security policy, France remains the linchpin to friendly relations with America's most vital, democratic and prosperous allies, and the single most important factor in determining whether the EU will cooperate or compete with the United States. Like it or not, Americans are going to have to live with a France that is as proud, assertive and—most infuriatingly—as fundamental to world order in the twenty-first century as it was in the twentieth.

Historical Ups and Downs

ANY suggestion that France and the United States always disagree would be inaccurate. From Lafayette's contribution to American independence to the extremely close U.S.-French military cooperation in Kosovo last year, there have been countless examples of the two countries standing together on important, contentious issues: the Berlin and Cuban missile crises in the 1950s and 1960s, the Euromissile debate of the early 1980s, and Bosnia after 1994–95, to name just a few. Still, the more constant themes of the past half century have been resentment and frustration.

In the 1940s, the driving force in Franco-American relations was General de Gaulle's deep resentment of Washington's recognition of the Vichy regime and its refusal during wartime to recognize the Free French as the legitimate government of France. Roosevelt's numerous snubs of France in general and de Gaulle in particular—excluding France from the Yalta Summit, summoning de Gaulle to meet in Casablanca (i.e., on French soil), or planning to introduce a new French currency without French consent—intensified the estrangement. The common threads in all these incidents were a refusal by America to take the French seriously or treat them with respect, and American exasperation at France's stubborn and prickly insistence on having its positions and interests taken fully into account.

In the 1950s, bilateral frictions revolved around America's refusal to support France's efforts to protect its colonial interests, despite French claims—very similar to American claims in subsequent decades—that their global policies provided a foundation of world order and Western security. In Indochina, the United States provided significant military aid to the French for several years, but in 1954 it allowed the final French garrison at Dien Bien Phu to fall, refusing to risk American troops or even air power to save it. Two years later at Suez, the American position went further. Eisenhower opposed the French and British intervention publicly and undermined it through the manipulation of oil and currency markets, a deep betrayal in the eyes of many French people. Indeed, Suez proved a turning point in the way

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

France viewed its relations with the United States. Whereas the lesson of Suez for the British was to "never again get on the wrong side of the Americans", for the French it was to "never again depend on them." In Algeria—the central issue of French foreign and domestic policy from 1954 to 1962—the French found no more support from Washington than they had anywhere else. Washington believed it alone defined the interests of the Western alliance, and pulling French chestnuts out of the North African fire was not part of the plan.

In 1958 General de Gaulle returned to power, and with him France's reputation as a difficult ally assumed a new dimension. Determined never again to suffer the dependence on Washington he had endured in the 1940s, the general created an independent French nuclear force, strongly opposed by Washington, and withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure. Abroad, de Gaulle felt no compunction about bluntly criticizing America's war in Vietnam or about breaking with Israel, America's ally, after the 1967 Six-Day War. With the Soviet Union, meanwhile, de Gaulle set out to pursue "détente, entente and cooperation." He denounced the reserve currency role of the U.S. dollar as an "exorbitant privilege" and sought to construct French "national industrial champions" to overcome the dominance of U.S.-based multinationals that were heavily invested in France. For Americans, all this amounted to more evidence of the same: a quarrelsome, free-riding ally unwilling to see the wisdom of U.S. positions.

The 1970s opened on a familiar note, with France criticizing U.S. management of the international monetary system and refusing to accept the idea of a U.S.-led energy policy after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The decade ended with disputes over détente. French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing refused to back NATO's Euromissile deployment on the thin grounds that France was not part of the alliance's military commands, and he refused to take a tough line on the Soviet Union even after Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan. After 1981, President François Mitterrand changed tack to eliminate those two sources of friction, but new ones quickly arose. Mitterrand opposed Ronald Reagan's arms build-up, refused to accept the logic of supporting "freedom fighters" in Central America, denounced the Strategic Defense Initiative, and pointed to massive U.S. budget deficits as further evidence of America's irresponsibility as a global power.

The end of the Cold War raised new issues, but the question of U.S. global leadership, and France's willingness (or lack thereof) to embrace it, has lingered on. France strongly opposes the U.S. policy of confronting rogue states with economic sanctions and military force, preferring the tools of dialogue and trade. In Europe the French continue to push for a European defense structure that could act independently of NATO. Increasingly vocal critiques of U.S.-led globalization and of the perils of a unipolar world have become a staple of French rhetoric. It was perhaps fitting that the last major French foreign policy speeches of the century, by President Jacques Chirac and Foreign Minister Védrine in November 1999, focused on the imperative of promoting multipolarity. Such themes could have formed the basis of French speeches at any point over the previous sixty years.

The sources of Franco-American friction over the past sixty years have thus been constant. France, resentful of American power, has been unwilling to play the passive junior partner in an alliance dominated by the United States, and the United States, in turn, has never been willing to modify its approach. Although the *issues* have changed enor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mously—from colonial conflicts and the Cold War to dealing with "rogue states" and humanitarian interventions—the *issue* has not: Paris is unwilling to let Washington dictate the terms of world order.

Why We Clash

FOR centuries before World War II, France was a major political, military and economic power, with control not only over its own fate, but over that of large parts of the world. As recently as 1930, the United States was focused inward, unsure of its international role, struggling with economic depression, and determined to stay out of European affairs. France, by contrast, boasted at that time the most powerful army in Europe, a hugely successful economy not yet slowed by the Wall Street crash, colonial holdings in Asia, Africa, South America and the Middle East, a widely used language, and a culture appreciated around the globe. Coming to terms with a fall from these heights to being a medium-sized power has not been easy.

France is not the only European power to have been eclipsed by the United States, but its case is unique. Germany was a great European power, but it never had the global presence of France, and in any case lost any sense of truly global (especially military) ambition after the Second World War. A better comparison might be Britain. Yet the British possessed an enormous advantage over the French: given its cultural, linguistic and historical links to the United States, the United Kingdom at least had the option of trying to influence Washington—"playing Athens to America's Rome", as Prime Minister Harold Macmillan once put it—an option not available to France. Unwilling to surrender entirely its global influence, France was left to exercise its influence in the only way it knew how—often by getting in the way of the United States.

Many of the clashes between the United States and France are not so much the result of differences as of similarities. Both want to be major world powers, and both seek recognition as such. Both see themselves as significantly responsible for developments in various parts of the world, and both—as a result of their respective eighteenth-century revolutions—have traditions of attempting to shape the world in their own image. Not only do they seek to do this by imposing their distinctive national cultures and socioeconomic models on others, but, as Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out, both seem to have trouble distinguishing between what is good for them and what is good for the world as a whole. (Nearly all French leaders and experts seem to believe that multipolarity is the healthiest formula for the management of the international system, whereas many Americans tend to think that system functions better with a single leader.) So long as France and the United States remain determined to leave their respective marks on the world, clashes may thus be inevitable even when fundamental interests are shared.

Where the two countries do differ significantly is not so much in how they define their interests but in how they seek to safeguard them. France tends to adopt a patient, *laissez faire* stance toward problems—accepting ambiguity and seeking mainly to limit the impact of those problems. The United States impatiently and assertively searches out solutions, often based on a technological fix, with a clear-cut result. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, the French approach, at least until 1995, was to avoid taking sides while attempting to limit the damage of Serb aggression. The Americans, conversely, first insisted on avoiding involvement, and then, once that became unsustainable,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

took sides and intervened with massive military power. In Iraq the French and American stances are equally at variance. France may not like Saddam Hussein, but in the absence of alternatives it looks to ease sanctions and live with a problem that it figures it can control. The United States feels it must take action—sanctions, air strikes, aid to the opposition—designed to *fix* the problem, or at least foster the impression that it is trying to do so.

Védrine's distancing himself from Albright's democracy promotion conference last summer also shows how France's proclivity for living with the world as it is contrasts with America's determination to improve it. The current dispute over national missile defense is yet another example: French and American assessments of the emerging threat are similar; what is different is the U.S. determination to solve the problem—to avoid vulnerability by counting on technology, as opposed to a French willingness to live with the problem.

These contrasting approaches, like much else in this story, are largely the products of dissimilar histories. France's relative acceptance of vulnerability and its fatalism derive from centuries of living with danger, enduring invasions, and experiencing the complexities of international relations. America's "can do" attitude, by contrast, results from the country's idealistic birth, its advantageous geography, and its preponderance of power.

Why We Still Clash

WHEN THE COLD War ended, many serious observers predicted that the traditional tensions between France and the United States would erode. A new generation in France, the argument went, would overcome its reservations about U.S. power, the United States—focused on domestic affairs—would come to accept the importance of a stronger Europe, and France would seek better relations with America to balance a united and more assertive Germany. Looking back at the disputes of the 1990s, it is clear that the rapprochement has not taken place. To be sure, the geopolitical stakes have diminished since the United States and France clashed over colonies and the Cold War, and a new generation of English-speaking French men and women care more about starting Internet companies than about whether de Gaulle should have been present at Yalta or whether there are too many McDonalds in France. At the same time, however, several features of the current geopolitical environment actually make Franco-American comity even harder to achieve than before.

The first such feature is the unprecedented breadth of U.S. power. When Védrine uses the term *hyperpuissance*, he means to evoke something even greater than a *superpuissance* of the Cold War. Even if not meant to be derogatory (*hyper*, in French, is a neutral prefix), the hyperpower concept nonetheless calls to mind for the French a problematic feature of the international system. The French public seems to feel the same way: in a 1999 opinion poll, majorities responded that the United States had "excessive influence" in all categories of power: cultural, economic, military and political. In a similar vein, 68 percent said they were worried about America's "sole superpower" status. In fact, French leaders routinely frame their appeals for a "more multipolar world" as criticisms not of America as such but simply of the concept of unipolarity. Unfortunately, this is small comfort for Americans, who rightly interpret the French aim as a reduction of U.S. power and influence.

Senior U.S. diplomats sometimes throw up their hands in despair and say

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there is nothing they can do since the French now oppose "not what we do but who we are", but that is only half the story. The French have a problem not only with how much power the United States has, but also with the way it wields that power. Védrine now asks the same question de Gaulle used to ask in the 1960s: "whether the United States is capable of going from unilateralism to multilateralism, and accepting a partnership . . . that is anything other than fleeting and incomplete." What for many Americans are signs of the burdens of leadership and the willingness to make tough decisions are for the French signs that the United States "thinks it can do what it wants, where it wants, whenever it wants", as the head of the French parliament's Defense Commission, Paul Quilès, has put it. The U.S. willingness to act unilaterally when necessary may be an inevitable consequence of having so much power; more than one French colleague I have spoken with privately admits that if France had this much power it would probably be "even worse." Indeed, Védrine himself candidly concedes in his new book, *Les Cartes de la France*, that many Europeans think the same thing—that "if by a stroke of fate the French were to find themselves in the same position as the Americans today we would be more unbearable than they are!"

Growing European integration—especially in foreign and defense policy—has also been complicating U.S.-French relations. For years the French have acknowledged that their only real hope of maintaining a prominent role in the world is to stand on the European platform. This is what Macmillan meant when he said that de Gaulle "often says 'Europe' but means 'France.'" During the Cold War, few Europeans were willing to follow France's lead. It was easier and cheaper to rely on American geopolitical leadership, and France's neighbors for the most part shared neither its skepticism of American intentions nor its desire for a prominent world role. All this made it simple for Americans to profess an interest in a stronger and more united Europe, while never really having to worry about the consequences were such a Europe actually to emerge.

A unified Europe with a distinct political profile remains a key French objective—this was most recently made clear in Chirac's June 2000 Bundestag speech, in which the French president called for a "pioneering group" of EU countries to steer the union after its enlargement, and encouraged Germany, alongside France, to think and act like a great power. And whereas the French remain more keen than other Europeans to see Europe become a major geopolitical actor, certain developments give them hope that their neighbors will soon see the light. First, there is the newly launched euro, which the French have for years viewed as the precondition to European integration and a common foreign policy. Second are changes in Germany, which has been overcoming its aversion to projecting military force and showing an almost France-like irritation with U.S. hegemony, notably after Washington vetoed Berlin's nominee to run the International Monetary Fund. Perhaps most important has been the drive toward a unified security and defense policy, stimulated largely by new attitudes toward Europe in London. The British naturally stress that the EU defense initiative is compatible with a strong role for Washington (and thus NATO), and that EU and NATO capabilities should be seen as complementary. But unless and until France and the United States exhibit more trust in each other's ambitions than they do now, Europe's push to enhance its defense autonomy could easily prove a new source of tension between the two coun-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tries. In fact, it already has generated considerable transatlantic friction.

The final reason Franco-American differences have not faded is globalization—the new ease with which people, capital, goods and ideas travel across borders. The effects of globalization have been felt especially keenly in France, which has long been proud of its *dirigiste* economy, distinct national culture and national independence. Of course, not all of the French agree with José Bové, the small farmer who became something of a national hero last year for vandalizing a McDonald's and denouncing globalization, but many of them share some of these same apprehensions: 67 percent of the French worry that globalization threatens French identity; 52 percent reject the American economic model; and 80 percent do not want to emulate the American lifestyle. Bestsellers in France this year include *The World Is Not Merchandise*, a tract by Bové criticizing globalization and bad American food, and *A Strange Dictatorship*, a diatribe against U.S.-inspired liberal capitalism by Vivianne Forrester, whose previous attack on the liberal model, *The Economic Horror*, sold over 350,000 copies in France. The fact that many French citizens equate globalization with Americanization and are concerned with its effect on their lifestyle and culture by no means guarantees diplomatic friction with the United States. But it doesn't help.

Limiting the Differences

NO ONE should expect the problems between Paris and Washington to go away anytime soon. But there are a few things American leaders could do to make the relationship less tense and more productive than it currently is.

The first step should be to stop treating every disagreement with France as an attack on the United States itself. Clearly there are cases when the French are motivated more than anything else by a desire to constrain the United States—French leaders themselves implicitly admit as much when they call for a multipolar world. But more often than not their positions derive from a logical understanding of France's own interests; if they are to be rejected it should be on the merits of the case rather than reflexively. Historically, de Gaulle's positions on the Vietnam War, détente and the Arab-Israeli conflict were all seen in the United States as particularly egregious examples of French anti-Americanism. But did these positions not look rather better over time? Today, are we so certain that maintaining sanctions on Iraq and pursuing national missile defense are so obviously the right approaches that the articulation of possible alternative courses must be a sign of hostility to our goals and our leadership? Even as he calls for alternatives to a world run exclusively by the United States, Védrine has urged France to move away from what he calls "a vain and routine aggressiveness [in its relations with the United States] that led to nothing and . . . compromised our chances to convince our other essential partners to undertake anything important with us." Maybe it is time for the United States to try out a similar approach in its dealings with France.

A second useful principle would be to keep in mind that France, however frustrating it might be, is likely to be at America's side when it is most needed. This was true during the Cold War, when American protection afforded France the luxury of standing by the United States only when it really had to, and it remains true today, when the stakes on most international issues are small enough that narrow national interests and the desire for national recognition can take priority over transatlantic unity. To be sure, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ideal ally from an American point of view would be one that combined the resources and willingness to act of the French with the Atlanticist orientation and lack of geopolitical ego of the Dutch or Italians. But for all the reasons discussed above, that is not a choice for France. Americans ultimately will have to take the advantages of an assertive France with the disadvantages; and there are times when a difficult but activist ally may be better than the reverse.

A third suggestion is for the United States, at the peak of its power, to share as much glory and credit with France and Europe as possible. In Paris a little bit of *gloire* goes a long way. And since many of our disagreements are concerned less with interests or substance than pride and perception, why not allow the small number of allies with global ambitions to have a greater stake in global leadership and engagement? If allowing the French to deploy the Eurocorps, lead the Macedonia Extraction Force, and dub the Dayton Accord the "Elysée Treaty" leads them to work more closely with NATO, devote more resources to common objectives, and feel a greater sense of contribution to a common cause, Washington should be more than pleased to share the limelight. As it should, too, in Lebanon or the Golan Heights. American gloating about its own pre-eminence and indispensability only diminishes the willingness of France and others to cooperate with U.S. dictates.

Even if Washington does all the right things in dealing with France, Paris may not always reciprocate, which leads to a fourth piece of advice for dealing with France: when necessary, isolate it. The French have in the past shown a high tolerance for isolation on key international issues, but we are now a long way from the days in which standing alone—while building a national nuclear force or blocking the European Community with an "Empty Chair" policy—was considered a mark of honor in France. The French may sometimes resign themselves to standing alongside only the Russians and Chinese at the UN Security Council—as was recently the case with regard to Iraq—but this is far from their preferred position. Instead, and particularly as the French come to see their future tied intimately to that of the rest of Europe, they will only maintain a policy that the United States rejects if their European partners are behind them. If America has the merits of the argument on its side, and most Europeans agree with it, France will have a very hard time standing in its way; if all the Europeans side with the French position, it is quite possible that a U.S. policy pursued in isolation will not succeed.

Finally, in its relations with France the United States should go out of its way to preclude the injection of French "theorizing" into foreign policy debates. Principles and concepts are very important to the French; as the joke goes, even if something works in practice they want to know whether it works in theory. Thus Americans are baffled when the French dogmatically insist that NATO's Strategic Concept should authorize military intervention only under a UN mandate, while at the same time calling for NATO intervention in Kosovo even without such a mandate. This rigorous defense of pride and principle exasperates Americans, and it is best resisted, whenever possible, by avoiding the theoretical debate in the first place. The United States and France are at their worst when they are quibbling over abstract principles like whether NATO has a "right of first refusal" or whether "neither the EU nor NATO is subordinate to the other." On such issues they would be better off saying nothing.

Following these modest suggestions will by no means eliminate the sources of friction that animate the Franco-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American relationship. But testing a new formula might help attenuate that friction, and lead to a relationship in which disputes between the two countries are seen as legitimate disagreements between relatively trusted friends. It may prove to be much more boring for those of us who like to follow such things, and Americans may come to miss "hating the French." But we would both be better off. □

Different Sides of the Gate

Just south of the United States Military Academy at West Point is the village of Highland Falls. Main Street of Highland Falls is familiar to everyone: the First National Bank with venetian blinds, real estate and insurance offices, yellow homes with frilly victorian porticos, barber shops, and wooden churches—the tiresome monotony and the incredible variety and discordancy of small-town commercialism. The buildings form no part of a whole: they are simply a motley, disconnected collection of frames coincidentally adjoining each other, lacking common unity or purpose. On the military reservation the other side of South Gate, however, exists a different world. There is ordered serenity. The parts do not exist on their own, but accept their subordination to the whole. Beauty and utility are merged in gray stone. Neat lawns surround compact, trim homes, each identified by the name and rank of its occupant. The buildings stand in fixed relation to each other, part of an over-all plan, their character and station symbolizing their contributions, stone and brick for the senior officers, wood for the lower ranks. The post is suffused with the rhythm and harmony which comes when collective will supplants individual whim. West Point is a community of structured purpose, one in which the behavior of men is governed by a code, the product of generations. There is little room for presumption and individualism. The unity of the community incites no man to be more than he is. In order is found peace; in discipline, fulfillment; in community, security.

—Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (1957)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Talking Turkey

Norman Stone

THE earthquake of August 1999 struck Turkey very hard, and did so at a time that could not have been worse—at three o'clock in the morning during a summer holiday, when homes were crowded with visiting relatives. But it also struck at a desperately unfortunate moment for Turkey as a whole: the point at which it was at last becoming a First World country. This fact occurred to some of the international teams who came in to help sift through the rubble: with some surprise, they acknowledged on television that Turkey actually did have earth-moving equipment and life-saving devices on hand. The earthquake set the economy back some way, of course, but as economic modernity these days is really a matter of knowledge and organization rather than of material goods, the country will no doubt continue on a promising path.

The list of positive trends is impressive. Turkey is a NATO ally, with a substantial army of proven efficiency. It is a crucial friend of both the United States and Israel, and is just about the only Islamic country with fair elections. It wields far more economic power than any of its Arab neighbors to the south (and does so despite having no oil to speak of). The Bosporus is a chief conduit for oil tankers, and the chief proposed pipeline for Caspian oil will pass substantially through eastern Turkey. Turkey's foreign trade, approaching $100 billion annually, may well overtake Russia's in the next five years, even though the country has little in the way of raw materials. The twelve million Turks of 1923 have now become sixty-five million, and, as the demographic pressure is at last easing, there will be eighty-five million by 2020.

But say "Turkey" and various problems are at once on offer: weak governments, the Kurds, Islamism, human rights violations and military interventions in politics. One problem stands out: inflation. For thirty years the currency has been losing value at anywhere between 60 and 80 percent per annum.[1] It is not a real inflation, in the sense that prices in dol-

Norman Stone, former professor of modern history at Oxford University, is professor of international relations at Bilkent University, Ankara.

[1]My own introduction to the extraordinary honesty of Turkish people concerned noughts on notes. Newly arrived in 1995, I had to take a taxi for a relatively short journey, at night, in sleeting rain, and with no possible means of communication with the driver (the language is, at first sight, impenetrable). The meter flashed some zeros. I squinted at a note with what appeared to have the requisite number of zeros, and handed it over. I had in fact presented $20 for a fare of $3. The driver insisted on giving me the change. The motto of the Turkish automobile association, as supplied by Atatürk, is, "The Turkish driver is a man of the most exquisite sensitivities." I should not quite have put it that way myself, but I see what he meant.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lars do not go up by very much, and the currency can be exchanged at the press of a few buttons in a bank machine (of which Turkey has many, even in outlying parts). But it is a headache for people who derive their money in the local currency and a deterrent for foreign investors. The truth is, inflation has been a weapon of last resort for governments that could not otherwise pay their bills, and help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—that is, America—has been essential. The trick is simple enough. In a state of great flux, with a very large black economy (maybe a third of the total), you cannot really collect direct taxes. Yet there are three fixed budget items that can only grow: defense (quite apart from the need to modernize and upgrade the armed forces, there is a guerrilla war in the southeast); state enterprises, which are extensively subsidized; and social spending.

An extremely important process is now under way to turn Turkey into a modern, democratic and more or less European country, and the first step in that process is to stabilize the currency. This cannot be done without a government with a substantial and stable majority. Elections in April 1999 at last threw together such a thing: a coalition of three rather unlikely allies led by a socialist reformer, Bülent Ecevit. The main economic posts are held by liberals (in the free-trade sense of the word). True, they share power with one-time socialists and also with nationalists, who believe in a strong Turkish state and in the past have distrusted foreigners, especially Europeans. But now that they are in government these nationalists seem to regard Europe as useful. It is, as the Germans said of a similar such coalition in 1907, a mating of carps and rabbits, but nonetheless it is a coalition with a coherent program.

Turkey has been undergoing the rigors of the by now familiar IMF "package" in hopes of stabilizing the currency. Much remains to be done. Government deficits must be curtailed, drastic privatization measures must be undertaken. On the political side, human rights must be respected, and the army's role in politics reduced. These aims will likely be achieved, for Turkey desires to become a Spain, which, subcutaneously, Turkey quite resembles. Its reward for trying has been a place on the European Union's candidate list since late 1999.

Is Turkey, then, going to become, as so many of its educated people seem to think it should, a full member of the European Union? The European Christian Democrats, meeting in Brussels in 1997, had something of a fit about the prospect: Europe, said a Belgian, could only be a Christian club. This is pretty well nonsense, not least because there are more practicing Muslims than Christians (in the sense of churchgoers) in many European countries today, and in any case there are powerful arguments for regarding Turkey historically as a European country. There is an interesting debate among historians as to how much the Ottoman Empire was actually a continuation of the eastern Roman Empire. The conqueror of Constantinople, Mehmet Fatih, described himself as "successor of Constantine", corresponded with the Pope, and had Bellini paint his portrait—not Islamic things to have done. To this day some Kurds call Anatolian Turks "Rumi", meaning, "Romans."

But the Europeans, nevertheless, have been reluctant to admit Turkey into the EU, even as a candidate, and did so only under considerable American (and British) pressure. As I write, there has been another revealing episode. The Turkish constitution forbids expressions likely to stir trouble over religion or separatism. Recently, a Turkish court sentenced the former prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, to a year in prison for a speech he made in 1994. "This is a suppression of freedom of speech", cried the Europeans, "we shall have to recon-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sider Turkey's membership." But here is what Dr. Erbakan actually said:

> The slave regime that is part and parcel of the economic system in Turkey did not come about by its own accord. It is a consequence of . . . colonial initiatives of the Imperialist and Zionist forces of this earth. The Zionists have taken control of world imperialism. Using the vehicle of interest-bearing capital, they have colonized the whole of humanity. . . . Turkey's false parties are supported by Imperialism and Zionism.[2]

Now, Dr. Erbakan may defend himself on the grounds that he did not really mean it, but in how many European countries today would such talk be allowed? Witness the Europeans themselves, who lay down sanctions against Austria for producing a right-wing government, with an allegedly proto-Nazi component, hostile to immigrants.

THERE IS no doubt much to criticize about the state of Turkey today, but critics need to remember what a long and difficult road it has traveled. After the First World War, the Ottoman and Romanov empires crumbled, and modern Turkey, the Anatolian heartland, was reconstituted as a republic under Kemal Atatürk. His "modernizing project" was the creation of a secular state that would implement political, economic and cultural reforms.[3] Initially it was very tough going. Indeed, for generations after the end of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey was reduced to the position of overseer of the Bosporus, through which only modest traffic—save a Soviet battleship or two—passed on its way from the Black Sea to the Aegean. In addition, the country was exposed to the usual strains of modern times: medical improvements brought a population explosion, which, as Süleyman Demirel complained when he was prime minister a quarter century ago, added the equivalent of the population of Denmark every year. Energy was short. There was little to be hoped for from exports. (An energetic Turkish woman of my acquaintance contributed a considerable share of them when she drove lorry loads of hazelnuts from Turkey to Newcastle, England.)

In Turkish politics, there was constant chaos, not so much because of the deep gulf between Left and Right, but because of the confusions within each of those blocs. By the 1970s, Turkey ceased to have a functioning government. The immediately identifiable problem was the disintegration of the Left: trade unions, civil servants, intellectuals and young revolutionaries responded in different ways, as the state was clearly failing.

For example, in the late 1970s, Turkey's Statistical Commission for the Five-Year Plan—well-trained statisticians armed with slide rules, graph paper and doctorates—met and solemnly discussed the subsidy for bituminous coal that was to be delivered from the Zonguldak mines to the steel factory at Kirşehir for the export of low-grade steel. It was a complicated, five-corner barter trade involving Egypt, Venezuela and Romania—and it was conducted entirely by candlelight. Outside the meeting, Ankara was experiencing queues

[2]David Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey* (Huntingdon, UK: Eothen, 1999), p. 210.

[3]Lenin, of course, had a much more radical "project" going at exactly the same time. But Turkey and Soviet Russia had much in common just the same, and maintained decent, though wary, relations in the interwar years. In 1929, when Trotsky was expelled from the USSR, Turkey gave him refuge for four years on the island of Prinkipo, south of Istanbul in the Sea of Marmara. It seems that Trotsky's correspondence regularly landed on Stalin's desk, perhaps because the Turkish police were intercepting and copying it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for olive oil and toilet paper. In the universities, a civil war raged as nationalists, communists and Islamists fought it out, to the despair of liberal-minded university administrators (policemen had to sit in on lectures). Parts of Ankara and Istanbul had been cordoned off by rival groups and subgroups, and twenty people a day were being killed.

The army intervened, in September 1980, to bring order, and did so without loss of life. (The coup leader, General Kenan Evren, was a humane man. Realizing that the politicians who were about to be imprisoned were on the corpulent side and likely to have heart attacks if confronted by soldiers at 3 a.m., he quietly asked friends of theirs to accompany the soldiers and be first to appear in the doorway.) A great many members of the Turkish educated classes felt humiliated that their country, whose modernization in the twenties and thirties had caught the world's attention, had been taken over by someone they saw as a Pinochet. Nowadays, though still not reconciled to the coup, they admit that it spurred considerable improvement.

The period of 1979–80 was decisive, when, with American and IMF backing, liberalizing reforms were implemented. The man of the hour was the American-trained Turgut Özal, who would dominate Turkey over the next decade. To this day, he divides opinion in that country much as do Reagan and Thatcher in the United States and Great Britain. In Turkey, one often hears the same tale: the economic recovery would have happened anyway; Özal opened up a great income gap; corruption pervaded politics and business as never before; he allowed Islam to subvert the secular state, building 80,000 mosques as against 50,000 schools. But it is hard to dispute that during Özal's time the face of Turkey changed beyond recognition. Thirty years ago, its economy was half the size of Sweden's. Now it is the other way around. Turkey, until recently mainly a manufacturer of textiles, is now a major industrial center. A tenth of the television sets sold in Great Britain, for instance, are Turkish. The country's foreign currency service sector is expanding faster than those of nearly all other countries. In Turkey today there is now considerable hope for the future, a state of affairs that has not really existed since the eighteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire was turning into what Czar Nicholas I famously labeled "the sick man of Europe."

Interestingly enough, the cause of Turkish membership of the EU unites people who are otherwise far apart in their verdicts of Özal. The secularist classes think that Europe will insist on secular standards, by which Turkish politicians will then have to abide. The Özal inheritors (he died in 1993) look to free trade and the rich European market. Reformist Islamic politicians join the chorus because Europe protects religion, at least as far as schooling is concerned. But on two outstanding matters, Turkey and the Europeans are on a collision course.

Cyprus

UP UNTIL 1974, Cyprus, a former British colony, had been a single state, the population of which was roughly three-quarters Greek and one-fifth Turkish. When the British left in 1959–60, the Turks were given various legal rights designed to make them feel more secure. There was good reason for this: the Greek Cypriots were keen on union with Greece, and the Turks knew what that would portend. The precedent was Crete, which had also had a mixed population. Before the First World War, with the blessing of the Europeans, it joined up with Greece. The result was an exodus, with accompanying massacres of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Muslim population (many of whom spoke Greek, as their descendants sometimes still do in today's Turkey).

A year or two after Cyprus became independent, the Greek persecution of the Turks intensified. It is a horrible story, the Turks being pushed into enclaves and humiliated (or worse) for a decade. What is so particularly maddening about the story is that the Turkish Cypriots were in no way a threat. Over a decade or two, one-third would probably have been assimilated, another third would have left, and the other third would have been an interesting piece of folklore for the tourists and evidence that the Greeks were really tolerant of minorities. Turkey "invaded" Cyprus in 1974, and occupied the northern third of the island to protect the Turks from the mayhem—as, under international treaties, it had a perfect right to do. Then, it refused to vacate the island when invited to do so, and was condemned by the United Nations. There is now a Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey (and, for some strange reason, North Korea).

The Greek Cypriots, none too good when it actually came to fighting, proved quite adept at selling a hard-luck story to the rest of the world. It had all been the CIA's fault, or Kissinger's fault, or in any case somebody else's doing. The British, tired of colonial problems such as this (and anyway short of money), decided that if Greece were to stay in NATO its Cyprus cause must be adopted. United Nations resolutions followed, framed by the British and supported by the usual Bloc and Third World suspects. An embargo was imposed on Turkish Cyprus, and, to this day, one can only fly there indirectly (it is well worth the journey, as it is the last unspoiled part of the Mediterranean). Greek Cyprus—with Greek defense money, mass tourism and a provision for offshore banking, which has officially attracted $20 billion from Russia alone (and who knows what else unofficially)—has flourished, its per capita GNP now being larger than Greece's. If Greece is European, then Cyprus, its Channel Island, might as well be too; but which Cyprus, and when? The Turks are now being pressed to make "concessions": the island should again be a unified country, with this or that "safeguard" for the Turkish "minority." Back and forth the emissaries go, and the whisper is that Turkish Cyprus might just be abandoned in return for Turkish membership of the European Union.

But why should it be abandoned? The simplest answer is surely just to have Turkish Cyprus recognized as a separate state—there are many smaller ones—and then see what happens next. Greeks may call the Turks aggressors, but in the past century and more it has been the Greeks who did the attacking—in 1897 over Crete, in 1912–13 to take Salonica, in 1920 to seize western Anatolia, in 1962 over Cyprus. In three out of four cases they very deservedly lost, although they then persisted in endless complaint, to the effect that the Turks were very bad people who, if provoked, tended to win battles.

The Kurds

BUT WE are talking now of a grand bargain to sort out the problems of the entire area of the old Ottoman Empire, from the Adriatic and Aegean far into Mesopotamia and old Syria. There is a further question, also related to Greece, which suggests that, somewhere in the Greek machine, there are elements that are seriously interested in this grand bargain. This has to do with the Kurds, a people who bestraddle the center of the entire old Ottoman area, and with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Maoist terrorist movement that claims to speak for them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In mid-February 1999, the leader of the Kurdish terrorist movement in eastern Turkey, Abdullah Ocalan, was abducted by Turkish military intelligence from the airport at Nairobi, Kenya. He had been hiding in the residence of the Greek ambassador to Kenya. Four months before, after a Turkish ultimatum, he had been expelled from Syria, where, since 1979, he had been directing terrorist operations in eastern Turkey. Then he went on an odyssey—Greece; Russia; Italy; Belarus; Greece again; then Kenya. Greek agents had been looking after him, supplying safe houses and aircraft, as well as false passports (a Greek Cypriot one gave him access to countries of the European Union without a visa). Turkish agents caught him and brought him back to Turkey to face trial, where he was eventually sentenced to death. The European Court of Human Rights has been invited to pronounce on this; meanwhile, Ocalan sits in prison, making the occasional pronouncement himself. But his organization seems mainly to have given up the fight, and eastern Turkey is recovering. Moreover, the silly nationalists in Greece who supported Ocalan's movement have been discredited; sensible Greeks can now deal with sensible Turks.

There is more to the affair than meets the eye. On the face of things, the Greek government was caught red-handed (literally so, in view of Ocalan's long and murderous career). Three senior ministers resigned, including the foreign minister, one Theodoros Pangalos, who had previously said on television that Turks were "thieves, rapists and murderers." Then, after a few weeks, came a Turco-Greek rapprochement at a public relations level, when Greek teams gave unstinting and very professional help in the great earthquake that struck northwestern Turkey. Since then, businessmen from both sides have been back and forth; it is very clearly in the interest of both that this long quarrel should be ended. Then the party of Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, PASOK, which represents a species of left-wing nationalism, barely made it back to power in elections. Pangalos, ostensibly discredited, came back to the government, this time as minister of culture. The prime minister had been hospitalized as the affair unfolded, conveniently placing him out of harm's way. Simitis has in fact done rather well out of this affair, when you reflect. With a huge majority in the parliament, he would have been at the mercy of a nationalist rebellion from his back-benchers. With a very thin majority, he can "Europeanize" Greece—join up with the euro, get the budget under control by cutting back on pork barrel spending, introduce identity cards that omit any reference to religion, and, who knows, come to terms with Turkey over Cyprus and much else.

In other words, the Ocalan scandal, desperately discrediting to the Greek regime, has been put to some productive use after all. After Ocalan was captured, there were demonstrations outside Greek embassies by indignant Kurdish nationalists, who were furious that the Greeks had not kept their man. At the time, this seemed incomprehensible. But those Kurdish demonstrators maybe knew a thing or two: the Greeks were hardly safeguarding Ocalan. Some Greeks had been using Ocalan against other Greeks.

Two books have appeared recently by journalists with a fairly obvious inside track on the Ocalan story.[4] It seems that

[4]Oktay Pirim and Suha Ortulu, *Ömerli Köyünden Imrali'ya. PKK'nin 20 Yillik Öyküsü* (Istanbul: Boyut Kitaplari, 1999) and Tuncay Ozkan, *Operasyon* (Istanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2000). The second book clearly has "inside information" (see especially pp. 168-70 for the reported remarks of a very senior intelligence officer). Both books show that Ocalan had quite close relations with HADEP, the ostensibly Kurdish party, which maintained training schools in Romania.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Turkish military intelligence itself did not really want to capture Ocalan. Rather, the Americans wanted to destroy the PKK, as part of a general pacification of the Middle East. The Americans had insisted that Ocalan be captured and, early in February 1999, informed Turkish intelligence where the man might be found. Ocalan had been spotted in the Greek embassy in Kenya. Why Kenya? Pangalos later said that it was because customs and security there would not be advanced enough to detect a clumsily faked passport, which Ocalan apparently carried on him. But Kenya would surely be a place with heightened American security systems, in view of the embassy bombing in 1997. Was Ocalan simply being dropped into it through an American deal with Simitis? Ocalan himself guessed as much, in his first interrogation: NATO had an undercover organization, Gladio, that accounted not just for his betrayal by the Greeks, but also for his letdown by the Italians earlier. But perhaps this goes too far. Certainly, the PKK seems to have been extraordinarily careless in its use of cellular telephones, possibly inviting an alert American or Turkish security service to take action. But the whole affair looks suspicious.

ACCORDING to prevailing wisdom, the Kurds are a minority struggling to free themselves from Turkish oppression, forbidden from being educated in their own language. It is not so simple. Kurds and Turks intermarry, and the share of Kurds in all parts of life in Turkey is considerably more than their proportion warrants. There is no single Kurdish language to teach to the young, but several. The main one in Turkey is called Kirmanci, but there is a substantially different one, Zaza, and both differ in turn from the main two languages of northern Iraq, which cannot be effectively standardized. The Kurdish nationalists themselves use Turkish as their means of communication, and so, in the main, does their West European television station, MED-TV. Turgut Özal, as president, made himself unpopular with other cabinet members in 1993 when he said that broadcasting in Kurdish should be allowed. It was a magnanimous, but empty, gesture: no one would really exercise the right, just as immigrants in the United States seldom use their native languages after more than a generation or two.

At bottom, most Turks cannot really see what the problem is about. Why should the Kurds, divided and poor, aspire to any sort of separation when so many of them flourish in Turkey? And why should European busybodies—those ineffable, preachy Scandinavians in particular—offer money for education in dialect languages when schools not far from Ankara cannot afford textbooks in the national language? A great many people of Kurdish origin seem to agree, at least if you take the electoral results seriously. There is a party, HADEP, that purports to speak for all Kurds but garners substantial numbers of votes only in the Kurdish southeast. Life there, during the two decade-long guerrilla war, has been grim, and the chief town, Diyarbakir, has become swollen with refugees. But HADEP gets under 5 percent of the vote in western and central Turkey, where at least half of the country's Kurds now live. Kurdish nationalism is barely alive there. Indeed, most Kurds are not interested in their alleged grievances, and instead wish to distance themselves from the troublemakers in their midst.

A grand bargain is coming into view: Turkey seems poised to join the European family, on the grounds that she has many, many very strong cards, for once, and for the first time since about 1700. If Europe intends to be anything other than, in the words of the French critic, Marc Fumaroli, an enormous version of Venice in 1770, it is Europe, not Turkey, that will have to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

come to terms, just as the Greek government has been sensible enough to do. This will do both sides a great deal of good.

Early in July, there was a conference on the Caucasus held in a town called Kars, in eastern Turkey. Kars is a historic town, once the easternmost outpost of the Roman Empire. Fifty miles to the east is an extraordinary ruined town, Ani, the old capital of greater Georgia. Before the First World War, Kars was Russian; Lenin, as part of a bargain with Atatürk, handed it back to republican Turkey. Kars did not have a good twentieth century: people kept fighting on its borders or sealing them. But now that the PKK war is almost over, Kars can think of the future. The planned oil pipeline from the Caspian will pass just north of it. And it has set up a University of the Caucasus, hoping that talents from the region will be drawn to a prosperous Turkey, as they were in the past. With a new energetic mayor, Naif Alibeyoglu, Kars may be unrecognizable in ten years' time.

The university has potential, of course, but as one sits in the lecture hall, talking about the politics of oil or the Russian-Turkish relationship, in the neighboring villages the locals live with their animals in the winter and make bricks of straw and animal dung, which they dry out in the summer, to supplement the heating. Two-dimensional Europeans will no doubt hold up their hands in horror at the idea of such a people calling themselves European. Wrong, and wrong again: the dynamism that made Europe in the first place has now been transferred to Turkey. And it is Europe, not Turkey, that will have to come to terms. □

The Culture Persists

What the President most seems to desire is the removal of images of atrocity (at the top of that list, scenes of lifeless American GIs dragged through the streets of some Third World dump like Mogadishu) and their substitution with images of virtue (soldiers helping hurricane victims in Honduras)—to replace war with operations other than war, an empty space in an army's traditional reality, where there are no friends and no enemies, no front or rear, no victories and, likewise, no defeats, and no true endings. . . . On average, he has ordered fired one cruise missile every three days of his administration. As the century ends, and the millennium with it, so ends a distinct epoch in the role of the American military—its identity, its use, its own worldview, the public's perception of it. And yet, until some unforeseen day, the military's culture *is* war, will always and must be war, not peace.

—Bob Shacochis, "Soldiers of Great Fortune", *Harper's* (December 1999)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Defending the Faiths

Allen D. Hertzke and Daniel Philpott

MANY OF today's foreign policy challenges—from Russian weakness and Iraqi aggression to Balkan instability and the rise of China—were anticipated during the waning days of the Cold War. One issue, however, has taken the foreign affairs community completely by surprise: global religious persecution.

A worldwide report by two British researchers, Kevin Boyle and Juliet Sheen, notes, "Religious persecution of minority faiths, forcible conversion, desecration of religious sites, the proscribing of beliefs and pervasive discrimination, killings and torture, are daily occurrences at the end of the twentieth century." The victims include Christians, Buddhists, Baha'is, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs and animists. The perpetrators include communist governments (China, Laos, Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea), Islamist regimes (Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan), other Islamic states under pressure from militants (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Algeria), and authoritarian regimes such as Iraq, Serbia and Burma.

In response to such persecution, the cause of religious freedom, which until recently was the passion of a small cadre of Christian activists, has today become the subject of talk shows, op-ed pieces, government reports and even official legislation. A movement on behalf of persecuted Christians and other religious minorities blossomed in the 1990s, sparking congressional hearings, which, in turn, prompted the Clinton administration to act more forcefully against violations of religious freedom abroad. Hoping to stave off more vigorous legislative action, in 1996 the administration created a State Department Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom, which was followed in 1997 by a congressionally-mandated State Department report on the persecution of Christians abroad. In that same year, Madeleine Albright instructed American embassies to emphasize religious freedom in their human rights reports and to nurture contacts with local religious figures.

Then, in the fall of 1998, Congress passed the landmark International Religious Freedom Act, enshrining religious freedom as a basic aim of American foreign policy. The law creates new offices at the State Department and the National Security Council devoted to the issue; funds "soft" initiatives to advance the legal

Allen D. Hertzke is Presidential Professor of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma. He is currently working on a book about global religious freedom and American foreign policy.

Daniel Philpott is assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and author of *Revolutions in Sovereignty* (Princeton University Press, forthcoming).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

protection of religious practice; requires an annual report on the status of religious freedom around the world; establishes an independent commission to monitor violations; and recommends presidential action against violating countries.

With a few exceptions, the mainstream media and foreign policy commentariat have reacted coolly to these developments, suspecting that the attention the issue has received is merely a sop to conservative Christian lobbies. But, pursued wisely, the elevation of religious freedom can properly serve the national interest. It is congruent not only with international human rights covenants, but with our founding tradition and basic values. It complements the promotion of civil society and democracy, and it may easily be pursued in tandem with our other interests.

The Emergence of a Cause

THE pervasiveness of religious persecution around the globe today does not in itself account for the new momentum of the movement to counter it. After all, atrocities directed against religious minorities were a leitmotif of the twentieth century. Two other elements now give urgency to the cause: first, a growing recognition of the unique role of religious freedom in fostering liberalization and democracy; and, second, the emergence of a formidable network of determined activists who document persecution and press for vigorous U.S. action. Contrary to critics who claim that such activism remains the exclusive property of the religious right, the advocacy network is wide and diverse, composed of Catholics, Jews, evangelicals, some mainline Protestants and members of both parties of Congress.

The groundwork for the cause was laid by Christian groups—Christian Solidarity International, International Christian Concern, Open Doors, the Cardinal Kung Foundation and others—that have forged links with, and documented the persecution of, underground Christian churches abroad. Joining them have been groups that represent such besieged religious minorities as Tibetan Buddhists and Iranian Baha'is, and those that fight against the enslavement of black North Africans, many of whom are Christians.

These organizations have provided an outlet for activists such as Nina Shea and Paul Marshall, both at Freedom House, who have succeeded in bringing the issue to the attention of politicians and the media. In turn, the huge "parachurch" network of evangelical broadcasting and direct mail ministries has drawn on their efforts to generate grassroots interest and pressure. A wide array of Christian churches and their policy arms has also embraced the cause, including the U.S. Catholic Conference, the Episcopal Church, the Southern Baptist Convention, the Salvation Army and the National Association of Evangelicals. In Congress, Frank Wolf (R-VA), Chris Smith (R-NJ) and Tony Hall (D-OH) in the House, and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), Don Nickles (R-OK) and Sam Brownback (R-KS) in the Senate have made the issue a centerpiece of their legislative efforts.

Among the cause's most important spokesmen have been Jews. Michael Horowitz, a former Reagan administration official currently with the Hudson Institute, catalyzed the movement. Journalist Abe Rosenthal, after being "screamed awake" by Horowitz, used his former perch at the *New York Times* to pen over a dozen columns on the global persecution of Christians. Mainstream Jewish organizations, from the Union of American Hebrew Congregations to the Anti-Defamation League, have been pivotal backers of religious freedom legisla-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion. Indeed, Rabbi David Saperstein, the principal lobbyist for Reform Judaism, not only emerged as a crucial leader in the campaign, but was selected as the first chairman of the newly legislated Commission on International Religious Freedom. He was followed in that position by former Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams.

Many close to the cause credit Horowitz with bringing together what was until recently a fragmented movement. A relentless advocate and a blunt polemicist, Horowitz prodded and harangued Christian leaders into action. Linking the fate of Christian minorities to that of his own co-religionists, he argued that "Christians are the Jews of the 21st Century", the "victims of choice for thug regimes", and the "canaries in the coal mine" that warn of broader human rights abuses. Throughout the late 1990s, he campaigned tirelessly for congressional action; most recently he was arrested in front of the State Department while protesting the administration's policies on Sudan.

A National Priority

THE PRESSURE brought to bear by Horowitz and his cohort helped spark congressional policymakers to produce one of the most comprehensive human rights statutes now on the books. The International Religious Freedom Act has mandated offices and procedures to ensure public attention for religious freedom and presidential action to promote it. It has also established the nation's (and the world's) first ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom, a position to which President Clinton appointed Robert A. Seiple, former director of the Christian development organization, World Vision. In his first report to Congress, Seiple testified that his office has become a clearinghouse for "people with information about persecution and discrimination, and for the persecuted themselves." The law has also established a U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom to monitor religious persecution and forward recommendations to the president and Congress. Composed of nine voting members appointed by Congress and the president on the basis of a partisan formula, the Commission is independent of presidential administrations and federal bureaucracies and maintains a separate budget, office and staff.

As required by law, in September 1999 the State Department produced its first annual report on religious persecution. Much like the State Department's report on human rights, the document contains over one thousand pages of detailed information drawn from embassies around the globe, and has prompted a series of diplomatic communiqués to offending governments. In addition, the State Department must identify countries "of particular concern", egregious violators that in 1999 included Burma, China, Iran, Iraq and Sudan.

Though the president is directed to act on all findings of persecution in the annual report, he may choose from a menu of options, which include a private démarche, the cancellation of a state visit, the withdrawal of non-humanitarian aid or even of trade subsidies. In instances of serious violations, he must choose from among more punitive measures such as sanctions. Although the president may waive sanctions for reasons of "important national interest", he must do so publicly. This provision is intended to promote clear presidential accountability, enabling the Commission or Congress to press for more vigorous action if they feel the White House has been too timid. What the law ensures, therefore, is regular exposure, priority consideration, protest and, at times, some form of weightier response to severe violations of religious freedom.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE IDEA that the legislation champions is straightforward. Religious believers should enjoy the right to worship freely; express their beliefs publicly; educate their children according to these beliefs; build and run houses of worship, schools, universities and seminaries; enjoy freedom from discrimination in employment and political access; and retain the liberty to take up, abandon, proclaim or dissent from their religion. At least this is how the right is articulated by international legal documents, including Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the UN Declaration on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief.

The recognition of religious freedom in international law, however, contrasts sharply with its gross violation in practice. Because of an unheralded demographic revolution—a tectonic shift of the globe's Christian population toward developing and non-democratic countries—Christians constitute the most numerous victims of persecution in the world today. While the proportion of Christians living in Asia, Latin America and Africa was roughly 25 percent in 1950, today it is approaching 60 percent. Paul Marshall estimates that at least two hundred million Christians live in countries where persecution is a regular occurrence, while many more live under "non-trivial restrictions on religious liberty." Reports published so far leave little question that millions of Christians in Asia, the Middle East and Africa live under the threat of murder, torture, arrest and abduction.

Behind the persecution lies one of the great surprises of the late twentieth century: a global resurgence of faith. Indeed, secularizing trends in Western Europe and among a thin, if influential, stratum of global intellectual elites now stand out as exceptions to more general trends. As Samuel Huntington has observed, persecution endures precisely because religion matters, and matters increasingly. When religion becomes important to people, dictatorial governments "will insist on controlling it, suppressing it, regulating it, prohibiting it, and manipulating it to their own advantage."[1] In China, for example, the communist regime has subjugated Tibetan Buddhists for over a generation and has initiated similar policies toward Muslims in Xinjiang. More generally, it restricts religious observance to state-run churches and has carried out a systematic campaign to eliminate worship by millions of unregistered Christians, in some cases imprisoning and torturing leaders of "house churches." The May 2000 report of the Commission asserts that the regime's violations of religious freedom have increased "markedly" over the past year.

THE CASE for American leadership against religious persecution rests in part on the international declaratory tradition of human rights, but even more on the role that religious freedom plays in our own legal tradition. The cacophony of denominations and sects in the early Republic, many of which had fled here to escape persecution, led the framers of the Constitution to enshrine the legal guarantee of free expression of religion, providing all religious sects with a stake in the pluralist system.

The issue also finds precedent in American foreign policy. The Jackson-

[1]Huntington, "Religious Persecution at the Close of the Twentieth Century: Its Nature and Causes, and Implications for the International System", presented to the Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, DC, January 6, 1998, p. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vanik legislation of the 1970s championed the liberty of Jews under Soviet and East European communism. America was also a leader in promoting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The legitimate place of religious freedom in U.S. foreign policy, then, requires no special plea or argument. Any partisan of universal human rights, any enthusiast for the genius of the First Amendment of the Constitution, ought to have a *prima facie* sympathy for the cause, if not for the specific remedies.

The case for religious freedom, though, extends beyond its intrinsic justice. Freedom of religion is a rich and potent human right, for its very practice entails other human rights as well: the right to assemble, to express oneself freely, to print literature, to own property. As the revolutions in Eastern Europe suggest, and as dissident Wei Jingsheng has argued with respect to China, allowing freedom for religious communities simultaneously opens space for political dissidents, labor organizers and other human rights advocates. Churches and religious organizations are vital to a healthy civil society, to the layer of mediating institutions whose importance to democracy Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill famously stressed.

As Huntington has demonstrated convincingly, Western Christianity in particular has encouraged democratization.[2] Its emphasis on the dignity of the individual, the equality of all souls before God, and the autonomy of churches from state control (now embraced by both Catholic and major Protestant traditions) fosters a respect for civil rights and institutional pluralism. Christianity may also foster democracy by molding opinion and encouraging opposition to authoritarian rule. Once the Catholic Church came to endorse liberal rights and democratic government in the Second Vatican Council, for example, it became a forceful advocate for change in Latin America and in Eastern Europe. Even the Chinese government has acknowledged the democratizing force of Christianity. Noting the role of Christian churches in the downfall of the Warsaw Pact in 1992, an official party organ urged that to avoid a similar fate the regime must "strangle the baby while it is still in the manger."[3]

Today, nearly nine out of every ten of the nations Freedom House designates as "free" are Christian countries, while others, such as South Korea and Taiwan, have substantial Christian populations and Christian leaders. Contrary to secular intellectuals' image of Christianity as backward or colonial, its indigenous growth outside the West is one of the signal democratizing forces around the globe today. A policy promoting religious freedom, then, will alert vulnerable Christian minorities—and also independent Muslims, Buddhists, Jews and others—that the United States stands with their struggle for free expression.

Answering the Skeptics

NOT SURPRISINGLY, the stress on religious freedom in foreign policy has encountered detractors. These include not only devotees of realpolitik, but also some within the human rights community itself and within such liberal Protestant organizations as the National Council of Churches.

Some detractors emphasize the negative role of religion—its historic record as a major source of persecution. From the Spanish Inquisition in Europe to the Puritans of New England and the Taliban

---

[2]Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

[3]Paul Marshall, *Their Blood Cries Out* (Dallas: Word, 1997), pp. 10-11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Afghanistan, religious institutions, when enmeshed with coercive state power, have harshly oppressed dissenters. But acknowledging this fact does not mean that religious freedom should be less vigorously promoted than other human rights. Quite the contrary. Promoting it will further protect minority faiths from the abuses of state power. Moreover, the stereotype of "Christians as persecutors" rests mostly on a record prior to Western Christendom's contact with, and ongoing adaptation to, the Enlightenment.

Much criticism of the cause also seems to reflect a mistrust of its conservative supporters. William Martin, a scholar normally sensitive and fair to religion, has described the legislative campaign as part of a conservative religious agenda that includes predictions about the coming of the anti-Christ and a fundamentalist paranoia toward the European Union.[4] Then, too, human rights activists have dismissed the issue as "special pleading" on behalf of "certain classes of victims." *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis argued in 1997 that the proposed legislation creates a "hierarchy of human rights" in which religious freedom crowds out genocide, political repression and racial persecution. In a similar vein, the National Council of Churches complains that the policy will promote the cause of Christians to the exclusion of persecuted believers of other religions.

These dismissals are troubling. The centrality of religious freedom in the human rights tradition, along with its support from Jews, Catholics, evangelicals, Anglicans, Tibetan Buddhists and voices from a broad array of other faiths, refutes the charge that the issue is the narrow concern of a single lobby. Indeed, some fundamentalist Christian groups actually have eschewed involvement *because* the religious freedom legislation invokes UN and international covenants.

The charge of special pleading is particularly puzzling. Would the same critics have considered human rights campaigns on behalf of South African blacks, Soviet Jews, East European dissidents, the Argentine "disappeared", the eradication of female circumcision or the banning of land mines to be special pleading? As Jacob Heilbrunn commented in *The New Republic*, "This seems a remarkable attitude for a human rights activist, since, by definition, all arguments on behalf of all persecuted groups—racial minorities, political minorities, ethnic minorities, etc.—are 'special pleadings' intended to help 'certain classes' of victims." Human rights campaigns on behalf of particular parties are the only kind of human rights campaigns there are. Concerns about special pleading certainly have not stopped Human Rights Watch, for example, from issuing special reports that advocate women's rights, children's rights, gay and lesbian rights, prisoners' rights, indigenous rights, journalists' rights and so on.

To be sure, the new legislation confers upon religious freedom a statutory significance that other specific rights may not enjoy. This special emphasis, however, is warranted by the corresponding priority the world's dictators place upon denying religious freedom. Moreover, human rights is not a zero-sum game in which the promotion of some rights involves the diminution of others. Rather than competing, different rights are mutually reinforcing. It is far from clear how the emphasis on religious freedom would diminish cries and protests on behalf of other kinds of human rights violations. Why cannot such pleas continue in full force?

Still, we cannot dismiss entirely concerns about narrow particularity. A fair

[4]Martin, "The Christian Right and American Foreign Policy", *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1999).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy would be one that supports the religious freedom of all believers, not just Christians. Fortunately, congressional legislation, and the first reports by the State Department and the Commission, have been inclusive in precisely this respect. True, earlier legislative findings and some congressional hearings weighted Christian minorities rather unevenly. But Muslim and Jewish lobbyists, along with some Catholic and Protestant leaders, worked to ensure that the final law applied scrupulously to all religious groups.

Another objection is that the policy will prove counterproductive, leading to reprisals against the very people that it is meant to support and little improvement in religious freedom. Critics of economic sanctions blame that blunt instrument for both kinds of failure. But the bill's drafters anticipated this concern, envisioning calibrated responses and recommending economic sanctions as a last resort. Generally, the policy ought to emphasize the tactic of exposure rather than punitive measures. State Department officials should publicize violations of religious freedom, and diplomats should convey to foreign governments the pressure they are receiving from the Commission and Congress to adopt more severe responses. Against only the worst violators ought presidents to take countermeasures; only rarely should these involve the withdrawal of non-humanitarian aid.

Instead of dramatic changes in the structures of foreign regimes, it is more realistic to expect incremental advances: one country loosening up restrictions on worship; another releasing some religious prisoners; another ceasing raids upon house churches. An encouraging example occurred in August of last year. Anticipating that the State Department's annual report might label it one of the "bottom ten" violators, the government of Uzbekistan freed its known Christian prisoners and substantially broadened its legalization of Christian churches. A few such achievements every year would be a noteworthy accomplishment. And as South Africa, Latin America, the Philippines and Eastern Europe have taught us, we have reason to believe that, cumulatively, these incremental victories may stimulate far more dramatic advances.

The Potential of the Cause

A FOREIGN policy that promotes religious freedom promises a liberalization more profound than one that promotes cell phones, McDonald's and Nike. It would open up new spaces for human liberty and democratization. Its tools are practical, too, providing policymakers the flexibility to tailor their response to each violation, and to balance human rights with other foreign policy aims.

Also working in its favor, the cause of religious freedom boasts an advantage that other human rights groups cannot claim: a formidable domestic constituency. What other organization can mobilize an estimated 100,000 American churches to focus on its particular international concern? Already, the ranks of the religious freedom movement have fueled a growing campaign against the government of Sudan, which has employed man-made famine, slavery and forced conversions against its black Christian and animist population. Mounting concern in American churches over this catastrophe has sparked a student-based protest movement, disinvestment pressures on oil interests abetting the regime, and robust congressional activity, all reminiscent of the anti-apartheid campaign. After hearings and resolutions charged Sudan's government with committing deliberate genocide, Congress passed the Brownback Amendment allowing food

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

aid to rebel areas, and it may pass further legislation aimed at ending Khartoum's use of food as a weapon and pressuring it to return to peace negotiations. In turn, the Commission presented a detailed set of recommendations designed to intensify pressure on the government of Sudan to improve human rights.[5]

A maturing coalition anchors this new international advocacy, knitting together diverse faiths in a common cause. Especially noteworthy is the way the movement draws upon, and transforms, the grassroots energy of evangelicalism. Through the crucible of engagement, "parochial" concern for fellow believers has given way to broader human rights advocacy. Major evangelical leaders, for example, are joining with feminist groups to mobilize against the international sex trade, which swallows millions of women and children into grotesque forms of chattel slavery. In a sense, evangelical engagement is not only improving the prospects for human rights, but human rights engagement is improving evangelicalism by broadening its horizons. If secular human rights activists can look beyond their suspicions, they will find in churches the potential for allies in a coalition far larger than their cause has hitherto enjoyed. □

[5]"Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom", May 1, 2000, www.uscirf.gov.

DIPLOMACY IS CHANGING.

SO SHOULD YOUR READING HABITS.

Summer/Fall 2000 Forum on Information Technology

Pick up something new.

Call 888.297.0757 or visit our Web site at http://journal.georgetown.edu to subscribe for one year (two issues) at the special introductory rate of $12.00.

Georgetown Journal
of International Affairs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Skeptical Conservative

Neil McInnes

IT IS NOW ten years since Michael Oakeshott died, in his ninetieth year and long after retiring from the chair of political science at the London School of Economics (LSE). So it is not surprising that some people should think that the time has come to rescue him from the limbo that claims celebrated writers after death and celebrated academics after retirement. It has been a long, quiet limbo, marked only by the publication of two small books he left in his desk drawers and not by the rise of any Oakeshottian school that might have applied or developed his teachings. Indeed, the only attention he has received in recent years has taken the form of musings about what possible relevance his metaphysical doctrines could have to political theory, not practical politics. As his most sympathetic expositor, Paul Franco, concluded, "To begin to work out what this political philosophy means for political life as we know it is the next step in understanding . . . Oakeshott's thought."* Less sympathetic students might have discouraged that "next step" by recalling Dr. Johnson's observation, "A High Tory makes government unintelligible—it is lost in the clouds." The great height from which Oakeshott poured scorn not only on politicians but on political scientists and even political philosophers gave his beautifully crafted essays (and his famously spellbinding lectures were essays read out loud) a rarefied charm, urbanity and dignity; but more practical (and more realistic) students were left hungry.

When Oakeshott was appointed to succeed Harold Laski at LSE, just when Churchill came back to power to end the era of postwar socialism in Britain, the appointment was condemned by many academics as a political one. To be sure, his airs and graces nourished the apprehension that he was a toff and a Tory dandy (in fact, he was the son of a civil servant), but he was no party man. The publisher's blurb on Steven Anthony Gerencser's *The Skeptic's Oakeshott* says that, "Mrs. Thatcher based much of her political philosophy on Oakeshott's theories", but this is wide of the mark. The systematic campaign Mrs. Thatcher ran to convert the Conservative Party to free-market ideology was exactly what Oakeshott condemned as "rationalism in politics" (and has been roundly denounced as such by John Gray in *The Undoing of Conservatism*). What theory she needed she got from Friedrich von Hayek, and Oakeshott would have none of *his* free enterprise ideology. In his view, "This is, perhaps, the main significance of Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom*—not the cogency of

Neil McInnes, a regular contributor, has also written for *Encounter*, *Survey* and *Quadrant*. He divides his time between Canberra and Paris.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his doctrine, but the fact that it is a doctrine. A plan to resist all planning may be better than its opposite, but it belongs to the same style of politics."

Oakeshott's influence among students was surely conservative but not because he supported the right-wing case against Labour (he disdained polemics) so much as because he preached to them the vanity of any political activism whatever. J.L. Auspitz notes that, "Undergraduates from all over the world had flocked [to LSE] in the expectation of learning exactly what Oakeshott averred could not be taught." As Jeffrey Hart remarks, Oakeshott appalled LSE students by telling them "that their hopes for a better world were an illusion and that their guides had been charlatans."

Thought and Action

IN TODAY's jargon, what Oakeshott rejected was "the vision thing", "the big picture." Politics was not about that, he said, and politicians and intellectuals who said it was exerted a corrupting influence. Even if they avoided such dangerous flights of fancy, politicians found no favor with him, for politics was at best a necessary evil, a second-rate occupation. With what Robert Grant called "a sublime, even breathtaking aloofness", Oakeshott dismissed politics as "vulgar", "bogus", "callous" and a "false simplification." It was the domain of a hasty, truncated understanding of society. It was an endeavor of marginal significance, administrative in character, secondary in the life of a people, shallow and narrow, and superficial in its effects, especially when compared with the truly vital activities of art, literature and philosophy. How Bloomsbury can one get? The idea that politicians are not the great movers and shakers they take themselves to be is a familiar one, but the advantage is usually, and realistically, given to industrialists, scientists and entrepreneurs, not to artists, writers and philosophers. But science and industry are largely beyond Oakeshott's ken.

Other political scientists have held politicians in contempt (Pareto didn't think much of them, for instance), but this one did not think much of political scientists either. In an essay deceptively entitled "The Study of Politics in a University", Oakeshott curtly dismissed what passes for political "science" (notably in the United States) as mere vocational training, presumably for party hacks and journalists, and a failed and "worthless" training at that. His reasons for this low opinion of political science were not those of Hayek, for whom it was mere "scientism", the misguided application of the methods of natural science to intractable social material. Oakeshott thought the scientific treatment of human affairs was perfectly possible; it just was not profitable. As he wrote in *On Human Conduct*, it was "not an impossible undertaking. But it has little to do with human conduct and nothing at all to do with the performances of assignable

---

*The comments cited in the text are from Paul Franco, *The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Steven Anthony Gerencser, *The Skeptic's Oakeshott* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); J.L. Auspitz, Jeffrey Hart, Timothy Fuller and Kenneth Minogue, in *The Achievement of Michael Oakeshott*, ed. Jesse Norman (London: Duckworth, 1993); Robert Grant, *Oakeshott* (London: Claridge, 1990); Michael Oakeshott, *On History and Other Essays* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999); and Anthony Farr, *Sartre's Radicalism and Oakeshott's Conservatism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

Oakeshott's principal works of political interest are *Rationalism in Politics* (1962 and 1991); *On Human Conduct* (1975); *Religion, Politics and the Moral Life* (1993); *Morality and Politics in Modern Europe* (1993); and *The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Skepticism* (1996).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agents." It would yield only certain statistical regularities, aggregates, and knowledge of unintended consequences, and no knowledge of human conduct. Wherefore: "In becoming scientific, political studies cease to be practical."

Other contemners of political science present their wares as political philosophy. After agonized hesitation about whether politics and philosophy could ever mix, Oakeshott agreed they could, and did in his own work, but only on condition that it was understood that political philosophy was useless, "has no injunctive force", and could never yield anything of interest or relevance to actual politics. It could not, for example, give guidance for action, suggest policies, rules, principles or programs. Of course, we expect philosophers to eschew propaganda and party politics, but Oakeshott was looking for something more remote, abstract and bloodless, something as far removed as possible from that mainstream of twentieth-century philosophy for which (in R.G. Collingwood's words) "all thought exists for the sake of action." The upshot was that his university teaching came down to lectures on the history of political thought, especially that of Hobbes. So it is the sign of a paroxysm of skepticism when a colleague at LSE, Kenneth Minogue, reveals, "The older he got, the more Oakeshott tended to regard the very enterprise of a history of political thought as an impossible one."

After this litany of skepticism about the practice and theory of politics, the title of Gerencser's book, *The Skeptic's Oakeshott*, should not surprise. Oakeshott called himself a skeptic, and his critics have mostly agreed. Gertrude Himmelfarb said, "Oakeshott's animus against Rationalism issues in a radical skepticism, in a refusal to embrace any idea, principle, or belief lest that imply a commitment to some absolute truth."[1] What Gerencser claims to detect is that, while maintaining his skepticism about politics, science and the rest, Oakeshott extended it to philosophy itself, thereby arriving at the position "that no voice—including that of philosophy—expresses an absolute certainty; rather truth is always dependent on certain conditions." This would have carried him toward the universal relativism of the postmodernists.

Whatever interest these arcane matters may have for metaphysicians, I think they can be laid quite aside when we consider what Oakeshott had to say about politics. For the extraordinary thing is that he did have something to say on that subject. After repeatedly telling us what we could not say or know or do in politics, he managed to advance a characteristic political doctrine; it is slender, repetitive and elegantly expressed.

It has been said that the world is made up of two sorts of people: those who believe that the world is made up of two sorts of people; and those who do not. Oakeshott belonged firmly in the former category. He thought there were two sorts of people, two ways of cohabiting in society, two kinds of politics, two sorts of state, and so on through a list of a dozen or so pairs. Predictably, these pairs of opposites correspond one to the other. The basic one is the contrast of two ways of cooperating in society: in a civil association or an enterprise association. (The distinction between the two is laid out in the essay "The Rule of Law", which is included in Liberty Fund's re-issued *On History and Other Essays.*) In an enterprise association there is a common purpose, a joint policy, and hence an obligation of members to behave in accordance with it or get out. Examples would include a business venture or a religious sect. In a civil association there is no common purpose, only an agreement (or a habit or

[1]Himmelfarb, *Marriage and Morals among the Victorians* (London: Faber, 1986), p. 227.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tradition) to abide by certain general rules while pursuing various purposes. All that members have in common is this recognition of the authority of general rules. So their commonality is purely formal; they do not join together for certain transactions since their association is "non-instrumental." The chief example is the modern Western state.

Individuals, naturally, belong to both sorts of association and that may be why a confusion arises: some people seek to make of the state an enterprise association, to give it a common purpose and to subject it to overarching control and direction. They wish to impose on it forms that are consciously planned and deliberately executed, supplanting forms that have grown up unself-consciously over long periods of time. They think they can succeed at this because they are possessed by an ideology and armed with technical knowledge and formulas that will replace customary and traditional ways of doing things. Their outstanding characteristic is "doing things by the book", pursuing an ideal, rather than trusting to traditional skills, practical knowledge, conventional morality and educated behavior. This is what Oakeshott at first called "the politics of faith", in contrast to the "politics of skepticism"[2] that is practiced by a civil association confronted by the need for change. Later he called it "rationalism in politics", against reliance on the "intimations" of traditional practice, meaning what is suggested as safe and reasonable and in accord with custom.

The Assault on Rationalism

ACTUALLY, THE contrast Oakeshott was proposing had earlier been stated by Disraeli in these words:

> In a progressive country change is constant and the great question is not whether you should resist change which is inevitable, but whether that change should be carried out in deference to the manners, the customs, the laws, and the traditions of a people, or whether it should be carried out in deference to abstract principles, and arbitrary and general doctrines.

But in 1872 Disraeli could not foresee what by Oakeshott's time was clear, the enormous damage that could be done by the irruption of passionate ideology into politics. Knowing that, Oakeshott brought to the denunciation of rationalism in politics as much ferocity as was compatible with his urbane and abstract style.

He said it corrupts and brutalizes a people, and leads to barbarism and tyranny such as the "cruel authoritarianism of the visionary leaders" of modern Europe (given the time, this was a reference to fascism and communism). He was especially harsh on the intellectuals, above all, the social scientists, saying that the impoverished way of thinking they had made fashionable was the most pressing cause of the corruption of our ability to live well. His ambition, says Anthony Farr, was to limit the authority of those who sought to direct other people's lives, be they scheming politicians or audacious academics. There is no question but that these are heavy hits when they are landed on the right opponents, namely, those who imagine they can recast society according to plan. But there is a question whether they are properly aimed at any state that undertakes the work of an enterprise association instead of confining itself to the "non-instrumental" activities of a civil association.

For consider what a state that did so confine itself would look like: consider,

[2] *The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Skepticism* was published in 1996 but was probably written around 1952.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that is, Oakeshott's account of the civil association. Its government would be small and, by our standards, inactive, for it would have few policies. It would have scant resources of its own, and hence little to distribute, and so the political contest for spoils would lose most of its point. Its economic policies would not extend much beyond sound money and antitrust policing. Its main task would be enforcing general rules of social and economic behavior by adjudicating conflicts as they arose; Oakeshott insisted adjudication did not mean conciliation, which was altogether too activist a role. He said, "Government in this style is, we have seen, primarily a judicial activity", and indeed it seems less like a government than a High Court of Equity. It would preside over a society that was a congeries of private enterprise associations, from whose conflict, mysteriously, all violence, ruthlessness and skulduggery had disappeared, thereby relieving the government of the duties of coercion and punishment.

Oakeshott was quite open about how inadequate all this would seem to earnest policymakers. They would see it as excessively skeptical, he conceded, as underestimating human possibilities, as frivolous, ironical, even playful. None of which bothered him, for at least such a style of politics was not self-defeating, as the politics of passionate rationalism inevitably and disastrously was. This did not convince even political thinkers who were quite near Oakeshott in temper. Hayek, for example, was waging a campaign against social "constructivism" that was parallel to Oakeshott's assault on rationalism in politics, but Hayek reasonably insisted that at the center there had to be a government armed with effective coercive power, which was necessary to the functioning of the market system—but which was also dangerous to personal liberty, and therefore had to be limited and in some way supervised. Keynes, too, had foreseen the objections to Oakeshott's brand of indolent conservatism, saying, "It leads nowhere; it satisfies no ideal; it conforms to no intellectual standard; it is not even safe, or calculated to preserve from spoilers that degree of civilization which we have already attained . . . [we] must have an attitude, a philosophy, a direction"[3]—in short, some sort of rational enterprise.

More fundamentally, it seems, there is the question whether, in the real world of politics from which Oakeshott was so remote, a state can even exist that is not in certain important respects a rational enterprise, notably in the matters of defense and foreign policy. His friend and editor, Timothy Fuller, says, after describing the modest adjudicator state, that Oakeshott

> thought that the main obstacle to enjoying such a government was the unavoidable and continuous preparation for war that imposed on all modern governments the undertaking to organize society in terms of uniformity of goals, reinforced by infatuation with technology, and the belief that human beings could not be entrusted to take care of themselves unless directed by an extrinsic goal or purpose, an ideology.

Now this is getting the wrong end of the stick, with a vengeance: what is being presented as the obstacle to good government is in fact the necessary condition for the existence of any government at all, namely, the external pressures of foreign policy and defense. As Otto Hintze said in a seminal essay, "All state organization was originally military organization, organization for war."[4] Dismissing Marx's

[3]John Maynard Keynes, *Essays in Persuasion* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1932), pp. 324, 338.

[4]Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State", in *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, ed. Felix Gilbert (New York: Oxford, 1975).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

notion that class conflict was the driving force of history, Hintze added, "Conflict between nations has been far more important; and throughout the ages, pressure from without has been a determining influence on internal structure."

Cannon Fodder

INSTEAD, Oakeshott chose to look internally and found the same driving force as Marx, though he put a different value on it: the power behind rationalism in politics was the rise of mass man (a.k.a. the proletariat). In an essay, "The Masses in Representative Democracy", he declared there were, and had been since sixteenth-century Europe, two sorts of people, individuals and individuals *manqués*, depending on whether they made or failed to make the adjustment to the dissolution of the pre-modern community. Some people failed in this because of some "combination of debility, ignorance, timidity, poverty or mischance", whereupon they became anti-individualists and "sank into guilt, envy, jealousy and resentment." When they turned to militant politics, their servility and submissiveness made them so many mice for the Pied Pipers of collectivism, for they wanted a state that would plan equality, sharing, partnership and solidarity. The mere availability of such cannon fodder called up the modern leader, a "cunning frustrate", an egoist whose only satisfaction came from commanding other people. Obviously, this same story could be told in different ways: not as the consequence of a lack or a failure but as the rise of a different morality, alternative to "possessive individualism"; or as the story of the widespread alienation produced by an economic system; or as the plight of people whose only acquaintance with the economy was through a factory or bureaucracy or other large organization in which individualism was scarcely known. But Oakeshott told it in heavily moralistic language, and decreed that all the consequences of individualism *manqué* were bad.

The tic of dividing things into two sorts and declaring one of them bad was alleviated when Oakeshott was brought to concede that political rationalism was inseparable from the European tradition and had to its credit what he called "many great achievements" over the centuries. Among these he mentioned "the supersession of violence by cooperative endeavor in many fields of human activity, and the whole movement of social and educational reform." It had not only promoted such chimeras as world government, the single tax, economic planning and open diplomacy, but also nationalism, federalism and the vote for women (though he has reservations about the last three, especially if the last is premised on the supposed "timeless rights" of women).

Thus, political rationalism was not some malady to be eradicated but an element in a complex European tradition, one force in a parallelogram of forces, one pole toward which policymaking might veer (like Left or Right). Ideology, too, after being deplored in comparison with the intimations of a live tradition, is restored to favor because, as a summary of a tradition, it can be of service to conservatism as well as to political rationalism. Moreover, since so much political rationalism is impractical and unworkable, what we are criticizing in it often is not the actual implementation of bad policies but erroneous belief, misdescriptions of society. When asked if that was worth getting so cross about, Oakeshott said trying to do what was impossible was "a corrupting enterprise."

That Oakeshott overlooked, or at least underestimated, the role of rationalism in the state was perhaps due to his reliance, which he often stressed, on English history. There is much in that country's story

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that can be represented as the working out of traditions, feeling the way by touch toward a balance of political forces, even doing great things in a fit of absent-mindedness. No such account could be given of the history of, say, Spain. As Ortega y Gasset said in *Invertebrate Spain*, that nation-state was "the great enterprise" of Castile during the centuries-long campaign against the Moors: "The vision of a united Spain was . . . an abstract ideal which could be realized, a plan which could fire men's minds." Generalizing from that case, he echoed Hintze: "The great nations have been made not from within but from without. A successful international policy, a policy of high enterprise, is the only thing that creates a fruitful internal policy—which is always, in the last analysis, a rather shallow affair."

But the massive counter-example that Oakeshott runs into, like Hayek and all the other critics of constructivism and rationalism, is the American Constitution, which, as every schoolchild is taught, was deduced *more geometrico* from natural law theory and cognate rationalist abstractions. When Walter Lippmann raised this objection, Oakeshott replied tartly that this was a typically shortsighted American view; there had been no Founding Fathers, only a series of limited decisions. Hayek had no better answer to the objection that the Constitution was "a product of rationalist constructivist liberalism." He said it was the "product of accident rather than design" and simply extended ancient English traditions. One must leave these assertions to the historians, but they have a *prima facie* air of desperate ad hoccery.

The Uses of Social Science

IN GENERAL, theorists like Oakeshott and Hayek are often arbitrary in drawing the line between rationalist political constructions and those institutions that have grown to no one's design over long periods of time. The distinction is not as clear-cut as it sounds. Because the Constitution is a good thing, it cannot be allowed to be an instance of rationalism in politics; but because the welfare state is (or has become) a bad thing, it is travestied as a political design deduced from the rationalist construction "social justice." It is not seen to have grown imperceptibly out of an old tradition, but must have been created by a political party, perhaps at the time of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, or in Britain's Beveridge Report of the 1940s, or, in the German case, in backroom deals between Bismarck and Lassalle. In reality, the welfare state is a stage in the evolution from the poor relief of Elizabethan times, and from religious charity via private benevolence, to social insurance. It is a classic example of the unplanned, dispersed, incremental growth of an institution, and one that was only brought under central government responsibility after the Second World War. Of course, that does not protect it from any criticism one may care to offer, except from the charge that it is culpable "constructivism" or "rationalism in politics."

If there was one crucial turning point in the development of the welfare state it was not a political intervention but an application of natural science to social affairs, that is, just the sort of thing Oakeshott said would be of no interest or importance. This was when the Belgian mathematician and astronomer Adolphe Quetelet showed that social statistics (then called "moral statistics") could be collected on such things as crime, mortality and accidents. Until then, workers' compensation for the distressingly frequent factory accidents of early industrialism (mostly involving steam) could only be established by judicial action to determine individual responsibility. But once the frequency and regularity of accidents were fixed, there was the actuarial basis

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for a system of insurance to cover the risks. And once factory accidents were seen as an insurable risk, so were unemployment, poverty, sickness and so on, until the notion of comprehensive social insurance (as in the Beveridge Report) appeared. My point is not simply that workers' compensation is the historical basis of the modern welfare state,[5] but that Oakeshott was wrong to think that the regularities and aggregates of social science were irrelevant to human conduct.

He was not only wrong but unfair to himself in saying that political philosophy is nugatory and irrelevant to political life. Insofar as it provides the tools for criticism of political ideas, it will always be of the utmost and urgent relevance, because politics is above all the domain of prejudice, fraud, deception and self-deception. The sort of criticism Oakeshott leveled at rationalism in politics—when he aimed straight and hit the planners and social engineers and not the modern state itself—was a useful weapon to put into the hands of conservatives. Much of his criticism of the state seen as an enterprise association, that is, as having in hand the interests of all members instead of protecting them to pursue their own chosen interests, was helpful in the exposure of solidarism, the passing off of limited sectional interests as everybody's interests. Since that is one of the most common frauds in politics, both on the Left and on the Right, Oakeshott had more relevance than he claimed. □

[5]François Ewald, *Histoire de l'état providence* (Paris: Grasset, 1996).

The Shadow Line

Politics is an activity unsuited to the young, not on account of their vices but on account of what I at least consider to be their virtues. . . . Everybody's young days are a dream, a delightful insanity, a sweet solipsism. Nothing in them has fixed shape, nothing a fixed price; everything is a possibility, and we live happily on credit. There are no obligations to be observed; there are no accounts to be kept. . . . Some unfortunate people, like Pitt (laughably called 'the Younger'), are born old, and are eligible to engage in politics almost in their cradles; others, perhaps more fortunate, belie the saying that one is young only once, they never grow up. But these are exceptions. For most there is what Conrad called the 'shadow line' which, when we pass it, discloses a solid world of things, each with its fixed shape, each with its own point of balance, each with its price; a world of fact, not poetic image, in which what we have spent on one thing we cannot spend on another; a world inhabited by others besides ourselves who cannot be reduced to mere reflections of our own emotions. And coming to be at home in this commonplace world qualifies us (as no knowledge of 'political science' can ever qualify us), if we are so inclined and have nothing better to think about, to engage in what the man of conservative disposition understands to be political activity.

—Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics* (1962)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Forgotten Few

Daniel Johnson

THERE has never, thank God, been a Battle of America. Despite the Hollywood depiction of the British Redcoats as proto-Nazi butchers in Mel Gibson's disgraceful movie, *The Patriot*, the American Revolution (or American War of Independence, as it is still known in Britain) was not a struggle for survival, but a colonial conflict between more or less civilized combatants that divided both American and British opinion. If George III had followed the wiser counsel of statesmen such as Edmund Burke and negotiated a settlement with the colonists, or even if he had won the war, Americans would not have been enslaved. The United States, or something very like it, would sooner or later have achieved independence.

Within living memory, however, there was a Battle of Britain. Sixty years ago this summer and autumn, the first great air battle in history was fought between the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the German *Luftwaffe* in the skies over southern England and East Anglia. The *blitzkrieg* had defeated the Allies in France, but had stopped at Dunkirk for long enough to allow the British Expeditionary Force to be evacuated, along with great numbers of Allied troops. All their equipment, however, had been lost. Unless a German invasion could be prevented, the *Wehrmacht* would almost certainly overwhelm the denuded and demoralized British Army. Only the Royal Navy could deter an invasion, but it was fully engaged in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. If the RAF lost control of the skies over the English Channel, the overstretched Home Fleet would suffer the same fate that American bombers later meted out to the Imperial Japanese Navy. After playing a decisive role in the fall of France, the *Luftwaffe* was confident of victory.

In its hour of peril, Britain turned to the only leader who promised "blood, toil, tears and sweat." Winston Churchill had become prime minister too late to prevent the catastrophe in France, but he succeeded in turning Dunkirk from an ignominious defeat into a "miracle" with the first of his great speeches to the House of Commons on June 4, 1940, which already anticipated an invasion:

> We shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.

Daniel Johnson is associate editor for cultural issues at the *Daily Telegraph*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In that speech, which he did not himself broadcast but which was repeated to the listening nation by an announcer, Churchill also promised victory, "for without victory there is no survival." The historian John Charmley calls this "sublime nonsense." It was, however, far more than bravado. It served two purposes: to boost morale and to warn Hitler that he would pay a heavy price if he sought to impose on the British Empire the kind of humiliation he had in store for France. Churchill still hoped against hope that Roosevelt would promise to intervene. Privately, he did not yet rule out a negotiated peace. But within a fortnight, Churchill came to the conclusion that a deal with Hitler was not to be done.

UPI/CORBIS-Bettmann

It is worth remembering what was at stake. If Operation Sealion, the German invasion plan, had succeeded, thousands of British adult males would have been conscripted as slave laborers; many would have been deported to the Continent to be worked to death in the Nazi war machine. Churchill could not have known this at the time, nor could he have foreseen just how terrible the consequences of the German occupation of Europe would prove to be. The invasion of Russia and the Holocaust were still to come. But he understood very well that the struggle for air supremacy would decide far more than the destiny of Britain. The Polish, Czech and French pilots who flew alongside their British comrades in the RAF already knew what fate had befallen their compatriots.

On June 18, 1940, Churchill gave one of his greatest speeches before the House of Commons. Later that evening, he repeated it on the BBC for the nation:

> What General Weygand called the Battle for France is over. I expect the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, and all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, 'This was their finest hour.'

That same night brought the first major air raid over England, and though there has never been agreement about precisely when the Battle of Britain commenced, this seems as good a date as any. For with that unforgettable oration, hurling defiance at Hitler, the die was cast. There could be no compromise now, no negotiated peace that was not also surrender. Was Lloyd George waiting in the wings to become "the Marshal Pétain of Britain"? Chamberlain had asked Churchill that question shortly before he spoke. "Yes, he might, but there won't be any opportunity", the Prime Minister replied. He could not, however, be sure. After the speech he reflected that "rhetoric was no guarantee of survival." Perhaps not by itself, but it certainly made all the difference.

THE ENEMY saw immediately what Churchill was about, but it grossly underestimated his support in the country. On June 23 Joseph Goebbels told the German press in his daily secret conference: "Well, this week things will come to a head in England. Churchill cannot hold on, of course. A compromise government will be formed. We are very close to the end of the war." The Nazi leaders did not believe a Battle of Britain needed to be fought. They expected British morale to collapse, just as French morale had collapsed. Thanks to Churchill, it did not. Goebbels, of all people, had misjudged the power of propaganda.

Yet it was more than propaganda. What is most striking about the "finest hour" speech is the way in which Churchill places the unfolding struggle for the skies in the grandest possible historical context. He deliberately raises the stakes with destiny. The British find themselves cast in the role of the saviors of Christian civilization, as God's people of the Covenant, worthy successors to the ancient Israelites.

This is a powerful theme, one that has endured for almost as long as Britain itself. We find it already in the eighth century, in Bede's *Ecclesiastical History of the English People*, which treats the *gens Anglorum* as God's missionaries. This providential sense of British history lay dormant throughout medieval and modern times, but always resurfaced at moments of great national crisis. It was a bold claim for Churchill to make: even in 1940 many Britons were not Christians, nor did the invocation of the deity necessarily appeal to those who were. Yet Churchill was surely right to draw on the deepest wellsprings of patriotism in such an emergency; and the roots of national identity are, at least in part, religious. Churchill knew he needed God, so he reminded the British that God needed them, too.

By depicting the struggle with Nazi Germany in apocalyptic terms, Churchill re-inforced his subliminal transfiguration of secular into providential history. The United States, too, is reminded that its salvation, as another branch of the English-speaking family, is at stake. A new dark age, not unlike that which immediately preceded Bede's, threatens; again, a trope of historical and eschatological significance. The reference to "perverted science" sounds doubly prophetic today: it evokes not only the industrialized slaughterhouse of Nazi Europe, but also the fact that eugenics, euthanasia, genocide and other echoes of that perverted science are still with us.

The extraordinary resonance of the phrase, "This was their finest hour", is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

due not only to its biblical echoes ("mine hour is not yet come"), but to the fact that it was seen at the time not as Churchillian bombast, but as the literal truth. Richard Overy's excellent new short history, *The Battle*, confirms that, at the height of the conflict in August 1940, RAF fighter pilots were being killed faster than they could be replaced, even though aircraft production was just keeping pace. Overy does not accept the myth of British technical superiority: the Messerschmidt 109, not the Spitfire or Hurricane, was in his view "the world's best all-round fighter." It was primarily a battle of men, not machines. Their chivalry belied their casualties. About half of the 3,000 RAF and Allied airmen who fought in the Battle of Britain did not survive the war.

Churchill knew the sacrifice he demanded of them; he was "never more moved" than on August 16, when he watched the entire strength of Fighter Command in the air from RAF Uxbridge. On the way home he made the remark that, repeated four days later in the Commons, became immortal: "Never in the field of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few." These words elevate the heroic self-sacrifice of the airmen onto a transcendental plane—not only the British, but all mankind, present and future, are in their debt. Britain accepted this tribute to its pilots, not as hyperbole or panegyric, but as fact.

This was the moment when the Battle of Britain not only entered into the British national consciousness, but became constitutive of it: part of its heritage, its identity, of what it means to be British. Churchill's speeches of 1940 are to the British what Lincoln's Gettysburg Address is to Americans. And it is that sense of nationhood that now seems so problematic.

Continental Europeans nowadays rarely refer to the Battle of Britain, though when Adenauer first met Churchill, he acknowledged the Germans' debt to their former adversaries. It is no reproach to the Europeans to say that their debt to the British is incommensurate with anything that the British owe them. We must give their silence the benefit of the doubt and assume that it denotes gratitude.

That is not the case with Britain's own government. Its silence denotes embarrassment. It regards the British people as hopelessly nostalgic. It blames their pride on the past. The newly elected mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, even blames Bede. They blame the Battle of Britain most of all.

In a recent speech, Tony Blair claimed that he loved history. But he doesn't know much about it. He does not dare to offend Europeans by celebrating what was Britain's finest hour and their most shameful one.

On July 9 this year, 66 survivors of the Battle of Britain stood on a lonely cliff top near Dover as a Spitfire and a Hurricane flew above. This will probably be the last such gathering to commemorate Britain's finest hour. No minister was present. The Few grow fewer, the many forget, and Tony Blair does not care.

Americans should care. For the Battle of Britain was also a battle for America. The United States saved Europe three times in the twentieth century: in two world wars and the Cold War. Yet Britain in its finest hour saved not only itself, but also America, from Hitler. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books

Banal and Dubious

Andrew J. Bacevich

Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 343 pp., $26.95.

Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), 246 pp., $23.

EVEN BAD books can serve salutary purposes. Unpacking the conventional wisdom of the day and expounding on it respectfully and at length, they unwittingly expose its defects. (Think of Frances FitzGerald on Vietnam, Jonathan Schell on nuclear war, or Paul Kennedy on American decline.) For such efforts, the conscientious student of world affairs, bending under a continuous assault of finely spun "news", may be grateful. The two books reviewed here offer a case in point. They are deeply flawed, but their defects imbue them with a certain estimable, if inadvertent, value. Offering two very different perspectives on Kosovo, they show the extent to which the prevailing understanding of this war that was not a war, fought for human rights and won by air power, is fraudulent.

Winning Ugly is a quintessential Washington think tank product: thoroughly researched, well organized, timely, judicious and utterly unoriginal. Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellows at the Brookings Institution, situate the war for Kosovo in a framework identical to that advanced by the Clinton administration and NATO and then replay the arguments vented during the war by the administration's many critics. The authors offer the equivalent of one of those comprehensive recapitulation/critiques that the *Washington Post* or *New York Times* publishes a month or six weeks after a major crisis—except that *Winning Ugly* appears a year late and is a couple hundred pages too long.

The book's main argument is that "NATO's cause was worthy but that the strategy it chose to pursue that cause was deeply flawed." The flaws for which the authors take NATO and the United States to task include the following: a tendency to issue threats without the means or the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will to back them up; a preference for political expediency over military efficacy, manifested above all in the decision to renounce a ground option at the outset of the conflict; a theory of "coercive diplomacy" based on the employment of air power largely for demonstrative purposes; and the inexplicable failure to have on hand a robust "Plan B" when expectations that "a bit of bombing would do the trick" proved mistaken.

Fair enough. But when Messrs. Daalder and O'Hanlon venture beyond the obvious, the results are either banal or highly dubious. A concluding chapter that purports to identify the larger "lessons" of Kosovo, for example, includes the pronouncement that, "When force is used, military means must relate to political ends." Or this: "Airpower alone usually cannot stop the killing in civil wars." Amen.

Other observations inspire less confidence. As a principle of generalship seemingly derived from the Robert McNamara-McGeorge Bundy school of war studies, Daalder and O'Hanlon urge that "when using military power, one must be prepared for things to go wrong and be ready to escalate." Alternatively, when things go wrong, one might want to think. Similarly, the authors conclude from the experience of Kosovo that, "Interventions should occur as early as possible." Yet might it not at times be the better part of wisdom to forgo intervention altogether?

That, it turns out, is the authors' worst fear. At the close of a decade in which the United States intervened *twice* in the Balkans, and with the use of force elsewhere occurring with such frequency that it barely qualifies as newsworthy, Daalder and O'Hanlon detect worrisome signs of resurgent American isolationism. The great danger they see looming on the horizon is the bugaboo of "American disengagement."

Portraying Kosovo as a success in which "the world's greatest alliance in history . . . proved its capabilities and its continuing relevance" just might help keep the benighted forces of isolationism at bay. Yet making that case obliges the authors to ignore a multitude of larger questions posed by facts scattered throughout their own narrative. For instance, they note that:

- Alliance cohesion was maintained only by adhering to a lowest common denominator military strategy. As a result, prevailing over a puny, but moderately obstinate adversary became a near thing. *Question:* When it comes to "out of area" responsibilities, what are the practical limits of NATO's capabilities? How many more Kosovos is the alliance capable of fighting?
- NATO prevailed not by destroying Yugoslav military power—the bombing of Serb forces in the field was ineffective—but by attacking TV stations, refineries and power plants, along with "cigarette factories, fertilizer plants, and chemical industries"—in essence, making war on Serb civilians. *Question:* Given the availability within NATO of alternative military means, what is the moral justification of such a bombing campaign?
- An action initiated to defend the principle and the possibility of multi-ethnic democracy concluded with NATO and the United States presiding over a process of reverse ethnic cleansing and partition, creating the likelihood that Kosovo "will one day be independent." *Question:* What are the implications of this outcome for the aspirations and legitimacy of other separatist movements in Europe and elsewhere in the world?
- The death toll resulting from Milosevic's campaign of repression against Kosovar Albanians was "far less than those of about two dozen civil wars around the world in the 1990s." *Question:* According to what criteria do the United

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States and its allies determine that some humanitarian catastrophes demand attention, while others—usually involving people of color—go unattended?

Authors rightly claim the prerogative of choosing to write about matters that interest them. These particular questions apparently do not interest the authors of *Winning Ugly*. Yet it should be noted that only by ignoring such concerns can Daalder and O'Hanlon prop up the fable that Kosovo somehow "demonstrated that Western peoples . . . care enough about suffering in the world to support efforts to reduce or end it."

THE LIST OF titles involving the high-tech term of art "virtual" is nearly endless: *Virtual History*, *Virtual Learning*, *Virtual Leadership*, not to mention the titles pairing that term with *College*, *Government*, *Selling*, *Faith*, *Light*, *Teams*, *Equality*, *Addiction*, *Vandals*, even *Tibet*. Now Michael Ignatieff, a London-based journalist, offers us *Virtual War*. What exactly does he mean?

Ignatieff professes to find the war for Kosovo not so much ugly as baffling. His interpretation relies less on comprehensive research than on one reporter's anguished personal impressions. *Virtual War* consists of a series of loosely related and uneven essays capped by an angst-laden if muddled conclusion. Ignatieff travels with diplomats attempting gallantly but futilely to avert conflict. He interviews and takes stock of the commander who wages it. He debates a prominent Western opponent of the war and exchanges phone calls and emails with Serb friends actually enduring NATO's bombing. And in Kosovo itself he trails behind an international magistrate who visits the site of a gruesome massacre and vows to bring the perpetrators to justice.

Putting all these impressions together, Ignatieff finds that Kosovo qualifies as the "first postmodern war in history." Everything about the conflict strikes him as novel and at least slightly surreal. Ignatieff prefaces his work with a quotation from General Wesley K. Clark, the NATO commander: "This was not", remarks Clark in connection to the hostilities, "strictly speaking, a war."

Of course, Clark's assessment is not, strictly speaking, accurate. Kosovo was not a war only in the sense that Korea was not a war: the president of the United States could not bring himself to acknowledge it as such. But Clark's comment serves Ignatieff's purposes nicely.

A virtual war, writes Ignatieff, is one in which events are perfectly transparent and in which spectacle trumps reality—to observers it is more akin to a sporting event than a serious armed struggle. In such a conflict, one side exploits its technological edge to attack with impunity. Preserving the lives of one's military professionals is the paramount operational priority—even if that means sacrificing "enemy" civilians. Since it is a contest in which image matters more than truth, virtual war is fought in large part to win the hearts and minds of the journalists who portray events to the general public. Himself a member of the media in good standing, Ignatieff reaches the self-gratifying conclusion that in such wars "the media becomes the decisive theater of operations."

Yet Ignatieff's war appears unreal only because his perspective is skewed. As it is, much of what he reveals suggests, *inter alia*, that there was precious little about the battle for Kosovo that was, in fact, "virtual." The victims of Serb atrocities did not think so. Nor did the Yugoslav forces who did Milosevic's bidding or the Kosovar Albanian guerrillas who resisted them. Nor did the citizens of Belgrade, despite Ignatieff's bizarre assertion that getting killed by precision weaponry "has a peculiar unreality even to its victims." How about the airmen flying strike mis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sions against Belgrade? Ignatieff does not record their experience. The only NATO soldier he observes in action is Clark, who fought the war from behind a desk in Belgium.

Ignatieff supported NATO's intervention in Kosovo as a moral imperative. After the fact, he professes to be troubled—and rightly so—by the "disconnection between the high moral language of the cause and the limited character of the war itself." He probes the wreckage left in the war's wake—the UN ignored, constitutional processes subverted by "linguistic subterfuge", vast suffering inflicted and absorbed, and an outcome in Kosovo not of justice but of revenge. As a result, he finds himself entertaining second thoughts.

Ignatieff wants enlightened members of the "international community" to use their power—mostly that means American power—to put a stop to evil. But to satisfy his desire to right the world's wrongs, ends and means command equal attention. Not only must well-intentioned nations be willing to fight for righteous causes; they must conduct the war in a way that is itself morally satisfying. This is a tall order.

Sensing that technology itself does not guarantee moral conduct in war, Ignatieff worries that virtual war "is a dangerous illusion." If anything, he writes, in high-tech warfare "the means we select may betray our ends." This is especially the case when the interests at stake are less than vital and where the notion of actually dying in battle "has become implausible or ironic." He notes correctly that, in the case of Operation Allied Force, "military superiority, rather than conscience alone, dictated restraint" and preserved Serbia from more severe punishment. Indeed, the record shows clearly that as NATO's frustration grew, restraint diminished.

Ignatieff consoles himself with the expectation that the technological edge (again, mostly American) that today makes virtual war possible cannot be sustained. As adversaries acquire comparable capabilities, virtual war will become a thing of the past. Ignatieff welcomes that prospect since it promises the return of "real" war. "Only then can we get our hands dirty", he concludes. "Only then can we do what is right." Who is the "we" that will fight and die to do the right thing in the morally acceptable way? Ignatieff breaks off his account without engaging this question.

That aside, there is considerable irony here. It has been, after all, *confidence* in the transforming potential of advanced technology that has inspired the Clinton administration to discover myriad new uses for American military power, always with the expectation of minimal costs, whether political or moral. Kosovo proves that expectation false, says Michael Ignatieff, quite correctly. But in imagining that a level technological battlefield will magically eliminate the sort of complications that Kosovo revealed, he falls prey to his own brand of nonsense. The chief obstacle separating us from utopia is not technology, but the intractable nature of politics and of humanity itself. To imagine otherwise is pure fantasy—not virtual, but real. □

Andrew J. Bacevich is director of the Center for International Relations at Boston University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Atatürk—and After

Graham E. Fuller

Andrew Mango, *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey* (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 1999), 539 pp., $40.

UPON ENTERING the Turkish embassy in Washington, D.C., one is immediately confronted with a massive bust of the "Father of the Turks", Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Atatürk is the very personification of the modern Turkish state—indeed, Turkey is one of only a few countries whose national ideology, in its case Kemalism, derives from a single individual.

Atatürk was unquestionably one of the greatest political figures of the last century. Modern Turkey most likely would not exist today, certainly not in its present form, if this brilliant statesman had not rallied the people of a collapsed Ottoman Empire, fought off the imperial forces of Europe, and established a nation-state in Anatolia. He brought Turkish society into the modern era at an extraordinary pace and, at least among the elite, inculcated a Western way of life that has made Turkey the most successful Muslim state in the world.

All this Atatürk achieved without the ritual bloodbath that so often accompanied such transformations. The social revolution he instigated avoided the excesses of Marxism-Leninism that seized neighboring Russia, and the grim features of national socialism that reigned in Germany and Italy during the same period. He was not revanchist or expansionist, he did not seek to re-create an empire, and he accepted the Western international order as it was. He possessed few if any foreign enemies in his day. As Paul Henze has observed, while Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, Mao and Tito have been thoroughly discredited, today's Turkey stands as a living monument to Atatürk's success. Few statesmen of the Third World can aspire to such a legacy. True, Atatürk ruled as an autocrat during most of his nearly twenty-year reign, but few other leaders have taken advantage of an "authoritarian interval" to build and create a lasting society.

ANDREW Mango, steeped in Turkish history throughout his life, has written the first truly definitive biography of Atatürk, avoiding the sins of excessive adulation on the one hand and excoriation on the other. The biography is deeply researched but eminently readable, and is likely to remain unsurpassed as a chronicle of this extraordinary man's life.

The book traces Atatürk's life through a period of cataclysm in the Ottoman Empire, as Balkan ethnic groups, encouraged by competing great powers, one by one contrived to whittle down the empire to its present Turkish ethnic heartland. Mango shows us Atatürk the soldier putting out Balkan fires and Arab world rebellious stirrings, his continuing disillusionment with the Young Turks' regime, whose efforts at reform and discipline only hastened Ottoman collapse, his dramatic role in decisively turning back the British at Gallipoli, his organization of the national resistance war, which mobilized the Anatolian center against European imperialist designs to further partition the country, and, above all, Atatürk's sweeping cultural revolution designed to bring Turkey into the twentieth century. Mango balances well the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political chronicle with insights into both the personal life and the psychological character of the leader.

A proud, headstrong, determined visionary with a demanding personality, Atatürk had few friends, and, apart from his obsessive and driving national project, his few interests included nightly soirées with a select handful of loyalists and intermittent romantic relationships. Mango probably provides more details on Atatürk's personal life than the official biographies care to see, and he also sifts and dispels some of the myths surrounding the supreme national figure. There have reportedly been some attempts to suppress the publication of the book in Turkey, but the official guardians of the myth should lighten up: Mango's portrait of the man is admiring, impressive and leaves little doubt of his greatness and overwhelming centrality to modern Turkey, while reminding us that he was human as well, lending both credibility to Mango's account and valuable detail to students of leadership and power.

For all its excellence, *Atatürk* is in some senses written too much as a chronicle. Turkey has evolved immensely since Atatürk's day, and, as with all historical figures, he needs to be assessed in light of subsequent events. Mango's interesting narrative makes no links to major issues such as Turkey's transition from a statist economy, the emergence of the Kurdish problem, the resurgence of Islamic politics, and the collapse of the Soviet Union—all of which have wrought immense change over the last two decades, with direct implications for Kemalism.

Presumably, Mango did not wish to date his book by systematically linking the Atatürk era to more recent decades. And it is true that his approach does offer a "timeless" account that can be re-interpreted and resummarized by others in later eras with new historical perspectives. Still, despite the excellent final chapter that analyzes the Atatürk phenomenon in light of today's events, one is left thirsting for a more interpretive biography.

For the post-Atatürk story is at least as important as Atatürk's life in determining his legacy. The unfolding of events continues to vindicate many of his policies, and also to expose their flaws. Mango suggests that Atatürk, as an autocratic reformer, was above all interested in cultural revolution. The many aspects of that revolution—the emasculation of Islamic institutions, the introduction of Western legal codes, the abolition of the Arabic alphabet in favor of the Latin, the imposition of formal surnames, the creation of a cult of new nationalism that would glorify the Turks as the center and seed of world civilization, the compulsory adoption of Western clothing styles over traditional Turkish dress—had a massive impact on Turkish life and on what has subsequently become of it.

But reforms imposed from above exact a certain price, and the passage of time has now revealed that price with greater clarity. Many of the questions about Atatürk today are in fact questions about the statist values of the blighted twentieth century as a whole. Atatürk was a child of the West, not of some exotic East. Large segments of the Ottoman reformist intelligentsia were steeped in Western thinking. Most of them were Turks from the Ottoman's Balkan provinces, intimately aware of the daily workings of European great powers and of their cultures. Atatürk had absorbed many of the values of the European eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including leitmotifs of the French Revolution such as the disestablishment of religion, the defrocking of the clergy, the veneration of the nation-state, the imposition of national identity upon citizens of all origins, and the supreme values of secular nationalism. All these features were adopted by the Turkish state.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Even in his autocratic rule, however, Atatürk scarcely flirted with bloodshed as an instrument of nation-building. What he did do was produce his own version of Western values. Six key principles emerged in his thinking during the twenty years of his unchallenged stewardship over the country, principles that provided the foundation of Kemalist ideology after his death: republicanism; nationalism; populism (vaguely defined but representing rule in the people's interests); statism (in the sense of state intervention in the economy); secularism; and "revolutionism" or reformism. Kemalism as an ideology was enshrined more deeply after Atatürk's death, and thereafter was preserved largely unchanged by a Westernized elite with a paternalist outlook.

UPI/CORBIS-Bettmann

IF THERE IS a problem with the Turkish state today, it is indeed the unthinking perpetuation of Kemalism as a static set of values. No text of any kind can continue to be applied in the same terms as those in which it was originally conceived. The world in which Atatürk so brilliantly and creatively operated is now gone. So many of the key tenets of Kemalism require re-interpretation, if not simple abandonment, as the world and the conditions of Turkey transform.

Turkey, one of the most successful countries in the whole of the Balkans, Middle East and Muslim world, still faces serious problems in offering itself as a full candidate for membership of the European Union. Ossified Kemalism lies at the heart of these problems. Among the six principles of Kemalism, that of statism in its broadest sense presents the greatest obstacle to the country's evolution today.

The centrality of the state was the key element of nation-building over much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but it is now perceived in a different light across the globe. This change reflects both the continuing evolution of liberal thought and the cautionary lessons concerning the gross abuse of power by fascist and communist states in the twentieth century. Received wisdom now asserts that the state does not embody the people, nor should it be an object of veneration. The state should serve the people and not the converse, and the people is made up of a plurality of groups. It does not constitute a monolith in the Rousseauian or Marxist sense, and so has no independent existence apart from the institutions and culture of civil society.

In spite of this wisdom, Turkey clings to the near Orwellian language of an earlier era that proclaims, in the very first sentence of the preamble to its constitution, "The Turkish state is eternal." Yet the Turkish *state* should not be eternal. It is a construct of the people, constantly evolving to meet their needs and demands. It is the Turkish people who are eternal and who will shape the state as they wish. Thus, laws in Turkey such as those that criminalize insults to the state help perpetuate the illiberal order that prevents Turkey's acceptance as a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fully Western country in European eyes. More important, that illiberal order hinders Turkey's own democratic evolution, and thus complicates a solution to its two main problems, Islamism and the Kurds.

First, the religious question. Turkey, as a "secular" state, continues to ban the main Islamist party in the country, which also happens to be the single biggest party. Turkey should indeed maintain secularism, but it must be real secularism that ensures absolute separation of church and state, not absolute state control over religion in the French Jacobin sense, which is what the word "secularism" means in Turkey today. Islam is not inherently incompatible with democracy. Islamist parties should not be treated as a security issue unless actual violence is employed, nor should religious issues be handled by security authorities in accordance with the views of an old paternalist elite.

Turkey's second-biggest domestic crisis is the Kurdish issue. In the interests of building a homogenized nation, the Kemalist state opted upon its foundation (as did France and many other countries) not to recognize any identities within the country other than the Turkish one. This was of course a fiction, since Turkey is quite multi-ethnic. The Kurds are only the single biggest of the ethnic minorities. They are not discriminated against as citizens, but they have virtually no cultural or language rights or regional voice over their affairs—in what is their original homeland within Turkey.

The Turkish state had a perfect right to employ force to put down the Kurdistan Workers' Party, a violent ethnic Kurdish movement that came into existence in the mid-1980s to articulate some long-held Kurdish grievances, but the state also has an obligation to solve the initial problems that gave rise to the conflict. A solution could come fairly easily if Turkey's democratic governmental processes, civil society and media were allowed to operate freely. But they are not allowed to do so, because the Kurdish issue is seen strictly in security terms, and thus outside the pale of discussion. The doctrines of the state, which the old elite chooses to call "Kemalism", are no longer adequate to handle the problem, and the cost for Turkey is high.

TURKEY's populace is now increasingly sophisticated and its civil society rich and growing. It possesses many of the democratic and civil institutions that we have in the West. The older Kemalist term, "republicanism", should now be understood in the context of contemporary liberal democracy and the needs of Turkish society as a whole. Similarly, the Kemalist concept of "statism", which enshrines the principle of strong state control of the economy, is archaic. Under policies of import substitution Turkey developed a sound functional infrastructure over many decades, but it could not leap forward dramatically until the adolescent economy was liberated in the 1980s by President Özal's policies of privatization and opening the economy to foreign investment. Nearly all Turks now recognize the need to replace economic statism with openness to the international market economy. Similarly, "revolutionism" or "reformism", once a paternalistic program of drastic cultural reform, should today be understood as continuing the ongoing evolution of civil society and liberalization of the state.

The life of Atatürk as chronicled by Mango is an important study in enlightened statesmanship in an era when many other major international statesmen were less enlightened—and less successful—in shepherding their peoples toward a better future. Even as Atatürk deserves permanent respect and admiration for his accomplishments, his policies of eighty years ago require serious rethinking. After

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all, Atatürk's distinctive strength was precisely a readiness to recognize and adapt to new conditions. It is a great disservice to this remarkable figure to allow the term "Kemalism" to be adopted by a single elite group within a vibrant and pluralistic society in order to serve its own ends. What is required is a liberalization and opening of the state to permit the particular historical genius of the Turkish people—who have administered many different empires across time and space—to fulfill itself in contemporary terms. □

Graham E. Fuller is former vice chair of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA, and co-author of *Turkey's Kurdish Question* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).

The Stiletto Idealist

Adam Garfinkle

Yoram Hazony, *The Jewish State: The Struggle for Israel's Soul* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 400 pp., $28.

YORAM Hazony, a not yet forty year-old head of a Likud-leaning Israeli think tank, is a believer in the power of ideas. He believes that the idea of Zionism is under concerted attack in Israel *by Israelis*, that a small group of post-Zionist cultural leaders and intellectuals has succeeded in undermining the very foundations of Israel as a Jewish state. He believes that only the restoration of the Zionist idea can save the state from internal decay and, ultimately, one form of destruction or another. Yoram Hazony is an idealist, and proud of it.

The Jewish State: The Struggle for Israel's Soul is not exceedingly overwritten, but, appropriately enough given the author's last name—derived from the Hebrew word for "vision"—it is a jeremiad. Its emotions are nevertheless generally under control; there is no cant or calumny unleashed here, except by indirection (of which more below), and the author is careful to evince nuance. He does not assert that Israel's cultural extremists are mainstream or that the majority of Israelis agree with post-Zionism, and he is not a Chicken Little announcing the imminent fall of the sky. But the reader nevertheless gets the point: be frightened for Israel's future.

Since he believes that ideas matter more than anything else in politics, Hazony argues that, in light of the contemporary post-Zionist assault, the real history of Israel is not contained by the rivalry among Zionist factions, but by the struggle between Zionists and those Jewish intellectuals who rejected Zionism. "The more important the struggle over the question of the Jewish state becomes", writes Hazony, "the less interesting become the threadbare disputes between Ben-Gurion and Menachem Begin . . . which take on the character of a squabble between the captain and the first mate of a sinking ship." This is a brash but brilliant reformulation of Israel's historiography, and makes perfect sense given Hazony's aim.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

According to Hazony, Theodor Herzl himself understood the power of an idea, but neither Labor nor Revisionist Zionism after him took anything abstract seriously. While Zionists institutionalized themselves to found and then manage the state, busying themselves with the material requisites of military and economic power, anti-Zionists took up residence at the Hebrew University, occupying themselves with ideas—moral and political philosophy, in particular. Little by little, year by year, the jerry-rigged ideological marquee of Labor Zionism became dilapidated, while the anti-Zionists of academe and *haute culture* made continuous if quiet inroads into the national psyche. As Hazony sees it, this process has now reached a stage in which the anti-Zionists have virtually won. The powerful ideas dominating Israeli intellectual and cultural life, and increasingly its mainstream as well, are post- and anti-Zionist, and the practical implications in Israeli public policy are increasingly manifest. These ideas, or anti-ideas, will in the end destroy the state in the name of purifying and reforming it—unless the post-Zionist intellectual trajectory is somehow reversed.

WHAT ARE we to make of all this? There *are* post- and anti-Zionists in Israel, and some of them, at least, are descended from the anti-Zionists of the pre-state Hebrew University. Hazony takes great pains, and many pages, to establish the lineages of the main players, from Martin Buber, Gershom Scholem and Judah Magnes on down. Still, the sources of Israeli post-Zionism have at least as much to do with the spreading plague of postmodernism and deconstructionism. There is such a surfeit of brooding self-alienation and narcissism at American and West European universities that some of it must spill over into Israel, whose academics are as afflicted by the *hutz la-aretz* (outside the Land of Israel) syndrome no less than its typical consumers. Charles Krauthammer has it about right when he defines post-Zionism as "really just Western counterculturalism applied to the Jewish Question."

Of these post-Zionists, whatever their pedigree, Hazony rightly says that there are those writing school textbooks, under the aegis of the education ministry, who make it seem as though Israel has been the aggressor throughout the Arab-Israeli conflict. There are post-Zionists who want to edit the national anthem, "Hatiqva", to expunge all reference to anything Jewish, and those who want to put a crescent on the Israeli flag. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) code of ethics has already been re-written to expunge all reference to the Jewish people and the Jewish state. There are those who want to limit or repeal altogether the Law of Return. There are those Jewish Israelis who claim that for Israel to be Jewish in any but the most abstract universalist (and hence meaningless) manner contradicts Israeli democracy.

These people, vaguely left-wing secularists every one, are both mad and maddening. Their home-grown Israel-bashing is often perverse to the point of medical pathology. But Hazony exaggerates their influence on mainstream Israel. Sometimes the exaggerations turn on facts left unstated. For example, it is true that some outrageous history textbooks have been produced; one high school text, for example, discusses the onset of the June 1967 War without ever mentioning the Egyptian blockade of the Strait of Tiran, the remilitarization of the Sinai, or the congealing of the Arab war coalition. But Hazony lets stand the impression that such books are required reading and that through such texts a minority of post-Zionists is brainwashing the country. This is humbug. High school and middle school teachers choose their texts from an ample assort-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment. In fact, it is unclear if the execrable book to which Hazony points is used in even a single Israeli school.

Other distortions emerge from a studied lack of context. It is true, for example, that many Israeli novels and films are written by those with, at the least, ambiguous attitudes toward Zionism. But it is the task of the writer *cum* intellectual to criticize the status quo, to make people reflect on what they otherwise take for granted. To ascribe virtually unopposed cultural hegemony to such writers is like claiming that Gore Vidal and E.L. Doctorow determine the mainstream culture of the United States.

The influence of such people is not trivial, of course, whether in the United States, Israel or any open society. Adversary culture intellectuals who take themselves and are taken too seriously can certainly be a problem. But that is hardly the whole story. There is a huge middle in Israeli society—not properly called a silent majority because Israelis are rarely speechless except when they are asleep—and it is literate, articulate and quite sensibly Zionist. It is not the hapless, wayward, moldable human clay of Hazony's depiction. It deserves more effective political articulation, for only a few small leftist parties, Meretz and Shinui in the main, are holding the fort of classical Zionism. The political center, represented by Labor and Likud, has lost its way and, indeed, the post-Zionist attack *is* delegitimizing the foundations of the state, at least to some extent.

THERE is yet another source of attack, however, against classical Zionism—or, more accurately, against the configuration of Zionist streams that came into being with the founding of the state. That configuration revolved around three compromises or balances: between the secular state and the religious establishment, between the need for security and for democracy, and between the requirements of power and peace. These balances are being attacked not only by post-Zionists, but also from the other direction by retro-Zionists of the secular and especially the religious right. Alas, Hazony's views lean toward that camp.

This suggests that Hazony's presentation may have a partisan edge. Hazony once worked for Benyamin Netanyahu. He also lives in the West Bank and is an Orthodox Jew. While this does not peg him as necessarily illiberal on social, religious or other issues, it is clear that Hazony believes Labor Zionism and the Labor Party to be his adversaries—hence his attempt to label them as propagators or consumers of post-Zionism. This has turned his passion for ideas into a form of stiletto idealism.

We learn, for example, in Hazony's interpretation of Israel's decline, that the Oslo peace process represents the quintessential sign of Israel's rejection of its own world-view and purpose. "For an agreement between the Zionists and the [Palestine Liberation Organization] to be reached", writes Hazony, "it seemed that one side or the other would have to concede the fundamentals of its worldview and the ostensible purpose of its existence. And sure enough, one side *did* make such a concession." That side, of course, was Israel under a Labor Party government, which, claims Hazony, was "not really that interested in questions of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence." Hazony bases this interpretation on the recent fantasies of Shimon Peres, never once mentioning that Yitzhak Rabin, not Peres, was prime minister when the Oslo accords were signed. He also attacks the current prime minister, Ehud Barak, for allowing the change in the IDF code of ethics to have taken place while he was chief of staff. But he never mentions Barak's abstention in the cabinet vote over

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oslo II, so concerned was he about the balance of concessions contained in that deal.

Hazony's stiletto idealism also leads him to try to claim David Ben-Gurion for what, by his measure, remains of Zionism (read the Likud and its allies). This is standard partisan posturing in Israel, but Hazony gives it personal form. In his introduction, he describes first his parents' home as Ben-Gurionesque, secularly Labor Zionist to the core even though it was in America, and then his uncle's Orthodox, religious Zionist home in Israel. The way he presents it, these homes were utterly compatible ideologically, Ben-Gurion and the rabbis hand in hand. But what Hazony has conflated for the reader the truth of history cuts asunder.

Distortions also make their way into Hazony's historical narrative. For the most part, the tales of Herzl and Ben-Gurion, Max Nordau and Ahad Ha'am, Martin Buber and Chaim Weizmann, are beautifully told. For those who have forgotten or who never knew this history, Hazony's rendition skillfully evokes the drama and the high stakes of the time. The level of biographical detail exceeds the needs of Hazony's argument, but this small sin is redeemed by the vigor of the prose.

Still, odd twists of interpretation abound. For example, Hazony vividly depicts Ahad Ha'am's opposition to Herzl's optimistic great power diplomacy. Herzl's belief that the ingathering of millions of Jews in Palestine could occur in a matter of only a few years, said Ahad Ha'am, was "a fantasy bordering on madness." But what Hazony neglects to mention is Ahad Ha'am's reasoning: that the land was populated with hundreds of thousands of Arabs, and that such massive and rapid Jewish immigration would mobilize that population against the Zionist aim. That same concern, at once practical and moral, is in part what turned Martin Buber away from Zionism, what turned Israel Zangwill into a territorialist,[1] and what endlessly complicated the lives of Ben-Gurion's generation as well. On this critical matter, however, Hazony's presentation is mute.

IT IS EASY, for me at least, to sympathize with Hazony's disgust with post-Zionism. And it is easy to laud his defense of Jewish particularism, and of particularism in general. Hazony shrewdly observes that the anti-nationalist, Rousseauean social contract states, which have insisted on the objective reality of human equality, have violated every principle of liberty and toleration in its supposed service. "It was constitutional monarchy", Hazony points out, "based as it was on the premise of the radical *inequality* of men, that in fact defended the ideals of tolerance and freedom in the Austrian empire."

But Hazony is in some ways as extreme as those he criticizes. Jewish national particularism need not be at odds with universal values, yet Hazony evinces no interest in the connection. He seems to care little about the fulfillment of Israeli democracy, and one can almost see his eyes gleam as he recounts Herzl's own skepticism toward democracy in the Jewish state. There is, after all, a real tension to be managed between Israel as a Jewish state and Israel as a democracy. Twenty percent of Israel's citizenry is not Jewish, and concern about the status and attitudes of that 20 percent represents a security issue as well as a moral and political one. On this tension, however, Hazony is silent. He seems to care even less for the possibility of peace with the Palestinians, even though perpetual war

[1] A "territorialist" was someone who favored Jewish political autonomy anywhere, including places thousands of miles from Palestine, for the sake of saving the Jews from the would-be slaughterhouses of Europe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with them is hardly a condition that any Zionist should wish to affirm.

Labor Zionists argue that Israel's ability to face these kinds of issues head on, internal as well as external ones, is a sign of strength and maturity, not weakness and incipient suicide. Hazony thinks they are delusional. They think he is fanatical. What this argument really comes down to, however, has nothing to do with one's choice of defamatory adjectives. It is about what the word "normal" means in the contemporary Israeli and Jewish context.

For Hazony, a society continuously mobilized by an ideal constitutes what is normal—and necessary—for Israel. This is not surprising, for, as an Orthodox Jew, Hazony is a partner in an intellectual and spiritual exercise in which the normal—in moral conduct, study and piety—is never enough. The system of Rabbinic Judaism, developed after the Jews lost their national sovereignty almost 2,000 years ago, has been a continuing and extraordinary response to a historical discontinuity, a condition of abnormality. What this system requires of its adherents is by most measures also extraordinary, which helps explain how Rabbinic Judaism saved the Jewish people as a people over the centuries of exile. Through 1,600 years, this extraordinary adaptation to the abnormal came to constitute the normal for all those Jews, like Hazony (and myself, for that matter), who adhere to the faith of their forebears.

The Zionist founders after Herzl, however, rejected that normality. Instead, they strove to normalize Jewish civilization by rejoining the Jewish people to their disrupted history in their own land. Zionist anti-clericalism was visceral but also analytical: what use would Israeli Jews have for a solution to an abnormal situation once that situation was normalized? None of the intellectual gyrations of those who have tried to square Zionism with Rabbinic Judaism has ever succeeded fully in answering this question. In a sense, Hazony's religious Zionism upholds the abnormal and the extraordinary in the name of the normal. Classical Zionism sees the *secularly* Jewish State of Israel as an escape from the extended abnormality of the Exile and its rabbinic accoutrement, and its adherents embrace that escape. For Hazony, *that* kind of normality leaves nothing meaningfully Jewish about Israel.

Not the exchange of polemics but the patterns of history itself will settle this argument over what normal can and should mean for Jews. Perhaps Zionism's successes must spell its decline as an ideal; after all, there has never been an ideology that did not eventually wind down, especially those that actually achieve their aims. Amin Al-Mahdi, a prominent figure in the contemporary Egyptian peace movement, perhaps said it best: "This is what happens to ideology: In the beginning, it needs dreamers, then warriors, and, at the end, biographers." One wonders if it isn't some sort of sign that, despite himself, Hazony spends so much time talking of Herzl and Ben-Gurion.

Still, the wisest Israelis never give up hope for a new synthesis of Jewish civilization that can reconcile the tensions between the universal and the particular, the democratic and the Jewish, the material and the spiritual. The real choice is not between Zionism and post-Zionism, between clinging to or jettisoning the Jewish ideal of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The challenge is to create a new ideal for the twenty-first century, a trans-Zionism that contains but goes beyond the Zionism of Herzl and Ben-Gurion. Attaining that new ideal constitutes the real struggle for the soul of Israel. □

Adam Garfinkle is a staff member of the National Security Study Group of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century. The views expressed here are his own.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Many Faces of Mitterrand

Daniel J. Mahoney

Ronald Tiersky, *François Mitterrand: The Last French President* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 431 pp., $29.95.

IN 1964, six years after the establishment of the Fifth Republic of France, François Mitterrand published *The Permanent Coup d'état*, a thundering denunciation of Charles de Gaulle's "regime of personal power" and a call for the return of parliamentary republicanism and the rule of law in France. In 1995 Mitterrand retired after fourteen dramatic years as occupant of de Gaulle's presidency, an "emperor in republican clothing", to use Ronald Tiersky's felicitous formulation in his new biography of the late French president.

Mitterrand, the quintessential centrist politician of the parliamentary Fourth Republic (1946–58), was one of a handful of prominent politicians (outside of the Stalinist French Communist Party) to persist in denying the legitimacy and republican character of the Gaullist regime. In the 1960s and 1970s, Mitterrand re-invented himself as a man of the Left, became the leader of the Socialist Party, and forged a "Common Program" and electoral alliance with the Communists. After twenty-three years in opposition and two failed runs for the presidency, Mitterrand led the *Union de gauche* to dramatic victories in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1981. At the time, Mitterrand and his allies spoke euphorically of a "rupture" with the past, with bourgeois capitalism and all its works. They pursued a decidedly ideological program dedicated to incompatible ends: enhanced growth and job creation on the one hand, and statist goals of redistribution of wealth, nationalization of financial and banking sectors and of key industrial groups on the other. To these they added the libertarian dreams of political decentralization and worker self-management in industry.

In a famous analysis of the Common Program of the Left published eight years prior to Mitterrand's election to the presidency, Raymond Aron, without challenging the Left's alleged good intentions, had highlighted its economic stupidity and political irresponsibility. The Left, he suggested, wanted to "square the circle." The appeal to good intentions was beside the point. As Aron wrote, "Castro didn't wish to end up with the militarization of Cuban sugar collection nor did Allende wish to ruin the Chilean economy."[1] The dream of a non-collectivist socialism, of a "third way" between social democracy and Soviet socialism, to be brought about through nationalization and state control in an already excessively statist society, was nothing short of delusional. In Aron's view, France would ultimately have to choose between remaining a liberal community and pursuing a dangerous collectivist adventure that would attenuate its strong political and economic ties with Europe and the liberal West. Faced with the disastrous economic results of his initial effort to "break" with capitalism, Mitterrand had the good sense to choose liberalism and "Europe" over ideological purity and fidelity to socialism. In 1983 he rejected various hair-brained "neo-protectionist"

[1]See Aron, "Le progamme commun de la gauche ou le cercle carré" (1973), in *Commentaire* (Février 1985), p. 489.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

schemes advocated by some of his advisers and made his peace with capitalism.

This dramatic turning point is well told by Tiersky, although he remains too impressed by Mitterrand's good intentions and libertarian convictions. Mitterrand effectively reconciled himself and his party to the legitimacy of liberal society, outmaneuvered and marginalized his Communist allies, and pursued the next stages of European integration in conjunction with Chancellor Kohl and the Germans. (The last point is crucial: Mitterrand was genuinely attached to the European project.) When faced with a fundamental choice, Mitterrand's "European" convictions won out over his socialist ones. Conservative critics of the bureaucratic and centralizing tendencies of the European Union should remember that the goal of European integration made new collectivist undertakings of the French type nearly impossible. Perhaps this explains why so many French liberals, critics of socialism and excessive regulation at home, reconciled themselves somewhat uncritically to the European construction. In light of the alternative, it was easier to ignore questions about the EU's bureaucratic heavy-handedness and its threats to national sovereignty.

THE AUTHOR of *The Permanent Coup d'état* and the architect of the Socialist Party's ideological lurch to the Left in the 1970s reconciled himself with surprising ease not only to capitalism but also to the constitutional order whose republican legitimacy he had so long denied. He managed artfully to accept "cohabitation", or the sharing of power with the Center-Right, both in 1986 and 1993. He thus preserved his own power and confirmed the flexibility of de Gaulle's "reactionary" constitution. His legacy is substantial: this man of the Left ratified what François Furet has called "the republic of the center" and helped put an end to the ideological style of politics that had dominated French national life since the revolution of 1789. By the late 1980s, Mitterrand's Communist allies were marginalized, the *coup de grâce* coming with the implosion of communism in Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991. Not that Mitterrand was always a model of civic responsibility along the way. His decision to restore proportional representation before the 1986 parliamentary elections was a deliberate effort to strengthen the far right-wing National Front at the expense of the responsible parties of the Center-Right. It was, most assuredly, not Mitterrand's finest hour.

This well-written, lively and comprehensive biography errs on the side of interpretative charity. But there is something to be said for at least provisionally attempting to interpret Mitterrand's renowned "contradictions" in the most sympathetic light.

Ronald Tiersky is particularly effective in making sense of the paradoxes that define Mitterrand's public and private lives alike. These contradictions are remarkably, even mind-bogglingly, legion. Tiersky's book does not minimize them and he has the good sense to allow the reader to judge for himself. The principal political paradox of Mitterrand's career—the fact that this socialist anti-Gaullist played a substantial role in reconciling the French to the inevitability of a liberal order and the legitimacy of the Gaullist republic—has already been noted. But the other contradictions are sometimes even more dramatic and have contributed to Mitterrand's widespread reputation as a sphinx-like opportunist.

This self-described agnostic and "existentialist" came out of a militantly right-wing and authoritarian Catholic milieu—the very one that gave rise to Pétain's "national revolution." A hero of the resistance, Mitterrand also served dutifully for over a year in 1942–43 as a civil servant of the Vichy regime, and he

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

maintained close ties with unsavory Vichyites such as René Bousquet long after their misdeeds had been exposed. A socialist critic of bourgeois society and "the power of money", Mitterrand was himself a quintessentially French bourgeois with a classical education and sensibility. Pascal was among his favorite writers. This cultured bourgeois had a daughter out of wedlock and maintained two families, each of which, remarkably, was equally devoted to him at the time of his death in 1996.

A critic of the imperial unaccountability of de Gaulle's presidency, Mitterrand lied with seeming impunity about everything—from his right-wing youth (not fully revealed until the publication of Pierre Péan's 1994 book, *Une Jeunesse française)*, to his complicity in the 1985 bombing of the Greenpeace ship, *The Rainbow Warrior*, and the fact that he had prostate cancer (diagnosed in 1981 but not disclosed to the French people until near the end of his life). Mitterrand even participated in a bizarre plot in 1959 to make himself appear the target of assassination by right-wing terrorist forces, the so-called Observatory Affair. That lamentable display of crude Machiavellianism—clearly intended to harness support from the Left opposition to de Gaulle—marked the humiliating nadir of Mitterrand's career. His parliamentary immunity was suspended by the National Assembly in the same year and he was spared prosecution only after his unsavory accuser and accomplice, Robert Pesquet, fled the country.

Tiersky convincingly argues that the Observatory Affair was the turning point in Mitterrand's career. It disciplined his ambition and taught him the limits of effective duplicity. It gave rise to a more dignified "Machiavellian republicanism", as Tiersky calls it. Mitterrand's remarkable ambition, his undoubted propensity for mendacity and his impressive political flexibility were henceforth circumscribed by a more scrupulous respect for republican norms and institutions. In making this point Tiersky compares Mitterrand to another "Machiavellian republican": Charles de Gaulle.

The comparison is inexact and misleading. De Gaulle was an effective, even expert, practitioner of *raison d'état* and a man of considerable personal and political ambition. But he was not a liar in any habitual or even Machiavellian sense. Instead, he embodied national and personal honor in an almost classical manner. He stepped down from office in 1946 and 1969 precisely because he did not believe he could continue to maintain his self-respect by accommodating himself to the political status quo. Mitterrand, in contrast, was Machiavellian in a vulgar and pejorative sense nearly wholly lacking in de Gaulle. He was inordinately attached to political success. Tiersky puts an excessively favorable gloss on this difference. He argues that Mitterrand, not de Gaulle, was France's "representative man", mirroring the contradictions, vicissitudes and transformations that defined the French in the last six decades of the twentieth century. Tiersky's is a democratic perspective that prefers the representative political man to the inaccessible, "aristocratic" political hero or statesman. In this connection, Tiersky nicely highlights Mitterrand's existentialist intellectual and moral convictions. He rightly states that Mitterrand was "against all absolutisms except the existentialist categorical imperative that each person has the moral responsibility to make one's own meaning in a universe with no transcendent meaning." This ethic has an austere, even noble dimension, one that allowed Mitterrand to adjust to great evils (captivity in Germany in 1940–41) and terrible setbacks (such as the Observatory Affair). But it also had something to do with his limitless capacity for mendacity and for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the enduring suspicion that his moral commitments were provisional at best. There may be more of a connection between Machiavellian flexibility and existentialist "authenticity" than Mitterrand's sympathetic American biographer appreciates.

TIERSKY's biography is factually exhaustive and always intelligent. It is and will remain an indispensable guide for understanding the phenomenon that was François Mitterrand and the modern France that he helped define. But Tiersky is in the end insufficiently distant from his Machiavellian republican hero. He gives Mitterrand every benefit of the doubt, and that is too generous. He claims, for example, that Mitterrand's abiding political passion was anti-communism. Undoubtedly Mitterrand wanted the Socialist Party to become what it has become, the dominant party of the Left and a respectable party of government. He certainly had no illusions about Stalinism and showed steadfastness in opposing both pacifist and Soviet-inspired propaganda during the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s. But he also loathed the bourgeois lifestyle and dreamed of a collectivist society without restrictions on freedom—an irresponsible dream on the other side of the possible. He seemed to lament the disappearance of the German Democratic Republic in 1989–90 and reacted with disturbing equanimity to the pathetic Soviet putsch in August of 1991. He did so, however, not only because of geopolitical concerns about German reunification or the destabilizing effects of the break-up of the Soviet Union, as Tiersky suggests, but because he retained a residual sentimental attachment to the dreams of socialism even after he abandoned any real socialist pretensions. This is one more Mitterrandian "contradiction" that needs to be squarely confronted and not wished away. This existentialist *cum* Machiavellian never completely overcame or abandoned the Jacobin division of the world into the party of the Left and the party of the Right. Ideological sentimentality coexisted with hard-headed political calculation and cynicism in a mix that defined him. Mitterrand was a Machiavellian socialist as well as a Machiavellian republican.

Tiersky is right to praise Mitterrand for his fidelity to republican institutions (and ultimately to the Fifth Republic). *Contra* the Mitterrand of 1964, this was a decent if flawed republican regime. He also deserves credit for his choice for Europe and the market economy. But Tiersky is wrong to suggest that Mitterrand finally had a more realistic understanding of France and Europe than his great predecessor, de Gaulle. Tiersky praises Mitterrand for accepting that "the old France" is "no longer big enough for success." In his view, the Mitterrand presidency is a "culmination of secular French and European trends"—trends that make resistance to European integration in its present form ultimately foolhardy.

But de Gaulle did not think that the larger trends of modern society—massification, the establishment of a global commercial society, the growth of hedonistic and individualistic attitudes in modern democracies—could be overcome. Instead, he believed that "republican pedagogy", as Tiersky puts it, ought to moderate these potentially pernicious trends in order to preserve estimable civic and political goods. The sovereignty of the nation was one such non-negotiable good that was worthy of preservation, in de Gaulle's view. Mitterrand, for his part, was no naive cosmopolitan. He could intransigently defend French interests when he thought they were at stake. But, like most members of the contemporary French and European political classes, he

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

did little to articulate the political meaning of the emerging Europe. As Pierre Manent has written, the market and European integration

> are certainly the alpha and the omega. But one must be able to repeat the rest of the alphabet: every political community, France, as well as Britain and Germany, wants its own existence to be recognized. . . . De Gaulle was the last statesman who knew how to speak of France to France.[2]

Mitterrand never adequately explained his abandonment of radical socialism to the French people, nor did he articulate the larger political purposes that ought to define the European project. He thus failed to exercise that "republican pedagogy" that is essential to enduring statesmanship. Nevertheless, his European convictions were admirable and saved France from a potentially catastrophic second round of socialist experimentation in 1984. He stands out as a particularly intelligent, complex and enigmatic embodiment of what Tony Judt has called "the French twentieth century." □

[2]Manent, "Letter from Paris", *Government and Opposition* (Summer 1990), p. 319.

Daniel J. Mahoney is associate professor of political science at Assumption College in Worcester, MA. His book, *De Gaulle: Statesmanship, Grandeur and Modern Democracy*, was recently released in paperback by Transaction Publishers.

Good Intentions

John Patrick Diggins

John C. Culver and John Hyde, *American Dreamer: The Life and Times of Henry A. Wallace* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 608 pp., $35.

IT WAS ON the day of July 11, 1944 that FDR finally decided to accept the urging of his advisers and dump his vice president. Henry A. Wallace had turned out to be politically incorrect, caught up in his dreams of a better world for the "common man." Perhaps out of affection and respect, FDR would delay informing him of the decision. At the Democratic convention, held in Chicago less than two weeks later, party leaders were stunned when the stadium thundered with the deafening chant, "We want Wallace!" The convention was veering out of control, and party officials feared that if a vote were taken immediately Wallace would be nominated and the plan to replace him with Senator Harry S Truman frustrated. With much jockeying the following day, Truman picked up winning votes on the third ballot and made a short, humble acceptance speech, while behind the scenes Wallace graciously bowed out of the administration.

A month later Wallace met with the President and was asked not to leave Washington since his services would still be needed. Wallace wrote in his diary that Roosevelt told him that he was "four or six" years ahead of his time and that the causes he advocated would "inevitably come." Four years later, the ideals

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Wallace embraced did indeed stir the nation's imagination when he ran for president as the leader of the new Progressive Citizens of America. The far-reaching Progressive platform of 1948 reads like a harbinger of Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society." It called for

> desegregation of public schools, an end to Jim Crow laws, open housing, national health insurance, equal rights for women, public day-care facilities, the minimum wage for workers, free trade, immigration reform, the direct election of presidents, home rule for the District of Columbia, indemnity for Japanese-Americans, collective bargaining for federal employees, new soil conservation programs, the vote for eighteen-year-olds, full taxation of capital gains, creation of a federal education department, and admission of Alaska and Hawaii to the Union.

The list is impressive, and in *American Dreamer: The Life and Times of Henry A. Wallace* authors John Culver and John Hyde have good reason to treat their subject as a prophet as well as a dreamer. Wallace knew where he wanted to take America and even the rest of the world; the problem was that he thought he could bring along the Soviet Union, too. During the Second World War, Wallace told Americans that he could think of no reason why the United States and Soviet Russia would have difficulty understanding one another. Did they not share a common history? "Both peoples were molded by the vast sweep of a rich continent. Both peoples know that their future is greater than their past. Both hate sham." Noting that both peoples hated imperialism as well, Wallace then offered his version of a convergence theory, speaking of "the new democracy" that he believed would emerge in the postwar world:

> Some in the United States believe that we have over-emphasized what we might call political or bill-of-rights democracy. Carried to its extreme form, it leads to rugged individualism, exploitation, impractical emphasis on states' rights, and even to anarchy.
>
> Russia, perceiving some of the abuses of excessive political democracy, has placed strong emphasis on economic democracy. This, carried to an extreme, demands that all power be centered in one man and his bureaucratic helpers.
>
> Somewhere there is a practical balance between economic and political democracy. Russia and the United States both have been working toward this practical middle ground.

"Somewhere"! One definition of utopia is "nowhere", which is exactly where Wallace's hopes for the future would go, since they had no basis in the past. History blessed America with the presence of the very ideas and institutions that burdened the USSR by their absence. Wallace's mistake was the fallacy of Bolshevism itself: the assumption that socialism could be built and freedom realized in an environment suffering from the long legacy of feudalism, autocracy, peasantry, and, as well, a resistance to Western liberalism and the absence of a Protestant tradition that honored the work ethic. Comparing Russia and America in 1905, Max Weber concluded that the appearance of liberty in the world might never be repeated, since the combination of circumstances that led to its establishment in England and the United States might have occurred for the last time centuries earlier. Mesmerized by his version of "the new democracy", Wallace had no inkling that it would be the older "bill of rights democracy" that succeeded in realizing many of the planks in the Progressive platform. (Where would today's feminism be without our rights-based political culture and the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection under the law?)

Wallace's thinking about the world is a case study of the heart prevailing over

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the head, desperate sentiment over prudent skepticism. Nevertheless, in our present age of politics, when fund-raising takes precedence over governance and cynicism leaves no room for shame, and in our academic world of postmodernism, where all politics is power and knowledge has no foundation in truth, it is edifying to read about an idealist who believed in the simple force of truth; a humanitarian whose concern for the welfare of the world's poor and forgotten remained a daily passion; a fallible leader who could err in judgment but would not tell a lie to save face. At the time of Wallace's death in 1965, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, a critic as well as an admirer, was right when he said in a eulogy: "Above all he was a good man."

WALLACE's moral rectitude sprang from the nurturing environment of his early upbringing in Iowa. He was born in 1888, son of an educated mother trained in music and art and a high-minded father who believed that man's worship of God expressed itself in his service to mankind. The father, Harry Wallace, became a professor of dairying, befriended George Washington Carver, the black agronomist who would teach at the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, and published several farm journals that protested railroad rates, tight credit and carried the message of "pitchfork populism." In the 1920s Wallace senior became secretary of agriculture in the Harding and Coolidge administrations. He carried on an ideological war against Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, denouncing the latter's Food Administration as an agency that favored merchants and consumers at the expense of farmers, by allowing prices to be determined by the market and its laws of supply and demand.

In addition to his father, the intellectual presence that shaped Henry Wallace's outlook was Thorstein Veblen, and in particular his influential book, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. Also a Midwesterner, Veblen indicted the idle rich and called for replacing the price system with the higher wisdom of science and technology. But here the authors Culver and Hyde let pass an awkward affinity between an agrarian idealist and an academic skeptic. While Veblen did chastise business for being more interested in making money than in making goods, he also scorned farmers who would, given the opportunity, curb production for reason of profit. Apparently the Wallaces had not read Veblen's essay on "The Country Town", which depicted farmers as caught up in the hustling ethos of capitalism while masquerading under the banner of patriotism and Rotaryism. Henry Wallace would make the same un-Veblenian mistake when he gazed upon the Soviet Union in the 1930s and saw a producer's paradise, remaining blind to the fate of the kulaks and to the Russian engineering class, the victims of the first party purge of 1931.

Wallace senior had fought the conservative Republican administrations of the 1920s tooth and nail, futilely advocating government-subsidized farm exports. When his father died in the mid-twenties, young Henry said on more than one occasion: "Hoover was the main cause of my father's death." While one can feel the son's anger and sorrow, there is an irony here worth noting: Hoover had been trained as an engineer, the very profession that Veblen had hoped would take over the industrial system and rescue it from the cupidity of farmers as well as financiers.

Theoretical matters aside, the authors of *American Dreamer* have done prodigious research in various archives, family papers, personal interviews, Wallace's own private letters and diary entries, and recently opened files that had been sealed for half a century in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Bettmann/CORBIS

But he meant well.

Soviet Union. John Culver, a former Iowa congressman, currently practices law in Washington, D.C.; John Hyde was once a Washington bureau chief for the *Des Moines Register*. It is not surprising, then, that their book has the qualities of both the experienced journalist and politician: a talent for keeping the story going at a brisk clip and a feel for a subject who was attracted to causes rather than men, issues instead of personalities. The authors excel in taking us through the maneuvers of backroom party politics and the calculations and miscalculations of its leaders. There are no Churchillian triumphs in this political biography, no finest hour for an America struggling to avoid what it would have to confront—the Depression, Hitler, the Cold War. The authors take us through these chilling episodes with a fine prose at once relaxed and lucid. They deal with a political subject both loved and hated, and with their keen observations about the faith and the foibles of an ardent believer, they enable us to know why.

Sustaining the spirit of his father's agrarian work ethic, Wallace threw all his energy into the science of crop production. He proved to be a pioneer in cross-breeding varieties of corn, and his experiments in hybridization were proudly displayed at farm festivals. Given his father's role in government and his own scientific achievements, Wallace's reputation was well known, but even into his late twenties he expressed little interest in politics. It was his sympathy for the plight of the Midwestern farming community, which had been experiencing its own depression years before the crash of 1929, and the election of Hoover to the presidency, that compelled Wallace to involve himself in national politics. In the early 1930s he organized relief drives on behalf of suffering farmers and he exhorted that America needed a leader of the "Roosevelt type", referring to Teddy Roosevelt, who cursed the "malefactors of wealth", and not to FDR, who seemed to be a child of privilege and a politician of urban intrigue and corruption.

Wallace changed his mind about FDR as he watched him run against Hoover and when it became clear that the Democratic candidate advocated allotment payments to farmers in return for their agreeing to limit production. FDR appointed Wallace secretary of agriculture, and as such he was to wield more power than any other of FDR's cabinet members. Through the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) Wallace tried to raise prices by controlling output, which often meant ploughing under acres of cotton and killing pigs. In trying to restore the economic health of commercial agriculture, the AAA had mixed results before it was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1936. But the energetic and personable Wallace continued to shine in FDR's second administration, when he experimented with granary storage systems. By 1940, when it was widely believed that FDR would respect the traditional two-term limit, Wallace was even mentioned as his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

possible successor in the White House. But, of course, FDR stayed on.

IT WAS during the war years that Wallace set out, as he saw it, to try to redeem America as the first step in saving the world. *Time* magazine's Henry Luce had declared the postwar era to be the "American Century", wherein the world would feel the influence of its reigning "unparalleled power." Wallace challenged Luce's seeming power worship when he gave his speech on "The Century of the Common Man", calling for an end to the domination of the powerful over the powerless and to the exploitation by the rich of the poor. Wallace would spread the New Deal to the four corners of the earth. His pious utterances were not that far from FDR's famous "Four Freedoms" speech, which claimed that the war was a crusade to rid the world of fear of want and fear of tyranny. But Wallace began to suspect certain figures in the administration of delaying military production, and he publicly denounced manufacturers for being greedy during a time that demanded patriotic sacrifice. His failure to continue on as vice president scarcely helped matters. With FDR's death in April 1945, Wallace at first believed that Truman would continue in the spirit of his predecessor by making efforts at fulfilling the early goals of the New Deal and by maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union.

It is an axiom of Cold War revisionist scholarship that Truman represented a significant break with FDR's more patient and benign outlook toward Stalin's Russia. This view overlooks the fact that FDR's outlook was shaped by the Allied Alliance and the necessity of keeping Russia a trusting partner in it, and that the President never lived to see the rise of the Iron Curtain and the fall of Czechoslovakia. For his part, Wallace remained unfazed by such ominous developments. He charged that the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima was meant as a "direct lever" to produce changes in Stalin's totalitarian system before there could be any sharing of atomic secrets or sending of food supplies to a prostrate Russia. Increasingly, Wallace convinced himself that Truman's toughening attitude toward the Soviets would only lead them to respond in kind. In light of new weaponry, Wallace exhorted, "we must move with speed, determination and faith. The stakes are the human race." Wallace might have mentioned fright as well as faith. The basis of political order, wrote Thomas Hobbes, is the fear of death that drives humankind's desire for the preservation of life. "Atomic power means", Wallace warned, "one world or no world."

Although Wallace hailed the coming dawn of oneness and unity, his running for the presidency as head of the Progressive Citizens of America left the country seething with bitter rancor and division. The election of 1948 saw a rare four-party race that pitted Truman and the Democrats against Thomas Dewey and the Republicans, Strom Thurmond and the Southern Dixiecrats, and Henry Wallace and the Progressive Citizens. By the fall, the Progressives had petered out and Wallace received only one million popular votes and no electoral votes, while Truman eked out a victory over Dewey.

Much that has been written about the Wallace campaign focuses on the communists who jumped on his bandwagon as well as many of America's leading cultural celebrities. On the other side, liberals forged the Americans for Democratic Action in opposition to the Progressives, and the New York intellectuals—long animated with the Trotskyist conviction that Stalin had betrayed the fruits of the October Revolution—were merciless in their attacks on Wallace. Eleanor Roosevelt and many others believed that within the Progressive movement lay a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"nucleus" of communist partisans. Wallace has been criticized for allowing himself to be used by the communists and for not distancing himself from them and renouncing their support. Although Wallace did prevent the Progressive platform committee from even mildly criticizing Soviet foreign policy, there is no evidence that Wallace took orders from Moscow or that he answered to anybody but himself. Yet Wallace did allow himself to believe that deep down what both Soviet Russia and American communists wanted was, above all else, "peace." As a wry poster-maker put it at the time, "A Piece of What?"

If Wallace was "four to six" years ahead of his time on domestic issues, as FDR remarked, in foreign affairs it could hardly be said that he was a half century ahead of his time now that the Cold War has ended. For Wallace saw his dream of a "new democracy" evolving from the bowels of Stalinist totalitarianism, when, in fact, that brutal system had to crash from top to bottom before democracy of any kind had a chance to sprout its rare roots. Nevertheless, one puts down this fine, discerning and balanced book with admiration for Henry Wallace. While he may have spoken for the common man everywhere in the world, he himself remained an uncommon man of good hope and unswerving integrity. □

John Patrick Diggins is distinguished professor of history at the Graduate School of the City University of New York, and author of *On Hallowed Ground: Abraham Lincoln and the Foundations of American History* (Yale University Press, 2000).

The Russian Journal of Foreign Policy


INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
POLICY OUTLOOK
Three Interviews in the Apennines
ESSAYS
Russia Ratifies START II ..... V. Gavrikov
The Kremlin and NATO: ..... V. Kozin
Russia in the Middle East ..... V. Sredin
Equal Security for OSCE Countries ..... M. Shelepin
The White Sun of Angola ..... A. Adamishin
Russia's Relations with Japan ..... M. Galuzin
EXCLUSIVE
The 116th Conference of the Bergedorf Forum
Vol. 46 Number 3, 2000
$9.50 per copy

Known for its close ties with the Russian Foreign Ministry, ***International Affairs*** offers unique "insider" interpretations of the major policy and security problems facing Russia presented by the leading Russian commentators and policy-makers.

Indispensable source on Russia and CIS!

PUBLISHED 6 TIMES/YEAR. ISSN 0130-9641

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE (PER YEAR):
Individuals: $45.00. Institutions: $296.00

ON-LINE EDITION:
Individuals: $29.00/yr. Institutions: $95.00/yr.
http://www.eastview.com

Distributed worldwide by

East View Publications, Inc.
3020 Harbor Lane North,
Minneapolis, MN 55447, USA

Tel: (763) 550-0961 ◆ Fax: (763) 559-2931 ◆ eastview@eastview.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Letters

Tainted Transactions, continued:

The debate over who bears what blame for what took place in Russia generates very deep passions. This is not surprising given the distortions that have resulted and the unfortunate way Russian reforms have evolved. But such passion frequently leads to intemperate reasoning and unjustified accusations.

In "Tainted Transactions: Harvard, the Chubais Clan and Russia's Ruin" (Spring 2000) and her subsequent rejoinder ("Tainted Transactions: An Exchange", Summer 2000), Janine Wedel falls victim to just such a reaction, especially when it comes to evaluating the role of Jeffrey Sachs. Admittedly, Dr. Sachs makes an easy target. To generate support for his causes, which in 1990 was the Polish reform and then the Russian reforms in late 1991 and 1992, he became an outspoken and ubiquitous advocate of support for these efforts. This brought him praise, sometimes deservedly, when things went well, but also criticism (also sometimes deservedly) when reforms became counterproductive. What Wedel neglects to mention, of course, is that Sachs has made positive contributions in other countries. This includes Poland, where I am told by officials involved at the time that Sachs played a key role in convincing the leadership of Solidarity to support the reforms that were subsequently introduced.

In the meantime, others (call them stealth advisers) who bear real responsibility for the grotesque privatization of state enterprises in Russia have so far escaped almost unnoticed. As a consequence, while Wedel is often right on target in highlighting the serious shortcomings in the reform process and in the way American support was provided, she all too often attributes too much importance to the role of foreign advisers and pinpoints the wrong culprits.

Wedel also has trouble with her logic. While she blames Harvard and the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) and especially Sachs for much of the failure of the reforms, she questions whether he was really an official adviser to the Russian government. Well if he wasn't an adviser, does he really deserve the blame? For that matter, is it fair to blame the United States for the reforms' failure? In a recent personal conversation with Yegor Gaidar, who was acting prime minister during much of 1992, he affirmed that while Sachs was an adviser to the minister of finance, Boris Fyodorov, he was not the central architect of the reforms.

Wedel also overdoes it when it comes to Harvard. Because it makes such a juicy scapegoat, she continuously refers to what she calls the Harvard-Chubais transactors. While this may be an appropriate description for those from Harvard who worked with Anatoly Chubais in 1992 and 1993 on his privatization program, Sachs was not part of that group.

The Harvard-Chubais team is such a convenient culprit that Wedel continues to attack it for what happened even after May 1997, when HIID suspended its activities in Russia, the U.S. government cut off its funds, and Chubais disavowed any further association with HIID. Undeterred, Wedel writes, ". . . in times of crisis for the Harvard-Chubais nexus—such as the ruble crisis of August 1998 and the Bank

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of New York money laundering scandals—the transactors and their associates have sought to bolster their colleagues' continued clout and standing in both Russia and the United States." This is simply unfair.

Over the years I have had disagreements with Sachs over his analysis of the transition in Russia and whether or not the United States and the IMF should provide financial aid. But never has Sachs sought to profit personally from such advice, or provide insider information for Harvard, its research centers, its financial management, or for-profit investment firms. Sachs is a big boy and he is not shy about criticizing the ideas of others, but implications that he prescribed knowingly flawed advice, benefited personally, or worked on two sides of the negotiating table are not true and certainly not fair or responsible.

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN
Wellesley College and
Harvard University

◆

Janine Wedel is clearly delighted. After three insignificant publications of the same article, her lies have been published in a respectable journal. It is tempting to take her inaccuracies apart again, but why treat her as a serious scholar? Wedel has accused me of conflicts of interest, but after several slanderous articles she has proven nothing. Her arguments are little but repetition of unsubstantiated allegations with a complete confusion of time. Tellingly, her only new claim is that I did not write that I was an economic adviser to the Russian government at a time when I was not. As if to emphasize that her basis of accusation is gossip, she quotes herself: "[Åslund] *was understood by some Russian officials*" [my emphasis], which is close to a definition of a rumor. She repeats her allegation that "Åslund *seemed to speak on behalf of* these governments" [Wedel's emphasis], showing that she pertains to the higher sphere of illusion, where I think we should leave her.

ANDERS ÅSLUND
Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace

◆

Janine Wedel's "transactorship" article provides an insightful—and, ultimately, profoundly disturbing—analysis. . . .

The main alternative approaches to economic restructuring—"shock therapy" and gradualism—are familiar, and have been thoroughly aired over the past decade. But what has largely been ignored since then (at least until Wedel's book and articles) is the critical question of how, in the Russian case, the "shock therapy" prescribed by Sachs et al. was fashioned and implemented, and how this process might be directly linked to the policy's disastrous failure.

Wedel's exposition of the murky tangle of interests influencing the central players in this process, and the shadowy netherworld they seemed to create and operate within—a world in which the principals were neither public nor private, neither official nor unofficial, neither clearly representing the United States nor Russia, and who seemed to have a monopoly over money and access—provides a persuasive diagnosis of how and why this epic opportunity was mangled.

An accounting for this failure by the principals whom she identifies is long overdue. And, certainly, they should be afforded full opportunity to respond to her claims, as it is only through this kind of give and take that the truth can be ferreted out.

But the nature of the principals' response to Wedel's article, in the Summer 2000 issue—*ad hominem* attacks, coupled with lengthy denials of largely small facts—does little to rebut the case she makes. In fact, the vehement, narrow nature of their responses adds credibility to the broader validity of the "transactorship" thesis she propounds.

JAMES W. BROCK
Miami University of Ohio

◆

As Janine Wedel points out, there is little doubt that an army of economists, academics, bureaucrats and opportunists—both American and Russian—took part in design-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing and implementing the disastrous U.S. policy toward Russia in the last decade. I witnessed this remarkable free-for-all first-hand, as a diplomat in the U.S. embassy in Moscow from 1993-95. For whom many of these people—including Jeffrey Sachs and his one-time confederates—formally worked or where they convened is of little importance. What matters is that their relationships to each other and to official Washington and Moscow were close, the money involved immense, their accountability minimal and their loyalties blurred.

Through much of the last decade the Clinton administration played a central role in Russian domestic politics. It used its personal contacts with Russian leaders, financial assistance and political support to promote the interests of a particular segment of the Russian elite in the view that this was advancing "reform." In its arrogant insistence that what it was doing was right—no matter what the social costs—and its indifference to what was actually going on in the country, the U.S. administration's behavior strongly resembled that of the oligarchs it now so vilifies. In fact, as Wedel demonstrates, U.S. policies are partly to blame for the oligarchs' rise.

As analysts sort through this policy rubble, three points of view have emerged. The first holds that for social, cultural and historical reasons, the so-called shock therapy was inappropriate from the start as the centerpiece of the Russian economy. The second is that, whatever their theoretical merit, these policies foundered because they relied on too narrow a political base, and neglected the need to strengthen property rights and develop the rule of law. A third view, apparently still believed by many members of the Clinton administration, posits that the reforms would have been more successful had "shock therapy" really been tried—that is, had the Russian government the "political will" to implement properly what the United States and international lending institutions wanted it to do. They were also sidetracked, so the argument goes, because of external factors such as the Asian financial crisis. To the latter explanation, Sachs now offers a variant that allows him to defend his policy prescriptions, while distancing himself from what happened: had the U.S. offered more assistance to Russia during the window of opportunity in the early 1990s (that is, when he was closely involved), Russia's transformation would have been far smoother.

Sachs and Åslund are wrong, of course. The United States never had the ability to shape the scope and pace of Russian reforms in any major way. The fate of post-Soviet Russia has indeed always been—in the U.S. administration's tired cliché—for the Russian people to decide. Washington could only be a constructive player at the margins.

Despite all the ink spilled on these issues, there remain, surprisingly, many unanswered questions. What was the role of Larry Summers, one of the intellectual godfathers of "shock therapy", in designing and implementing U.S. policy? His key role has barely been raised in the debate. Which Western companies profited from U.S. assistance? Why hasn't the U.S. government more aggressively pursued the investigation into the Bank of New York scandal, which was a by-product of its policies? Finally, in 1996 the United States turned a blind eye as its friends in Moscow bent the rules to re-elect Boris Yeltsin. As odious a Russian president as Gennady Zyuganov would have been had he been elected, are the policies of Vladimir Putin, Yeltsin's hand-picked successor, now significantly better?

DONALD N. JENSEN
Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty, Prague

◆

When was Anders Åslund last in Belarus? Or in saying that its citizens "suffer under a frightful dictatorship in a Soviet theme park" is he just citing conventional wisdom?

True, since becoming independent in 1991 the country has conspicuously shunned the kind of "shock therapy"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

approach to change recommended by Åslund (and accepted in a certain sense in Russia). As a result, Minsk may lack the veneer of Western shops and cars casual visitors make so much of in Moscow. But it has also avoided the widespread pauperization, decrease in life expectancy and violent racketeering that have been the main outcome of the so-called radical economic reforms endured by ordinary Russians.

Over this period, Belarusians have had plenty of opportunities to vote freely—the only time the international community did not indicate its approval being when it sent no observers to the 1996 referendum. Compare that, though, to the referendum held three years earlier in Russia to legitimize Yeltsin's bombardment of the country's parliament. Western election monitors, journalists and experts queued up to hail his fairly won victory—only to have the rug pulled from under them several months later when the Russian authorities themselves admitted the result had been fixed.

Besides all this, no one can accuse the Belarusian government of having waged a war of virtual extermination against one of its minorities (although it has plenty of them), nor of having interfered repeatedly and often ruthlessly in the internal affairs of its neighbors. Both policies—which are nothing if not characteristic of the Soviet era—have been taken for granted most of the last ten years within ruling circles in Moscow, at a time when Åslund has been all too ready to sing their praises.

JOHNATHAN SUNLEY
Budapest

Wedel replies:

Professor Goldman's defense of Jeffrey Sachs demonstrates that passions run high. Goldman presents no evidence in support of his Harvard colleague. He appears to agree with the thesis of my article and the facts, excepting those pertaining to Sachs. Many of Goldman's claims are contradicted by documents in my possession, including those of Sachs' own consulting firm. The rest contain refutations of points I never made. To wit:

• Goldman shares my view regarding "the grotesque privatization of state enterprises", as he puts it. He agrees that the Harvard-Chubais transactors were involved in privatization but states that Sachs was "not part of that group." Sachs' own project documents (Jeffrey D. Sachs and Associates Inc., 1992) tell it differently: "The [Sachs] team has had an extensive interaction with the [Russian] State Committee on Privatization and has helped in the design of the mass privatization program legislation recently enacted by Parliament." The team consisted of Sachs, his business associate David Lipton and Harvard Professor Andrei Shleifer, as well as Jonathan Hay and others. Later, as I have pointed out, while being funded by the U.S. government, the HIID, with Shleifer and Hay at the helm, wrote decrees for Yeltsin's signature and participated in high-level Russian privatization decisions. Despite this, Goldman cites "stealth advisers" "who bear real responsibility." Who are they?

• The issue is *not* Sachs' official standing. (Some officials said he had it, while others, including Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, have suggested otherwise.) Sachs and Goldman seem unwilling to accept that the issue is the *multiple* and sometimes *conflicting* roles that the transactors assumed, not the specific official title they held at any given time. Goldman claims that Sachs never "worked on two sides of the negotiating table", but documents show that Sachs and Lipton were proffering advice to the IMF while representing the Russian side and that Sachs offered his services to the parliamentary opposition of his client, Gaidar.

• My work is not focused on Sachs. Goldman's attempt to defend Sachs personally by reference to his behavior in other countries is wholly irrelevant to my article on U.S.-Russian transactors.

• Goldman puts words in my mouth and assumes emotions that are not part of my work and then says that *I* am unfair. For example,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nowhere do I say that *any* of the transactors "prescribed *knowingly* flawed advice" [my emphasis] or that Sachs was "the central architect of the reforms" or "provide[d] insider information" to Harvard. Transactorship does not imply that all transactors take part in or know of all activities; a division of labor is at the very essence of the concept. Contrary to what Goldman suggests, Sachs and some other key transactors (such as Anders Åslund) continued to work together and defend their earlier actions long after USAID cut off HIID's Russia money and U.S. investigations into HIID's activities began.

In the end, it is the Russians themselves who must bear the blame for the "reforms", which both Goldman and Sachs characterize in worse terms than I. But where is the responsibility of Western advisers? Is it not childish to say that, "Everything I advised was good", and lay blame for everything that went wrong on others? What concretely can the "big boy", as Goldman calls Sachs, point to as his success?

Anders Åslund's letter is a condescending *ad hominem* attack. The last refuge of someone whose troubling conduct has come to public light is to attack the credentials or character of the individuals who helped bring the public scrutiny to bear. Åslund's attack is particularly unpersuasive given that he ignores the other experts who wrote letters that echo my findings. If Åslund wants "rumor" and "gossip", he and the other transactors whose activities are detailed in my article have left a whirlwind of that behind them. My work is based strictly on facts that I carefully document with myriad named sources. Tellingly, in his letter above, Åslund fails to challenge a single finding or source, let alone the central thesis of the article.

Living With a New Europe:

Zbigniew Brzezinski's article on the U.S.-European relationship ("Living With a New Europe", Summer 2000) was a generally admirable analysis but contained a few demonstrable misperceptions. "The British, more skeptical, have finally concluded that there will be a Europe of sorts and that they must be in it if they are to infuse some genuine significance into their own special relationship with America." They haven't concluded anything of the kind and there is no doubt that the majority, including the official opposition, would prefer to retain membership in the Common Market (re-inforcing the accuracy of Dr. Brzezinski's view that Europe is essentially an economic organization) while also joining NAFTA. In all respects except geography, Britain is closer to the United States and Canada than it is to France and Germany, and is awaiting some indication that the United States does not wish to take the self-punitive step of dismissing its deputy sheriff and only serious functioning ally by banishing it into an integrated Europe.

It may be that "most Europeans do not partake of anti-Americanism as the impulse for unity", but a great many euro-integrationist policymakers do. While I agree that Europe's potential to be a rival to the United States is limited, it will not be for lack of effort from many of its leaders. The surest antidote to that is to detach Britain in advance from any such European effort and keep it close to the United States.

Brzezinski is doubtless correct that the enlargement of Europe will make integration more difficult, but the protectionist forces in France and Germany are going to make an extension of the EU into Eastern Europe practically impossible. NAFTA should be renamed and extended into Eastern Europe and appropriate parts of the Middle East as well as Latin America and Australasia. Since I don't expect the enlargement of the EU to take place, my disagreement with the concept of a joint enlargement with NATO is slightly academic, but Brzezinski and others should be extremely cautious about attempting to extend the concept that an attack upon one is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an attack upon all beyond Poland. In practice, virtually all of the deterrent credibility of NATO rests in the military power of the United States, and convincing the American public that it should consider an attack upon Riga, Kiev or Astana as equivalent to an attack on New York, Chicago or Los Angeles is a dubious strategic formulation and is going to be a very hard sell.

Of course the Russians must be treated respectfully and full admission to the West must be sincerely proffered to them. We must encourage the Western emulators over the xenophobic nativists in Russia. I also agree that these minor European steps toward improved self-defense should be encouraged. However, Brzezinski's phrase "buoyed by the modest success of the euro" is astonishing. The euro has been a fiasco and will continue to be so until France and Germany cease to be socialist countries virtually incapable of creating jobs or generating investment.

Extreme caution should be shown about anything emanating from Jacques Attali. Apart from his questionable administrative practices, he is a foaming-at-the-mouth anti-American who predicted that in thirty years or so the United States would have no function except the exportation of grain to Europe, like Algeria during the Roman Empire. Such a man should not be so swiftly rehabilitated by being cited in a learned publication by so eminent a person as Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Daniel Vernet's comment was the usual *Le Monde* self-pity about the injustice of the correlation of forces between Europe and the United States. It was surprising that so sensible a man as Christoph Bertram would make the silly claim of American "irritation over Europe's new-found confidence" and assert that Europe is getting stronger and America weaker when the reverse is true. Timothy Garton Ash was true to his customary standard of being nervous, well intentioned and more or less reasonable.

CONRAD BLACK
Chairman, Hollinger
International, Inc.

◆

Brzezinski's claim that "no 'European' is willing to die for 'Europe'" is not quite accurate. Dozens of West European soldiers—with Spain in the lead—died in Bosnia for Europe.

MICHAEL ROSKIN
Lycoming College

Victory:

James Kurth's very interesting piece in the Summer 2000 issue ("The American Way of Victory: A Twentieth-Century Trilogy") demonstrates how difficult it is to write about great power relations. The author must understand economics, domestic politics of the powers, and their interactions. In spite of many valid points, Kurth doesn't succeed on the economic side. The Great Depression in the United States was caused by the U.S. Federal Reserve actions that produced a collapse of the money supply. This has been demonstrated by Milton Friedman's Nobel Prize-winning work. We exported, not imported, this disaster. England did not grow slowly before the First World War because of foreign investment. Slow growth in England came out of deep economic and societal problems. The high level of foreign investment was stimulated by lower returns on investment in England as a result of these problems.

Finally, and most important, China does not have the choice of remaining as it is now politically and economically if it wants to be a prosperous nation in the twenty-first century. The notion that China will stay as it is, and continue to grow rapidly and thus became a real threat to the United States, shows a misunderstanding as to why communism fell. It fell because its economic system had become such a failure that China, Russia and others were faced with economic retrogression and perhaps collapse if they did not abolish it. China's growth since Mao died has continually run into near crises that have only been avoided by further reforms, further opening to markets and private property. These

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic reforms will require political changes as well. The genuinely free markets and secure private property China will need to maintain rapid growth are inconsistent with a one-party state. China will be forced to go democratic to maintain economic growth. It is unlikely that a democratic China with a market economy will find enmity to the United States in its interest.

DANIEL LANDAU
Cheshire, CT

◆

James Kurth's article in your most recent issue is a concise and insightful look at the American century. His ability to analyze the post-World War II geopolitical system as an integration of economic and military incentives is beyond reproach.

There is, however, a major flaw in his prediction pertaining to the political climate in East Asia. Kurth drastically overestimates both the military and economic potential of China in the first half of the twenty-first century. According to 1994 estimates, China is still primarily an agrarian economy. It is largely uneducated and lacks significant nationwide infrastructure. The next fifty years for China will be predominantly inward looking as it copes with its far-reaching social burdens (for example, the elderly poor, significant government debt, the failing public sector).

Disappointingly, Kurth cites Huntington's alarmist, fatalist view of a Sino-Islamic military alliance. These two cultures share no common identity (in fact, the communists have done much to repress Muslims in the province of Xinjiang), save a general anti-American consensus. Furthermore, China's military is largely composed of outdated Russian hardware. The troops are poorly organized, lack focus, and are completely inferior to modern Western forces. . . .

Living with China is an important issue. But, as Americans, we must not forget that they must also live with us.

STEPHEN R. GOOCH
Austin, TX

Remembering the Future:

Paul Wolfowitz's "Remembering the Future" (Spring 2000) offers important historical lessons from recent decades of American foreign policy in which the author played an important role at the Pentagon and at the State Department. But by covering the period 1946-91 and not just the seventies and eighties, he opens up some "neoconservatives" that roost at *The National Interest* to an examination of their own evolution, from the radical Left to the radical Right.

Wolfowitz begins his essay derisively: "Given the rate at which many politicians and commentators have been revising their recollections of their own stances during the period 1946-91 . . . it seems that now, safely after the event, we have all become cold warriors. . . . Far from believing that the Cold War was a clear struggle between good and evil", Wolfowitz instructs, "the leaders of the Democratic Party attacked President Reagan as a war-mongering ideologue when he declared that the Soviet Union was an 'evil empire.'"

Wolfowitz's study of the tricks that history plays on us should have induced a little humility when it comes to asking "Where were you?" or "What was your stance?" in the Cold War. Where I take strong exception is when he seems to be playing off the same sheet of ideological music recently featured in op-ed pieces by Charles Krauthammer, Lawrence F. Kaplan and Richard Perle. For when you get right down to it, Wolfowitz—a member of *The National Interest*'s editorial advisory board—and the others are suggesting that those who opposed President Reagan's policies on the Strategic Defense Initiative or Central America or elsewhere were somehow unpatriotic and on the wrong side of "history."

But it is not a "fanciful conceit"—per Kaplan—to make the claim, regarding the latter half of the Cold War, that the leadership of both parties generally shared in a consensus as to where the United States stood *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The neocon revisionists would now purge our public memory at the end of the millennium. They peddle their own distortions of history so as to lead us to the conclusion that Ronald Reagan rode in on a white horse in 1981 and "won the Cold War" by the time he departed in 1989. This is history for simpletons. Strangely missing in at least a co-equal leadership role is Mikhail Gorbachev. By the time George Bush became President in 1989, it was the actions of Gorbachev, above all others, that ensured that the Wall came down peacefully, the Cold War ended, and the Soviet Union disintegrated—despite his desire to save the "socialist system" through reforming it.

Eventually, the end-of-the-Cold-War revisionists will be found out by historians once removed, just as the leftist revisionists on the origins of the Cold War lost ground as more primary source documents surfaced. There is enough credit to go around for the fall of communism—from President Truman's containment policy to the Reagan crusade against the "evil empire." We were all cold warriors; and both political parties spent trillions to demonstrate it. This was not a pretense, as Krauthammer suggests was the case. No one had any trouble in understanding the superiority of the Western democracies over the Soviet system.

Let us bury the parochial perspectives and ideological hatchets that lead to charging some American political leaders with a kind of treason.

WILLIAM E. JACKSON, JR.
Executive Director of the
General Advisory Committee
on Arms Control, 1978-80

The World's Resentment:

Peter Rodman's assessment of the almost universal anti-Americanism ("The World's Resentment: Anti-Americanism as a Global Phenomenon", Summer 2000) is right on the mark, especially with regard to most intellectuals. The Russians and Chinese, the Third World and even our European allies resent the political, military, economic and cultural predominance of the United States. As Rodman indicates, some of that resentment derives from jealousy and other kinds of small-mindedness, weaknesses that we just have to put up with. However, I believe that we should face a fact that even he does not mention: we, by our own international economic policies, have provoked much of the current anti-Americanism.

I am referring particularly to the principal instruments we have been employing in an effort to make friends and influence people in other countries: carrots (primarily foreign aid) and sticks (primarily economic sanctions). There is much that needs revision in the ways we've been using each of those instruments.

In many parts of the world, including Eastern Europe, Russia, Africa, Asia and Latin America, we have been making loans and grants contingent upon the recipients' enactment of legislation or issuance of regulations designed to promote institutions that we think would be good for them, such as democracy, free markets and the rule of law. Those institutions and several others are indeed critically important for economic growth and other goals, but our efforts to foster them have been highly misguided. They have been resented because they are clear manifestations of our throwing our weight around—if you want our money, establish the laws and regulations we think would be good for you!

What's more, the changes we've forced on them haven't worked. Getting officials to sign the necessary pieces of paper has not created any of the institutions we hoped to see. The general populace must understand and want such institutions if they are to function as planned. But neither the hearts nor the minds of people are conquered easily. And we haven't even started to promote that basic need anywhere—as I believe we should.

HERBERT K. MAY
McLean, VA

Rodman replies:

I am not in a position to judge Mr. May's criticisms of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.S. foreign aid practices, though he seems to have a point. At the same time, I want to make clear that blaming America was not the thrust of my article, or of my analysis. It is true that some of the anti-American resentment I document is provoked by clumsy or heavy-handed American behavior. Much of it, however, is structural—that is, the natural reflex of weaker powers to a single power's predominance. A proper response is not to go around apologizing for American misdeeds (as the Clinton administration is wont to do) but simply to recognize that the world works according to classical geopolitical principles regardless of how altruistic we believe our actions to be. This is the starting point of strategy. We should of course strive to be good internationalists—maintaining the liberal economic system and our security commitments, consulting more scrupulously with allies, etc.—but reserving the right to act as our best judgment requires us, especially on compelling issues of security.

Culture Matters:

Lawrence E. Harrison ("Culture Matters", Summer 2000) writes, "Over the almost two decades that I have been studying and writing about the relationship between cultural values and human progress . . ."; and, "largely unnoticed in U.S. academic circles, a new, inward-looking paradigm that focuses on cultural values and attitudes is gradually filling the explanatory vacuum left by dependency theory's collapse." These two citations from his fine article are noted because as I read the article it became increasingly clear to me that Harrison has not encountered the work of Thomas Sowell. Sowell has been writing about the overriding significance of culture with respect to human progress for almost those same two decades of Harrison's study and writing; his syndicated columns and three brilliant books have, for this student of history, settled any controversy over colonialism versus culture that may have existed in the past. Therefore, I commend to Dr. Harrison, and others who may have overlooked them, *Race and Culture* (1994), *Migrations and Cultures* (1996) and *Conquests and Cultures* (1998)—all reviewed extensively and with near-unanimous praise.

SIDNEY HELFANT
City University of New York

Harrison replies:

I am very familiar with and have found extremely helpful the excellent work of Thomas Sowell. I have cited him in the three books I have authored, *Underdevelopment is a State of Mind*, *Who Prospers?* and *The Pan-American Dream*.

I know Professor Sowell and urged him to attend the 1999 Harvard symposium on the relationship between culture and human progress. Unfortunately, and to our great loss, he was unable to attend.

Islam and Islamism:

With all due respect to Daniel Pipes and his long years of work on Middle Eastern affairs, I would urge him to drop the term "fundamentalist" when speaking of anyone other than those Christians who employ it when speaking of themselves. I fear that careless use of the "fundamentalist" buzzword will not only alienate portions of the Muslim world, which might welcome Western cooperation, but also play into the hands of those who would stifle recent Christian inputs into the American domestic political dialogue.

Why is Necmettin Erbakan a "fundamentalist" and his erstwhile protégé, the late Turgut Özal, not? The latter accepted traditional Muslim beliefs and practices, advocated a wider public role for Islam in Turkey, and followed an educational and career path quite similar to the angry young men of Algiers. The difference lies in that whereas Erbakan desired to see Turkey become a leader of western Asia and northern Africa, Özal was a supporter of NATO, joining Europe, and the anti-Iraq coalition.

It is said that Muslim "fundamentalists" will be bad for minorities and women in the Muslim world. Has anyone noticed that the house of Sa'ud

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

won't let guest workers and diplomats hold Christian services in their country? Or that not a single Gulf state tolerates conversion from Islam to another religion? Or that shaking the faith of a Muslim is against the law in Morocco? But why aren't the governments of these states called "fundamentalist"?

Radical Islamism more often than not represents the unpaid bills of various socialist, militarist, radical nationalist or even communist and post-communist states, all of which ensured that only the most stubborn and uncompromising dissent tended to survive. Nor do I see any real difference between the fanaticism of Hamas and the sort of fanaticism earlier seen in the supposedly "secular" Palestinian factions of the period from 1967–80. It seems to me that if we can mend fences with the Chinese communists, we can probably do the same with Islamists, who might just win in several African, Middle Eastern and Asian states.

Perhaps the best thing we could do for any Muslim state plagued by neo-traditionalist ferment would be to let it work out its best possible internal solution rather than providing a convenient Shaitan for the next generation of agitators—especially since neither our current social science nor our policy machinery seems geared toward dealing with the sorts of questions posed by neo-traditionalist ferment in the Midwest, to say nothing of the Middle East.

PETER J. HERZ
Carbondale, IL

Pipes replies:

Mr. Herz is not a fan of the term "fundamentalist" when applied to Islam. Neither am I. That's why I used the term just twice to ground the reader (as well as once in a quote); and I used the alternate term "Islamist" or "Islamism" fifty-two times—including the title. So, why the lecture, Mr. Herz? Next time, how about reading the article beyond the first line before shooting off a letter to the editor? □

Letters to the Editor

We welcome brief comments (under 300 words) from our readers. Due to space constraints, all letters are subject to editorial revision. Remarks should be addressed to:

Managing Editor
The National Interest
1112 Sixteenth Street, NW, Suite 540
Washington, DC 20036
Or send us an email: tni@pop.dn.net

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Letter from Wales

Owen Harries

AT THE beginning of June my wife and I left the capital of the indispensable nation to visit the capital of a country that is, for all but its inhabitants, quite inconsequential in the affairs of the world. So here we are in Cardiff, once a great industrial port but now a sedate and rather handsome service and cultural center for a small nation. Its once notoriously tough dockland area, Tiger Bay, has been innocuously renamed and is now the site of "luxury" apartments and expensive restaurants.

More about Wales presently, but first a word on the "state of Britain" question, for we arrived just as the country's politics entered a very interesting phase. Indeed, in retrospect our first few weeks back in Britain may stand out as a decisive turning point in the premiership of Tony Blair. For him this was a hellish month, when everything went wrong. It started with his being slow-clapped by a normally decorous audience of middle-class women, while delivering an ill-judged, patronizing speech. Then, in rapid succession, came copious evidence of deep divisions and rivalries in his cabinet; utter incoherence in policy toward Europe; adverse public opinion polls; the symbolic fiasco of the opening and then immediate closing of a much hyped "Millennium Bridge" over the Thames; a spectacular display of English soccer hooliganism in Belgium, followed by the early exit of the English soccer team from the Euro 2000 competition; strong popular discontent with the insanely high gas prices (the equivalent of $4.80 a gallon); and substandard performances by the Prime Minister in Parliament, at a time when the leader of the opposition, William Hague, was doing exceptionally well. This dismal succession of embarrassments climaxed with what was in personal terms the worst one of all, the arrest of Blair's son after being found hopelessly drunk on the sidewalk of Leicester Square.

Not surprisingly, by the end of all this Tony Blair appeared badly rattled and a normally sympathetic press was giving him a rough time. Whether this will turn out to be merely an unfortunate interlude, of the kind that all governments experience from time to time, or a defining moment remains to be seen, and things will be clearer by the time this piece appears. But for someone who has depended so much on the manipulation of image, and the projection of an air of easy superiority and supreme confidence, recovery will not be easy. A series of leaked documents has made it clear that there is considerable demoralization, if not near panic, in the upper reaches of the government. As Philip Gould, one of Blair's closest advisers, lamented in one of these documents, "We are outflanked on

Owen Harries is editor of *The National Interest*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

patriotism and crime; we are suffering from disconnection . . . undermined by a combination of spin, lack of conviction and apparent lack of integrity." Incredibly, his advice on how to recover from all this was simply more and better spin: "We need to reinvent the New Labour brand"! Live by the image, die by the image. Indeed, by now overindulgence in the art has made spinning itself a major issue in British politics, and there is growing contempt for its practitioners. Once respected and feared as powers behind the throne, they were recently dismissed contemptuously by one ex-friend of the Prime Minister as "rent boys." It is a demystifying phrase.

DURING the same month there was compelling evidence that there has been a more fundamental and dramatic reversal in British public life. Until quite recently, it used to be the case that Britain was a decent, civilized country with very good public services but an absolutely lousy economy. Now it has changed to a country with a brilliant economy that is seriously and progressively sick in other respects.

In our first weeks here, two reports appeared. The first, concerning crime rates in the Western world, established that in every category of crime except murder—in terms of assault and mugging, of burglary, of car theft—Britain now has a worse record than any other developed country, and as far as crimes of violence are concerned things are still deteriorating. This in a country that used to be a byword for lawfulness, civility, respect for property, and police efficiency and incorruptibility. (It is reported that CBS's Dan Rather seized on this news with alacrity and made much of it. Understandably, he was delighted to find a country in worse straits than the United States in terms of crime, particularly one that takes much pleasure in tut-tutting about American violence.)

The second report, issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), places Britain close to the bottom of the table of developed countries—down with Poland, Portugal and Ireland—in terms of both literacy and numeracy. Fifty percent of the population of the United Kingdom is deemed incapable of coping with the normal demands of everyday life and work. Thus, at the dawn of the "information age", when knowledge is becoming the key asset in global affairs, Britain is busily creating a genuine lumpenproletariat of depressing dimensions.

This has been the unintended, though quite foreseeable, consequence of a deliberate policy of treating equality and anti-elitism as the most important ends of education, and subordinating intellectual performance to them. In short order, this policy has destroyed a perfectly good grammar school system and debased the idea of a university. And even as the OECD report appeared, Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer and second-most powerful man in the Blair government, was providing proof that the mindset that produced this policy is unchanged, as he launched an unprovoked and ignorant attack on the University of Oxford for its alleged elitism. They have learned nothing and they have forgotten nothing.

Then there is the National Health Service, once the jewel in the crown of Britain's welfare state. Complaints about it are now universal, and doctors and nurses are themselves using words like "collapse" and "crisis" to describe it. In Wales, the waiting time for surgery for a patient with a serious but not immediately life-threatening cardiac condition is over one year. In Scotland the surgeon at a University teaching hospital says that, "We are moving toward a second class

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

system where only the desperately ill get into hospital", and confesses that he and his colleagues have resorted to "the widespread practice" of encouraging their patients to lie about their pain levels in order to jump the queue. A journalist writes in the *Daily Telegraph* of his experience: diagnosed with colon cancer in January, frustrated by incompetence, indifference and prevarication for months on end, finally operated on in June, by which time the cancer had already spread. (Reading this last account, I reflect that when, in Washington last January, it was discovered that I had the same ailment, the time that elapsed between diagnosis and surgery was three days.)

One could go on: the BBC is only a shadow of its former self as it enthusiastically embraces what has been accurately labeled an "ideological philistinism"; the country that invented the railway now has a public transport system that is a bad joke. . . . Predictably, the only response of politicians to all these social ailments is to boast that they intend to throw much more money at them. As I write, the government has proudly announced the biggest increase in public spending in thirty years.

TURNING NOW to Wales, two disparate items that illuminate the relationship between the Welsh and the English have caught the eye.

During the height of the frenzied excitement about England's prospects in the Euro 2000 soccer competition, the *Times* of London reported that a Welsh pub was promising its customers free beer every time a goal was scored *against* England—and that it had been roundly condemned by a body named the Commission for Racial Equality in Wales for doing so.

At the same time, the National Library of Wales has been displaying an item it has on loan from the Archives nationales in Paris. It is a letter that was written, on goatskin parchment in 1406, by the Welsh Prince, Owain Glyndwr, to King Charles VI of France, asking him for military assistance against the English. It begins:

> Most serene prince, you have deemed it worthy on the humble recommendation sent, to learn how my nation, for many years now elapsed, has been oppressed by the fury of the barbarous Saxon. . . .

Charles did provide some help and Glyndwr put up a good fight, but of course he failed. For the next six hundred years Wales was to be governed from London, not viciously by modern standards (though, picturesque as they may be, those castles that dot the Welsh landscape were not put there as decoration), but certainly patronizingly and sometimes contemptuously. The Welsh gentry class, potential leaders in any revolt, were systematically anglicized, and sustained and determined efforts were made to stamp out the Welsh language by forbidding its use in schools and public life. During that time there was no Commission for Racial Equality available for lodging complaints, but despite this the Welsh language and sense of identity somehow survived, and today both are thriving.

Indeed, survival—in the closest proximity and subordination, bear in mind, to what was until quite recently the greatest imperial power on earth—has been the great Welsh achievement. It was done, not in the Irish manner by confrontation and violence, but by cultivating the classical political skills of survival: adaptability, compromise, persuasiveness, charm, evasiveness, deviousness and ridicule. The English have many excellent qualities, but a sensitive appreciation of the point of view of others (and of how they themselves are perceived by others) is not among them. They have usually failed to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

understand the functional importance of these survival skills for the Welsh.

As a striking example of such a failure, consider the response of one of the most brilliant of twentieth-century Englishmen—John Maynard Keynes—to the most brilliant twentieth-century Welshman—David Lloyd George. When Lloyd George was prime minister and conducting negotiations with Woodrow Wilson and Georges Clemenceau at Versailles in 1918–19, Keynes worked under him as a senior Treasury official. Immediately afterwards he wrote his impressions of Lloyd George:

> It is not appropriate to apply to him the ordinary standards. How can I convey to the reader, who does not know him, any just impression of this extraordinary figure of our time, this syren, this goat-footed bard, this half-human visitor to our age from the hag-ridden magic and enchanted woods of Celtic antiquity? One catches in his company that flavor of final purposelessness, inner irresponsibility, existence outside or away from our Saxon good and evil, mixed with cunning, remorselessness, love of power, that lend fascination, enthralment, and terror to the fair-seeming magicians of North European folk-lore. . . . Lloyd George is rooted in nothing; he is void and without content; he lives and feeds on his immediate surroundings . . . a vampire and medium in one.[1]

Keynes goes on and on in an overwrought, almost hysterical, prose, a peculiar feature of which is an insistence on Lloyd George's alleged feminine nature. At various times he refers to him as "the Welsh witch", "a *femme fatale*", "a syren" and even "the lady from Wales." Make what you will of this, bearing in mind that when he was writing Keynes was promiscuously homosexual, while Lloyd George was notoriously heterosexual.

What was it exactly that had reduced this normally most rational of Englishmen—the one man Bertrand Russell considered might be smarter than himself—to such an overwrought condition? Incredibly, Keynes' main charge against Lloyd George is that he was guilty of *compromise!* He concedes that at Versailles the Prime Minister's devotion to duty was exemplary, his labor immense, his advocacy of the League of Nations sincere, his pacifism and radical idealism genuine (thus contradicting his charge, made almost simultaneously, that his subject lacked both beliefs and principles). But he condemns Lloyd George for having allowed himself to be "pushed along the path of compromise", and, what is worse, *for having found it congenial.* Keynes concedes that President Wilson too had been forced to compromise, but "while the President failed because he was very bad at the game of compromise, the Prime Minister trod the way of ill-doing because he was far too good at it."

The notion that a readiness to compromise in diplomacy is a sin is a bizarre one, especially when the diplomacy involved is the hammering out of a peace treaty by three friendly, allied and democratic countries. Reading Keynes' extravagant invective, one cannot help feeling that his real problem was that, despite his cleverness, he simply could not understand his subject, and that he resented the fact furiously. What Keynes found deplorable was, essentially, simply a refusal to play by conventional English rules—those "ordinary standards" referred to in the quoted passage. Brought up in very modest circumstances in the heart of rural Wales by his cobbler uncle, Lloyd George had not become the most powerful man in the greatest empire in the world by behaving like an English

[1]Keynes, *Essays in Biography* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1933), pp. 35-6. Keynes explains that he decided not to publish the Lloyd George essay immediately after writing it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gentleman. For him, as an outsider, politics was a deadly business of survival of the fittest, with nothing to fall back on if he failed. He could not afford too many scruples, nor an excess of principles. It was said of Sir Austen Chamberlain, brother of Neville, that "he always played the game, and always lost it." Lloyd George rarely played the game by accepted English rules, and for nearly twenty years he consistently won it.

There was another remarkable Englishman—himself an aristocrat but something of an outsider and, until quite late in his career, considered by many conventional gentlemen to be a disreputable adventurer—who had a very different view of Lloyd George, based on a much longer and closer association. We have the evidence of Lady Violet Bonham Carter, Asquith's daughter and Winston Churchill's close friend, that Churchill thought Lloyd George "the greatest political genius he has ever met." She goes on to say that

> His was the only personal leadership I ever knew Winston to accept unquestioningly in his whole political career. He was fascinated by a mind more swift and agile than his own, by its fertility and resource, by its uncanny intuition and gymnastic nimbleness, and by a political sophistication which he lacked.[2]

Robert Boothby, at one time Churchill's private secretary, confirms this description of a relationship in which Lloyd George was always the dominant partner, even when he had been in the wilderness for several years while Churchill still held high office.

In the course of describing the relationship between the two men, Bonham Carter herself demonstrates much more insight than Keynes when she observes of Lloyd George, "He was not an Anglo-Saxon, by birth, instinct or tradition. He was as unlike an Englishman as Disraeli." The great Jew and the great Welshman were the only two outsiders to dominate Britain's political life, and to climb to the very top of what Disraeli described derisively as "the greasy pole." And they did it their way.

THE LATEST, but surely not the last, monument to the inability of the English to understand the Welsh is the National Assembly for Wales, devised by the Blair government and now housed in the old Tiger Bay. In being for just over a year, it was meant to keep the Welsh happy by giving them a sharply limited and harmless bit of autonomy. But things are not working out quite like that.

From the English point of view, several critical errors have been made. First, and most invidiously, the Welsh Assembly was given significantly less power than the Scottish Assembly that was created simultaneously. The latter has control over a budget and genuine legislative power, the former does not. The Cardiff body has only "subordinate" legislative power, that is, the right to determine detailed regulations necessary to implement laws passed in Westminster. Its legitimacy was thus undermined from the beginning. Today, while few in Wales argue for complete independence, the demand for equality with Scotland is virtually unanimous.

Second, the adoption of a system of proportional representation to elect the sixty members means that no single party has an overall majority and that it is going to be very difficult for any party to get one. It also means that the profile of Plaid Cymru, the nationalist party and the one least reconciled to the limitations now imposed on the body's power, is greatly enhanced. While it was insignificant on

[2]Bonham Carter, *Winston Churchill: An Intimate Portrait* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1965), pp. 129-31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the larger United Kingdom stage, it is now the second-largest party in the Assembly.

Third, the set-up tends to emphasize the dependence of the Welsh Labour members on London and their loyalty to an English-dominated party. The fact that Labour, with fewer than half the seats, currently occupies all the pseudo-ministerial positions in the Assembly's pseudo-cabinet while being clearly subordinate to the party leadership in Westminster undermines both its own credentials and those of the Assembly itself. Things were made much worse by Tony Blair's initial insistence on imposing his own choice of leader on the Welsh Labour assembly group, overriding the strong local preference for another candidate. The fact that he initially got his way but that his candidate was later deposed meant that the party suffered the worst of both worlds.

At present the Assembly is housed in a building that is administratively adequate but symbolically feeble. Members meet in a small, low ceilinged, irregularly shaped room. This, together with the fact that Scotland is already committed to spending a large sum on building a parliament of its own, makes an irresistible case for the creation of a new impressive home for the National Assembly for Wales. Initial cost estimates are in the region of $50 million. The nationalist party is leading the demand, and in terms of its long-term goal this makes good sense: if you cannot get real power to start with, concentrate on getting the symbolism right. The more impressive the symbol, the harder it will be to deny the body a real measure of control over time. Meanwhile, members busily work the gray areas covered by the concept of "subordinate legislation", and use "Europe" and its offers of funds to try to extract more money from Westminster.

In its feckless way, the Blair government has started a process that in all probability cannot be stopped and that will end by dismembering the hitherto United Kingdom. The parliament and other appurtenances of independent nationhood that Owain Glyndwr envisioned six centuries ago stand a good chance of eventuating in the next decade or two, as the unintended consequence of a policy lightheartedly entered upon. Soon, an independent Welsh leader may once again be writing letters to the ruler of France—and of the United States. □

The Dry and Gritty Residue

Moral ideals are a sediment; they have significance only so long as they are suspended in a religious or social tradition, so long as they belong to a religious or a social life. The predicament of our time is that the Rationalists have been at work so long on their project of drawing off the liquid in which our moral ideals were suspended (and pouring it away as worthless) that we are left only with the dry and gritty residue which chokes us as we try to take it down. First, we do our best to destroy parental authority (because of its alleged abuse), then we sentimentally deplore the scarcity of 'good homes', and we end by creating substitutes which complete the work of destruction. And it is for this reason that, among much else that is corrupt and unhealthy, we have the spectacle of a set of sanctimonious, rationalist politicians, preaching an ideology of unselfishness and social service to a population in which they and their predecessors have done their best to destroy the only living root of moral behaviour.

—Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics* (1962)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLICY *Review*

Politics

&

National Policy

Foreign Affairs

Essays &
Reviews

Policy Review's new look and style are already proving irresistible. Our articles have been called "fascinating" in the Washington Times, and "provocative" in the Los Angeles Times. We have been food for thought in the Washington Post, the Economist, Forbes, and National Journal. Syndicated columnists George F. Will, E.J. Dionne, James Mann, Cal Thomas, and Jeff Jacoby have all taken note.

Don't miss the fresh insight, sharp analysis, and in-depth focus of the new Policy Review.

Subscribe today and save up to 40% off the cover price!
Call 1-800-566-9449

One year: $26.95 (25% off)
Two years: $49.95 (30% off)
Three years: $64.95 (40% off)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"EFFECTIVE engagement cannot be pursue through one-sided courtship but only by shaping decisive geopolitical context, in which a choice for th West becomes Russia's only viable choice."

—Zbigniew Brzezinsk

"TIMING IS vital in diplomacy. The deal o Germany's unification was sealed just as th window of opportunity was closing."

—Robert B. Zoellic

"OVER the last thirty years, fundamental concept of military professionalism in the United State have eroded, at times to an alarming degree."

—Eliot A. Cohe

"THE chief obstacle separating us from utopia is no technology, but the intractable nature of politic and of humanity itself."

—Andrew J. Bacevic

"IN THREE out of four cases the Greeks persisted i endless complaint, to the effect that the Turks were very bad people who, if provoked, tended to win battles."

—Norman Ston

"THE great Jew, Disraeli, and the great Welshman Lloyd George, were the only two outsiders t climb to the very top of what Disraeli described derisivel as 'the greasy pole.' And they did it their way."

—Owen Harrie

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED